dakami

You're right. I'm specifically referring to his attacks.

I'm curious if you can find any references to the key expansion / hashing collision before Solar Designer started talking about it a little while ago.

If they're obvious you should be able to find dozens of references. Because they're obvious.

Yeah, a message less than blocksize bytes is padded with 0's, and a message greater than blocksize bytes is hashed to blocksize bytes. It "follows" just as much as Little MAC, is about as security relevant, and is no less clever (arguably a bit more).

It's novel in that I wasn't able to find anyone else who had posted a colliding HMAC pair, and the couple papers people have found have sniffed around but hadn't quite gotten to the point of "Oh, yeah, compensate for ipad and collide after the first block".

You're correct that it went without saying in that people did not actually say it.

Way to not cite Solar Designer though.

Heh, I'm one of the authors of the report. You can pick it up at http://whiteops.com/botfraud .

Also it's an opinion piece because I don't work for Wired.

Duct tape and bailing wire, all the way down.

What's the global supply differential of Gold to Iridium?

If you have a technology (Money) and it doesn't work, it's buggy. You've never had your credit card declined?

(Author here)

It disappears in Iraq. What, you think they're gonna burn it for warmth? Those bucks are coming back.

Eponysterical.

Oh, hi Tom :)

Was WONDERING why you were so quiet.

Neither DNSSEC or DNSCurve are interesting if they're securing just IP addresses. So we both need code on the client, to link into certificate validation stacks and the like.

The difference is, when DNSSEC has code on the client, it can still leverage the caching infrastructure. When DNSCurve has code on the client, it has to bypass it entirely.

Er, DJB and I are both presuming endpoints will validate -- we're both end-to-end security people. And that's fine, it ain't 1983 anymore, and a device that can handle TLS can handle both DNSCurve and DNSSEC (remember, the crypto construct in Curve is only about 8x faster).

What I'm saying is that mass adoption of DNSCurve eliminates the caching layer in DNS, and that will cause a major increase in traffic to the authoritatives, especially TLDs and the root.

Man, it's 2011, not 1983. If a device can run TLS, it can run DNSSEC.

For the record, I thoroughly doubt I was the first person to find that poisoning bug.

I sure as hell wanted to be the last one.

(I'm much prouder of getting DJB's fix in, than I am of finding the bug in the first place. The former took two days. The latter took six months, and convincing people DJB was right. Only now do I understand what sort of a hurdle that was.)

If you'll notice, that's glue for ns0, ns1, and ns2. This information from the parent is just there to say "here's where to go to resolve information from the child".

It's not the actual IP addresses for all the child data, like www.wikimedia.org.

DJB's basically saying "how can you say .org is signed when not every child in .org is signed". No delegated solution could ever offer that feature. If DJBCurve doesn't support signed and unsigned children, it's a thoroughly irrelevant technology that should be laughed out of the room.

Bashing DNSSEC for supporting a basic reality of delegated trust is flat out unfair.

Phreebird isn't production code. I've been telling people to use it for internal testing only -- and I've even got that into various articles.

What it does do is show what DNSSEC is capable of -- it's a way to separate fundamental limitations of the protocol (which do exist) from implementation faults (like the horrifying things you have to do to maintain DNSSEC with two year old DNSSEC code).

DJB's talk argues that a whole bunch of things are fundamental limitations of DNSSEC. It implies that it must be a offline signer. This is patently false. Actually, any system that supports offline signing can be an online signer, and Phreebird is an example of one.

I'd love to hear more about what you think the biggest problems with DNSSEC are. Perhaps this could inspire new features for Phreebird!

Is this a really bad problem?

Agreed completely that the form factor doesn't work for everything. The hope is that I can knock out a few annoying buggy cases for you.

Gene therapy makes me nervous every since it killed that random kid. Looks like there's some checksumming going on?

Actually, I'm exposing all the internal settings, precisely because color blindness is more of a spectrum disorder than something you either have or don't have.

It's fairly rare to find someone who the second image doesn't massively help, so it'd be really cool if you could play with the hard settings. Also, HueWindow is pretty much guaranteed to work if you can see at all.