AFAIK Itanium has explicit software control of speculative loads.
357 karma · joined December 28, 2017
AFAIK Itanium has explicit software control of speculative loads.
Spectre is a whole other can of worms, on the one hand it's more tricky to exploit, on the other hand there might not be an easy fix and people are speculating (no pun intended) that it will have to be dealt with in hardware.
Unless there is some way to turn off speculation entirely, but that would hurt performance badly.
> Information leakage through covert channels and side channels is becoming a serious problem, especially when these are enhanced by modern processor architecture features. We show how processor architecture features such as simultaneous multithreading, control speculation and shared caches can inadvertently accelerate such covert channels or enable new covert channels and side channels.
There is no fundamental reason why speculative instructions should be allowed to mutate the cache.
OTOH the contention-based side channel attack on speculation has been public knowledge for over a decade. [1]
[1] Z. Wang and R. B. Lee, "Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture," 2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06), Miami Beach, FL, 2006, pp. 473-482. doi: 10.1109/ACSAC.2006.20
The issue cannot be fixed without disabling speculation entirely on current hardware.
Sounds like something that would be hopefully fixable in microcode.
The "out of bounds" Spectre variant is still feasible.
Also: What about hyperthreads? It seems to be many people's assumption that the BTB is shared within a physical core.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf
> Both hardware thread systems (SMT and TMT) expose contention within the execution core. In SMT, the threads effectively compete in real time for access to functional units, the L1 cache, and speculation resources (such as the BTB). This is similar to the real-time sharing that occurs between separate cores, but includes all levels of the architecture. [...] SMT has been exploited in known attacks (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1)
What would that entail? Disabling speculation completely? Disabling memory accesses during speculation?
Wrong, those signals will average out over a long enough data collection time.
Note that even speculating across multiple loads could lead to observable side-effects by measuring memory bandwidth to differentiate between loads of accessible and silent page fault addresses. [1]
An interesting question is whether the CPU would also speculate on loads from mapped PCI device regions, as that could be also detectable in many different ways.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf
> Both hardware thread systems (SMT and TMT) expose contention within the execution core. In SMT, the threads effectively compete in real time for access to functional units, the L1 cache, and speculation resources (such as the BTB). This is similar to the real-time sharing that occurs between separate cores, but includes all levels of the architecture. [...] SMT has been exploited in known attacks (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1)
Centralized.