609 karma · joined October 14, 2012
For Wi-Fi to survive, it must bring improvements in security protocols /and/ user experience (speed, coverage, and ease of setup). While I agree that security configuration should ideally not be tied to the physical characteristics of the link, security tends to lag, and the driver is user experience. So, if we want to have a high baseline of security, we have to tie it to the driver, the craving for a better user experience (higher speed and better spectrum utilization).
Good standards make trade-offs in the right places (both in time and space). Dumb standards miss the goal. I cannot say that this is a dumb standard when it is evident that trade-offs have to be made. Using WPA2 would have impacted cost of equipment, performance and security negatively.
[1]: https://youtu.be/TpGQY9qSigY?si=QBiQHQczlDYHchlK [2]: https://simovits.com/flipper-zero-zero-trust/
What you are talking about is a “remote signature service”. Such a service will often onboard a user remotely using a physical ID, video and liveliness checks and give them the credentials to produce advanced or qualified electronic signatures with the service in question. These credentials have to meet LoA Substantial or High for a QTSP to be able to issue a QC to a user. Most remote signature services use very short lived certificates (10-15 minutes) that are created for every signature the user produces. (As opposed to the long lived certificates of several years for a physical card).
Germany have to follow the eIDAS-regulation as a member state of the EU/EAA. But what level of signature is needed for what transactions is not regulated in the eIDAS.