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contrarian_

357 karma · joined December 28, 2017

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contrarian_··on CPU hardware vulnerable to side-channel attacks
Did Itanium really fail because of the technology or because of x86's momentum and lock-in effects?

AFAIK Itanium has explicit software control of speculative loads.

contrarian_··on CPU hardware vulnerable to side-channel attacks
There are (at least) two separate things going on. Meltdown, the flaw exclusive to Intel and some ARM CPUs, is very easy to exploit and is the one being patched by OS vendors.

Spectre is a whole other can of worms, on the one hand it's more tricky to exploit, on the other hand there might not be an easy fix and people are speculating (no pun intended) that it will have to be dealt with in hardware.

contrarian_··on CPU hardware vulnerable to side-channel attacks
Any branch on attacker-controlled data can be speculatively bypassed. You would have to at the very least recompile all applications to attempt to mitigate the two Spectre variants discussed so far.

Unless there is some way to turn off speculation entirely, but that would hurt performance badly.

contrarian_··on Meltdown and Spectre
Not a bug according to Intel.
contrarian_··on Speculative Execution Exploit Performance Impacts
Isn't that only for Meltdown?
contrarian_··on LLVM patch to fix half of Spectre attack
FWIW, all branches will need to be followed by a memory load fence which seems to trip up speculative execution on Intel CPUs.
contrarian_··on LLVM patch to fix half of Spectre attack
Note for a true fix to the BTB poisoning attack you would additionally have to disable SMT/HT.

See here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16070304

contrarian_··on Covert and side channels due to processor architecture (2006)
From the abstract:

> Information leakage through covert channels and side channels is becoming a serious problem, especially when these are enhanced by modern processor architecture features. We show how processor architecture features such as simultaneous multithreading, control speculation and shared caches can inadvertently accelerate such covert channels or enable new covert channels and side channels.

contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
> The mistake is clear from the design

There is no fundamental reason why speculative instructions should be allowed to mutate the cache.

OTOH the contention-based side channel attack on speculation has been public knowledge for over a decade. [1]

[1] Z. Wang and R. B. Lee, "Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture," 2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06), Miami Beach, FL, 2006, pp. 473-482. doi: 10.1109/ACSAC.2006.20

contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
Process isolation does not prevent Spectre. In theory, you can carry out Spectre over the network.
contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
If it cleans cache, you can detect the evicted address tag.
contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
Run it for long enough and you can average out the random drift.

The issue cannot be fixed without disabling speculation entirely on current hardware.

contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
There's also the diffraction limit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffraction-limited_system
contrarian_··on A CPU bug with undocumented opcodes, possibly Intel (scroll to p. 155)
The bar is just the right width for "(redacted)", I wouldn't read into it.
contrarian_··on A CPU bug with undocumented opcodes, possibly Intel (scroll to p. 155)
One page later: (redacted) hardware bugs.

Sounds like something that would be hopefully fixable in microcode.

contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
That only fixes one variant of Spectre, and only for code running in kernel mode.

The "out of bounds" Spectre variant is still feasible.

Also: What about hyperthreads? It seems to be many people's assumption that the BTB is shared within a physical core.

contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
No, that would not be enough. CPUs speculatively execute across multiple branches. Even if you had a separate speculative cache for every code path, you could still build a side-channel from the amount of contention. [1]

[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf

> Both hardware thread systems (SMT and TMT) expose contention within the execution core. In SMT, the threads effectively compete in real time for access to functional units, the L1 cache, and speculation resources (such as the BTB). This is similar to the real-time sharing that occurs between separate cores, but includes all levels of the architecture. [...] SMT has been exploited in known attacks (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1)

contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
> New CPU microcode is enough

What would that entail? Disabling speculation completely? Disabling memory accesses during speculation?

contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
No, because there's correlated noise: all the stuff in between us and the planet.
contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
Worse, no mitigation will ever be complete against Spectre, unless flat out disabling speculation across memory loads.
contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
It's an arms race, there will always be new ways of exploiting this flaw in unexpected ways unless speculation is disabled entirely on existing CPUs.
contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
I don't believe for a second that nobody came up with this idea before. I believe that nobody until now had the motivation to spend the time actually trying to confirm that it's a problem by developing a PoC. Most people would have given up on the idea simply because CPU vendors are not expected to make such a fundamental mistake.
contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
This is basically an arms race. As long as the fundamental issue is not fixed and all silicon replaced, there will always be people coming up with new ways of exploiting the Spectre vulnerability in unexpected ways.
contrarian_··on Mitigations landing for new class of timing attack
> In some cases though that is not possible, because at that timescale the signal they're after is degraded by noise that they cannot predict or control: operating system interrupts, memory traffic from other threads, etc.

Wrong, those signals will average out over a long enough data collection time.

contrarian_··on Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
So the vulnerability likely isn't something nobody thought of, it's just that nobody seriously expected the CPU vendors to make the mistake of speculating across multiple loads and actually leaving observable modifications in the caches.

Note that even speculating across multiple loads could lead to observable side-effects by measuring memory bandwidth to differentiate between loads of accessible and silent page fault addresses. [1]

An interesting question is whether the CPU would also speculate on loads from mapped PCI device regions, as that could be also detectable in many different ways.

[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf

> Both hardware thread systems (SMT and TMT) expose contention within the execution core. In SMT, the threads effectively compete in real time for access to functional units, the L1 cache, and speculation resources (such as the BTB). This is similar to the real-time sharing that occurs between separate cores, but includes all levels of the architecture. [...] SMT has been exploited in known attacks (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1)

contrarian_··on Linux page table isolation is not needed on AMD processors
Sounds like servers handling lots of small UDP packets would be hit pretty hard.
contrarian_··on Founders Fund Makes Bet on Bitcoin
> Ripple

Centralized.

contrarian_··on The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation patches
Perhaps an interaction with conditional branches and cache timing? You could then extract individual bits from privileged memory by having the CPU pull in specific cache lines as part of a speculatively executed branch on the value of the bit.
contrarian_··on Clang runs in the browser and compiles C++ to WebAssembly
Yeah, except for that 30% of your revenue vanishing.
contrarian_··on Clang runs in the browser and compiles C++ to WebAssembly
Qt solves almost the same problems as a browser, all it's missing is sandboxing and fetching resources over the network.
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