2,273 karma · joined May 20, 2013
Solutions Architect at Arpio.io
The takeaway being, even with a small fault in the connector, there's more than enough margin to ensure safe delivery and therefor, no molten pins or terminals.
The current connector seems to lack this, and if one of the terminals does not make a solid connection, then the drop in effectiveness is enough to push it out of spec and cause a failure.
I do greatly enjoy Buildzoid, and I was eagerly awaiting his video (and one from Gamers Nexus; note they haven't commented yet) from someone who actually looked at this from an EE perspective. I recognize his video was titled "rambling", but he largely repeated himself for 30 minutes, and scattered the relevant datapoints in the video in a few short snippets. A little planning on his delivery would gave gone a long way.
I remember these units too. Back in 2002-2005, I worked for a small system integrator. We built turn-key appliances for software vendors. Firewalls, security appliances, etc. We'd work with chassis manufacturers to add cutouts for these units on the front of 1U and 2U servers to provide for an interface without needing to hook up a console cart. Same as you might see on a Dell or HP.
Really neat seeing these still in use!
It's easy to say "they can figure it out". Sure, in a restful state. But the people we're asking to take action already have a lot on their plate. Using plain, conversational language whenever possible with exceedingly clear steps means less mental exertion on the receiver. And since we need their help, anything we can do to make it easier on their end helps us.
I feel there's a trend when it comes to disseminating messaging like this that we adopt an attitude of our audience "is smart, and should figure the rest out". They may be. But they already have lots to do any plenty to figure out. Any opportunity we, the requestor, can lighten their mental load, is going to increase the odds that they'll be inclined to take action right away.
AMD has for a long time favored an inclusive, compatible approach. First (that I can recall) with x86-64, more recently with AdaptiveSync over G-Sync, and now with their Ray Tracing approach. Each time they chose a move efficient path that was open to the industry as a whole.
This seems to have had some pros and cons. On the one hand, they've been able to keep up with the market with a solution that is the best value for them. They've never been a large company against the likes of Intel and NVidia, so I suspect there's less appetite for risk.
On the other hand, by always going that route, they cede the leadership role to others, or if they do have leadership, it's not in a way they can really leverage. It becomes commoditized. Note how when the industry was moving to 64bit, AMD ended up setting the direction over IA-64 with their more inclusive approach. But it didn't turn into any significant leverage for them. They set a standard, but it was one that everyone else then adopted, including Intel.
So I feel like while AMD's approach keeps them alive and always in the running, it's an approach that will never put them on top. Whether or not this is a bad thing really depends on what the goals of the company are, and if the the goal is to remain steadily in the race, then they're doing great.
But arguably, NVidia pulls the industry in directions by way of its choices. They're risky and sometimes irritable. It's also put them in front.
So in my opinion, AMD hasn't ceded the market, but they have ceded leadership in many instances by their safe approach. It's still profitable and safe for them. But they'll always remain second place as a result.
A large-caliber, direct-fire gun provides long range, precise, and instant effects. As The Chieftan explains: https://youtu.be/lI7T650RTT8?t=934 (timecode link provided.)
ATGMs, RPGs, guided mortar rounds and switchblade drones are not offensive weapons that can take and hold ground. But infantry, supported by a tank which they can knock on the hatch of and tell to obliterate the machine gun nest pinning them down with instant 120mm fire, can.
When armies find something that can replace the mobile, protected, and relatively instant firepower a tank can provide to the infantry, the tank will be dead. But nothing yet has quite come along to combine those things, and so regardless of the tank's vulnerabilities, it will remain.
But it never was meant to operate on it's own. And when it did, it was either lost in large numbers (Russian tank charges in WWII) or was in all actuality a fluke (Your Blitzkrieg example. See The Chieftan's video on the Battle of France in WWII on why this was such a reckless thing to do, followed by reading on the Battle of The Bulge on why it didn't work a second time.)
Tanks unsupported by infantry are a liability. However, infantry, unsupported by tanks, can be a liability as well when attacking an opponent who's well fortified and/or has heavy weapons. When tanks, infantry, and artillery work together (combined arms theory), then the danger posed by ATGMs and the like is greatly reduced. Armies have been reminded of this numerous times last century, and each time a renewed emphasis on combined arms fixes the balance.
Lastly, and I feel this point is missing in a lot of arguments: ATGMs like Javelin, mines, guided mortars, etc and all but the heaviest drones are defensive and supporting weapons. For ATGMs and RPGs, these weapons exist to prevent infantry from being overrun. (And as the Russians are being reminded, they can be quite good at this.) They are not offensive weapons. That is the reason the tank remains. It's offensive.
I'll add a complimentary link for others' benefit from Military History Visualized: "Tanks are obsolete, apparently since 1919" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPth_xqBXGY
In short, people forget about Combined Arms warfare. One cannot look at the tank, or other arms of a military without understanding how it supports and is supported by the others. When that is overlooked, misunderstandings and exaggerated conclusions are the result.
Compare this to a contemporary like the Sovremenny, which carries only medium range SAMs and point-defense.
I agree that the primary mission of USN cruisers and USSR ones are different, but the Slava-class is designed for area air defense, bot for itself and for the rest of it's surface group.
A carrier is fast. 30+ knot speed, likely more (top speed is classified.) Going with 30 knots gives you 720 nautical mile radius of action, or 2,156,746 square miles.
This is to say nothing of the satellite's capabilities, or the back-end systems needed to find objects in the photographs.
There's better ways to go about it though, and the open source satellites taking photos are probably the worst for this job, to be brutally honest. But some examples:
The Soviets use to fly radar satellites to search for US carrier groups. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US-A
The Chinese are suspected to have their own satellites for this purpose, though they are passive in nature, searching for electromagnetic emissions from the ships: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaogan (Look up EMCON on how this is countered.)
But in short, it yes a carrier can still hide, though it's tricky. And this is without active measures being taken. And the Carrier Group Commander will have intelligence notifying them of when the overhead passes are. With that, they can start piecing together what the kill chain looks like, from getting that data down to the ground, the time it takes their analysts to find the carrier in it, get that data to command, and then down to the assets to take action against it, plan a sortie, and get the weapon out to where it is...during all that time of which the carrier is free to maneuver and take other counter measures. It becomes a game of cat and mouse.
It's rather dated now, but the classic book "Red Storm Rising" illustrates some of this and how it plays out.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/satellite-image...
Doing some really rough napkin math gives you 3-6 minutes of warning, assuming the missiles were detected the moment they cleared the island. The island wouldn't have generated "noise" (doesn't work like that) but as a shadow, sure. I don't know that I would say that was the winning factor however.
But now that I think about it, given how tiny (some consider it a rock, not an island) Snake Island is, you'd have to be darn precise to get your launchers on a spot on the coast to perfectly place the island between them and the ship, and I can't see those constraints being practical to make an attack in a timely fashion. So I suspect it's a stretch at best.
(On the other hand and slightly unrelated, in the flight sim DCS World, we'd take AJS-37 Viggens with RB-15 AShMs and dogleg missiles around features against ships on the Persian Gulf map. This sorta angling becomes a lot easier if your launch platform is far more mobile like an aircraft. Depending on where your target is, you can set up some good ambushes with very little warning if you get your timing right. It's part of the reason the littoral areas can be so darn scary to fight in.)
>*In this context it should be noted that no reports thus far have explicitely mentioned the number of AShMs supposedly launched (as opposed to the number that impacted), so that a scenario in which the Moskva's defences were overwhelmed by a well-planned volley of missiles is not out of the question.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptunes-wrath-flagshi...
Answering this would require some sleuthing as to how many they're estimated to possess. I understand there's been some attacks since (rumored), so they didn't expend all of them, apparently:
https://eurasiantimes.com/russian-warship-hit-by-ukranian-an...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM
Then there's hypersonics, which, when flying at low-level, reduce the possible reaction time by the target by several orders from the moment it is detected at the radar horizon (best case!) to impact. Subsonic missiles, provided they're detected, take longer and allow for more reaction time.
The Neptune is basically a domestically built version of the Soviet Kh-35, with minor improvements. It's a contemporary of the U.S. Harpoon, and that one is rather long in the tooth. It's not to say that they're bad, nor is it any dig against the Ukrainians. Any capability is better than no capability! But it wasn't a frighteningly new technology either, and one that, on paper, the Moskava should have been capable of handling. It didn't, and it raises questions.
>There’s also some other speculation suggesting that “Moskva has/had a single main air defence radar (3P41 Volna) for guiding S300 missiles, which has only a 180 degree field of view. Therefore, 360-degree coverage is provided by the 3-D long-range air search radars MR -800 Voshkod/Top Pair for short-range missiles SA -8.” The claim reveals that the Top Pair radar couldn’t distinguish the Neptunes flying over the sea from the crests of the waves due to the stormy weather.
These claims lack a solid basis, as the ship in question is a cruiser with good air defense capabilities. Although TB2 drones are very useful in naval warfare, cruiser-type ships are designed to track and repel multiple air contacts. As a result, paralyzing a Slava-class cruiser with one or more drones is unrealistic.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/analysis-chain-...
>Though it makes for a compelling tale, this narrative is almost certain to be false. Not only are the radars and their operators onboard a warship like the Moskva more than capable of detecting and tracking more than just a single target, and would in fact do so virtually automatically so long as they were operating, but if they were in fact tracking a drone then situational awareness should have been at at a higher level than if the attack had occurred out of the blue.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptunes-wrath-flagshi...
On paper, a Slava-Class cruiser should have no issues tracking a drone and plenty of other incoming missiles and aircraft. That was in fact, the scenario it was designed to face. I suspect there's just simply too much we don't know and too many unanswered questions. There's a lot that would have to work correctly for the Neptunes to be targeted, from the search radar, handoff to tracking radar, and then successful intercepts by the medium tier SAMs and if not those, the CWIS. There's plenty that can go wrong. And keep in mind, there have been very few successful AShM intercepts in history.
If the full story ever gets told, it will be read by many, I'm sure.
And regarding the satellites themselves, also agreed. I really believe that success at sea is going to depend a large part on success in space, and many countries know it.
I think they're slowly coming around to the idea that they need these, though it's arriving in the form of supporting roles and to solve a pilot shortage.
With regards to ground, many of those cancellations came about as a result of the end of the Cold War. Comanche and Crusader were both 80's era programs The threat of a general European land war receded tremendously. Had those gone forward, I'm sure they'd be useful, but aged now even. I do wonder how useful Crusader would have been, given the shift to highly mobile wheeled SPGs as opposed to armored ones. (See CAESAR and Archer systems).
FCS was later, and tripped over itself I think trying to make a series of vehicles that could do everything at a time when we weren't sure what we wanted a vehicle to do other than survive IEDs. They wanted air mobility (low weight!) but networking, tons of firepower, and be resistant to ATGMs and the odd buried 155mm shell exploding underneath it. It sounds like the Bradley all over again, but it's a tricky problem to solve. A combination of electronic jamming for IEDs and active protection for ATGMs might finally solve the problem. Might.
I think you're right about SHORAD, and given the aerial performance in the Gulf and elsewhere, they've had little reason to think otherwise. The USAF and Navy have been so effective up until late that the Air-to-Air squadrons have had so little to do that the USAF invented sorties for their F-22 squadrons just to give them a shot at advancement compared to their A2G brethren. And while the Russians have been cranking out one fancy Flanker variant after another, they haven't had the funds to build them in any quality. The PAK-FA has been little more than a demonstrator. And up until relatively recently, the Chinese have been struggling to replicate Western and Russian turbofan technology. Lack of decent engines has held them back for years. It seems they're finally turning the corner on that.
So yeah, they haven't had much reason to pay attention to it. Drones are starting to make them pay attention though. https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
Better late than never I suppose.
I hear the "they'll rely on air superiority" bit a lot, but haven't read anything official that suggests that it's actual policy. It might just be one of those things that went unsaid as priorities shifted elsewhere. I think the Ballistic Missile Defense debate sucked a lot of oxygen out of the need for ground-based aircraft defense.
There's growing calls for more robust aircraft defense, both against fighter airplanes and drones, and it's getting some attention as you can read here: https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-ten-shorad-battalion...
I note though that these are short-range systems, and I haven't seen much new for longer range systems such as what some NATO countries are doing with NASAMS, and so it seems like things have been quiet in the U.S. for medium and upper tier (BMD being the exception.)
I've long wondered if there's hesitance to overlap medium and upper tier defenses with counter-air operations because of the risk of blue-on-blue engagement (See the Persian Gulf War and Patriot), and that it might be there reason why there's so little development in this space. Deconflicting those two things sounds rather difficult to me, and given our lack of success to date, the U.S. might simply have strategized that - with a few exceptions - it's best to leave medium and high altitudes to aircraft and just not worry about shooting down your own pilots.
But that's just a guess. It's an interesting question and one I'll be curious to see play out.
That's the part that I find missing from these discussions. Missiles like the D21 sound really deadly, but the information and communications needed to successfully target a carrier hundreds or thousands of miles away and deliver the weapon successfully is the much more difficult part of the equation. As the U.S. Navy (paraphrasing) said themselves, "The D21 has a long kill chain, and plenty of places to disrupt that kill-chain."
Likewise, the carrier goes around with much more than it's planes and escorts. It has the information being fed to it from ISR elsewhere, from satellites overhead to pre-mission information, communications eavesdropping, etc to know what they're up against and when and where they might encounter it. That, in my opinion is far more important than the specifics and specs of such and such weapon.
The success or defeat of a carrier battle group I think is going to depend far more on who knows what and when, and therefor, what's going on in the electromagnetic spectrum, than any singular missile.
So you need a system or system of systems to find your target, relay that information down to your launchers (securely, quietly, and timely!) so you can launch your relatively cheap weapon. That's where all of the investment in communications, radars, overhead platforms (drones, aircraft, satellites) comes into play. The GlobalHawk that had been flying over the Black Sea for weeks at 40,000 feet isn't cheap, but without one, one's firing missiles blind.
The further out you get, the more eyes and links you need to find and track your target, and that's where it gets expensive. It also becomes less of a sure bet.
My overall take away from the Atlantic piece is that they've fallen into the same trap as much of the rest of the internet. Large platforms have not been rendered obsolete because of the advent of these weapons, just as they weren't during the 70s with the first large battles involving Anti-tank and Anti-Ship missiles. (The former has a number of well-cited examples, but for the latter, I call attention to the Battle of Latakia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Latakia )
It's worth nothing as well that the Neptune AShM isn't really a revolutionary weapon, and is marginally improved over classes of AShMs developed in the 80s. It's notary comes from the fact that Ukraine essentially was able redevelop the capability of the old Kh-35, with modest improvements. It's not a next-gen missile such as a LRASM.
Similarly, the Javelin, while effective and having gone through incremental upgrades, is not a wildly new weapon. It's been around for decades, and as we're finding along with the Stinger, the U.S. needs to reactivate the manufacturing to build them from scratch which has been dormant for decades.
I draw attention to the fact that these are older weapons. Drones are giving troops in the field better ability to target than ever before, but the fundamentals haven't changed and the same difficulties apply. WaPo had an exclusive stating that it was U.S. Intelligence that gave the Ukrainians the necessary info to find and target the Moskava with their missiles. The weapons themselves are just one part in long chain of capabilities.
So that's where I think this piece misses much, because it's ignorant of some of the other elements of how all this comes together. The U.S. has been aware of China's long range precision fires for quite some time, and while they're worrysome, they're not terrified. To paraphrase a quote I heard, "a long kill chain provides plenty of opportunities to disrupt it along the way."
And that's where the Russians have failed. Not because they're being surprised for the first time by these weapons (they invented many of the earliest examples themselves!) but because they're not fighting effectively. As some commentators have noted, the supporting elements that would defend against these weapons are not in place, the systems designed to counter them are not active/maintained (which was probably the case of the Moskava), and the intelligence/reconnaissance that would have identified and monitored these threats are not in place. All of this contributes to failure.
The Russians are not getting wrecked by guided missiles because they're so high tech, they're getting wrecked because they're inept.
It was an epic night for hockey.
The rest seem to be lacking context. The Censorship accusation takes me to a link that has an update from 6 years ago indicating that their crime is something inherited from an upstream search provider and not intentional. The other accusations are in some cases just that, "accused", or lacking context and necessary details to establish motive. Saying "read: bribe" to a contribution makes me feel the author has an axe to grind when it's follow by assumptions to people's motives and interests.
Overall, this reads like a stretch. It looks damning at a glance, but falls apart once you start looking at the details. Happy to read criticism of DDG if it exists, but I feel like this was an invented laundry list. Show me one really good reason why I shouldn't use DDG, instead of 100 questionable ones.
But I didn't know what searx was before now, so that's cool at least.
(Disclosure: I work for AWS, which is mentioned in the article. Views are my own, etc.)
He posted a good video on his views (and cautions!) on some of this subject matter to date: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9pVEP0AzZ4