4,345 karma · joined May 30, 2020
Some people think identity and the continuity of consciousness are based on information or computation, and not on specific physical matter or soul-like constructs, so for them a transfer of all relevant information would constitute a transfer of consciousness and identity. From this perspective (leaving aside questions of practicality) "you yourself looking from the biological body at somebody else in the computer" is exactly as valid as "you yourself looking from inside the computer at somebody else in the biological body" (and in fact the whole idea that you have to choose one or the other as "the real you" becomes moot on this view).
Of course it's a difficult metaphysical conundrum but to say that your view of things is "a simple fact" when the basic scientific materialist worldview of today points at least as much in the opposite direction is a bit overconfident.
If you broaden the comparison (only a little bit) it looks suspiciously like employees being forced to train their own replacement (be that other employees, or factory automation), a regular occurrence.
Ok yeah I guess you could be right..
I acknowledge this is partly just my personal bias, in some cases really not fair, and unenforceable anyway, but someone relying on llms just makes me feel like they have... bad taste in information curation, or something, and I'd rather just not interact with them at all.
Anyway to reiterate my point upthread, there could be people who think a chicken-level entity suffering is permissible, and a human-level entity suffering is not, and it is a perfectly consistent moral position for them to say we should not do research into creating new kinds of human-level entities with the potential for suffering. The permissible suffering being in the present and the impermissible suffering being in the future does not really change that.
PS in this thread we were not only talking about computer programs, but artificial brains made from biological human neurons too.
This is a fair point in general, but the whole point in this context is not that human design is more efficient at duplicating an entire organism, but that it can be more efficient at narrowly defined tasks. Evolution has never had the goal 'evolve human consciousness as quickly and efficiently as possible', it just had the goal (and even calling it that is stretching things of course, but let's say an emergent goal) of reproducing organisms.
How do you know?
>This an impressive simulation. But it's just not honest to call this 'brain emulation', a 'brain upload' or to say that this is doing anything like 'sensorimotor loop in simulation'. Aside from the fact that a connectome is not a brain, and so we have no idea whether the parts that have been filled in by ML actually function like a brain, the motor control in this framework is not even driven by the brain simulation. The output from the 'brain' is not a sequence of motor commands. It is a steering mechanism, a 2-dimensional descending signal (essentially, turn left or right, speed up or slow down). That is then fed into a series of CPG oscillators, outside of the brain emulation, that model fly movement in response to that 2-dimensional descending signal. Since outputting a 2-dimensional descending signal is not what a fly brain does, the simulated brain is not operating as a fly's brain does. It's machine learning, clamped into the shape of a fly connectome, that has a resting state of 0Hz, being zapped with simple inputs, not virtual sensory data.
Nevertheless a worrying direction.
Mark Fisher/K-punk on hauntology.