4,280 karma · joined December 1, 2011
That was never a thing.
> I observed the change in tone in Mozilla blog posts, from experts talking about their craft to marketspeak.
I think I can explain what you're seeing here. The original blog.mozilla.org was run very much like the old "MSDN blogs" from Microsoft (think Raymond Chen's The Old New Thing.)
When I started at Mozilla a decade ago, my manager told me to file a request for my own space on blogs.mozilla.org -- which was denied. I was told that this was because blog.mozilla.org was being refocused as the "official" Mozilla blog.
People who already had accounts on there were grandfathered in, which is why some people (Nick Nethercote's blog come to mind) still had blogs on there. Obviously as those developers moved on, those employee blogs have gradually died off.
These days, if you want technical content, you'll need to look at hacks.mozilla.org for "officially sanctioned" pieces, or look at the blogs that publish to planet.mozilla.org for developer blogs (though much like blogging in general, there is much less traffic on there compared to a decade ago).
TL;DR: The focus of blog.mozilla.org is primarily corporate and marketing at this point.
LONGs and ULONGs are 32-bits on 64-bit Windows, so when porting the API to 64 bits, types that were typedef'd as such on 32-bit, but actually need to be 64-bits wide on 64-bit systems, were replaced with ULONG_PTR.
Unfortunately nothing had improved by the time I left in 2021.
The reason for omitting tests is because they are essentially the exploits themselves; omission raises the barrier to entry, as somebody has to be skilled enough to craft an exploit based on the source code change.
While security fixes are typically pushed out on all supported branches within a very short window of time, anything that buys time is useful imho.
Not on Android, it isn't. https://geckoview.dev
For now, we've optimized for doing that for operating systems where users most expect it.
In general the OSS operating systems get OSS clients, whereas the closed-source ones don’t necessarily get the full OSS treatment.
I feel this hard. On the occasions that I tried to reach out to product management about things that, for important technical reasons, weren't going to work, I was more or less blocked by director-level management and told that I was being mean to my colleagues for wanting to provide that kind of feedback.
> that's why they've killed XUL
We couldn't deliver a multiprocess browser without doing it.
> about:config for the android version
I completely supported this and continue to do so. GeckoView on Android works completely differently than desktop Firefox, and about:config's semantics are not identical between the two. A few of us were interested in offering an alternative that gave users a way to make adjustments in a way that was "safe," but as you can imagine that has never been a management priority.
However, all three groups (UX, PM, Eng) need to work symbiotically. Everybody needs to be sharing information and acting as partners in the work they're doing.
From an engineering perspective, the sad thing about this is that the work to finish extensions in GeckoView was essentially completed in the months after the initial Fenix release.
When GeckoView was still being rolled out into release, we understandably wanted to restrict the selection of addons only to those that exercised APIs that we knew were ready for production. Since that time, however, the WebExtensions work was essentially completed -- since that time it has entirely been a business decision to continue restricting the selection of addons available.
I didn't personally work on the WebExtensions bits, but I know that those who did were frustrated that their work to finish fleshing out full extension support was being held back for seemingly arbitrary reasons (that were never explained to engineering).
It's great when a fork ensures that it is always taking security patches from upstream. But what about the code unique to the fork? Is that new code following the same security practices as the upstream project? Are enough eyeballs poking at it to get it the same security scrutiny as upstream?