The US dollar index is now stronger than it's been at any time pre-pandemic since 2002. If anything the Fed is most likely trying to do the opposite, weaken the very strong dollar, as it did in the early 2000s and 1980s.
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The US dollar index is now stronger than it's been at any time pre-pandemic since 2002. If anything the Fed is most likely trying to do the opposite, weaken the very strong dollar, as it did in the early 2000s and 1980s.
The 2022 shortfall relative to baseline is about $800B. Even if this continued it would take another 2 years to burn off excess pandemic savings. And that doesn't even count the sizable gains in home equity and investment portfolios over the period.
We've already gone through one cycle of "young people are abandoning Facebook" with millenials and Snapchat. And it turned out that the thesis of Snapchat as FB killer was widely overblown. Snapchat failed to really expand into other demos the way early Facebook did, not to mention a lot of those Millenials aged out of it and migrated to Instagram.
Now we're hearing the same story but with Gen Z and TikTok. But it's hard to see a compelling reason why TikTok will wind up a different story. Seems very unlikely that my kids pre-school will eventually wind up uploading to TikTok the way they do Facebook.
My guess is the youth vanguard will always use whatever the new hotness is in alternative social media platform, because keeping grownups out is the point. But Facebook (and Instagram) seem like they're firmly entrenched as the base layer of civil society.
[1]https://www.marxist.com/wage-differentials-under-lenin-and-t...
The reality is most of the big tech companies have had to staff under pretty unfavorable conditions over the past few years. That's meant either scraping the bottom of the barrel in terms of the less talented. Or ballooning TC packages. If you think that all of a sudden it's going to become a buyer's market for employers, then you probably want to free up some spots today. Especially among your weakest performers or your most overpaid.
The reality is that tech cos overbites since market conditions were extremely ebullient in the tech sector circa 2021. A large fraction of those new hires never had anything productive to even do.
The physicians in Spain and South Korea and Costa Rica are really good. Arguably better than American doctors based on health outcomes. Many would jump at the chance to earn high American wages. There's no reason a South Korean doctor with ten years of experience in the world leading hospitals of Seoul shouldn't be allowed to practice medicine in the US just because he didn't do a residency in rural Alabama
Second, Coinbase has ambitions beyond just being an exchange and that's driven a lot of hires. It runs Coinbase Ventures, Coinbase Cloud, an NFT platform, develops tooling (e.g. Coinbase Wallet), and contributes to crypto protocols. A lot of the recent hiring was driven by these "other bets".
The upshot is that while CPI is probably over-measuring inflation today, and we're basically back to baseline, earlier in the year we were probably running closer to 11-12% inflation with the real housing numbers.
For AI to be as valuable as current rounds are implying it has to actually be capable of replacing your lawyer, your accountant, your software engineer. ChatGPT is nowhere near accurate enough to do that. It’s the same issue we ran into with super cruise control versus fully autonomous driving. Or speech recognition. Early progress was fast. Last mile in AI is always brutal.
Maybe there’s some argument to say ChatGPT won’t replace your lawyer or software engineer but will make them 20% more efficient. Possible. Though I’m still skeptical. ChatGPT’s unparalleled ability to create really convincing sounding errors is a big hidden negative productivity drag.
Like crypto, there are other potential use cases on the horizon for LLMs. The problem is the tech is still far too clunky, unreliable and impractical for the foreseeable future. LLMs are subject to a devastating hallucination problem, where they confidently report clearly erroneous data. And there is no solution in sight. Marketing copy is one of the sole major use cases, where random inaccuracies is mostly not catastrophic. But you're never going to trust LLMs to write code or legal contracts or technical documentation or even your own emails until the hallucination issue is drastically improved.
That leaves us with a few other niches that are, frankly not very monetizable. ChatGPT is very good at writing student essays, but students don't have very much money to spend. Makes a fun chatbot, but people are unlikely to pay much of anything to have a chat companion.
Like crypto, AI is a case of really intellectually interesting technology that nerdsniped a lot of smart people. Like crypto, AI has a few small (in terms of market size) use cases where there's clear PMF. Like crypto, there are potentially a lot of other much larger use cases that the nerdsniped smart people are imagining. Like crypto, these large use cases are going to require a lot of fundamental improvements to the tech itself before they become feasible. Like crypto in 2021, AI valuations in 2023 are treating those large scale use cases as imminent rather than long-term speculative.
(Note this isn't a statement about which tech has a brighter long-term future. It's still more than possible to believe (as many on HN do) that AI will be transformative over the next couple decades and crypto is vapor. But the point is AI valuations are implying that it's going to be transformative over years not decades, and it's pretty clear that's not the case. There are parallels with crypto in 2021, where regardless of the long-term promise, the short-term returns simply cannot support the valuations.)
What really gave FTX a competitive advantage was its cross-margining system. It was super easy to post collateral in any supported asset, and all open positions were automatically margined against each other. So if you were doing something like pairs trades between spot and futures, you didn't need to constantly monitor and manually move capital between the silos. In hindsight though it's not clear if this was possible because of better engineering, or just because Alameda was internalizing all the risk.
Foreign stocks: There's a well-documented effect called "home-country bias"[1]. Basically, investors tend to buy much fewer international stocks and are overly concentrated in their local domestic stocks. There's all kinds of reason for this, but they mostly seem to center around regulatory barriers (typically harder to open a fund to invest outside the country), political (major pension system are encouraged to invest at home for patriotic reasons), and reputational (losing money overseas tends to make the asset manager seem more reckless).
Real estate: Most governments heavily subsidize real estate from a combination of tax advantages and cheap credit. Look at how easy it is for the average Joe to buy a house with 400% leverage, no margin call, no capital gains on sale, and he gets all kinds of tax credits. Which means if you are getting those advantages than it's rational to invest in real estate, but if you look at raw returns real estate tends to underperform because investors with those advantages are willing to accept lower returns.
Bonds: The disparity between equity and bond returns is perhaps the most studied in all of finance, and is known as the "equity risk premium"[2]. There are numerous explanations, but two major ones standout. First, bond returns tend to be anti-correlated with the general economy. During recessions, when people are most likely to need liquidity, bonds tend to go up whereas stocks tend to go down. Second, many large classes of investors are basically forced to invest in bonds instead of stocks. For example insurance companies can only hold a tiny percent of their reserves in stocks and are required to invest in fixed income products. Similar story with banks, and to a lesser extent pension funds.
[1]https://www.gsam.com/content/dam/gsam/pdfs/common/en/public/...
But the point is this is a slow and continuous process that occurs over years or even decades. Discontinuously making a big shift in weight, up or down, is basically impossible. Which is why despite very high rates of obesity, it's basically unheard of for someone to gain 50 lbs in a short period of time. Almost all weight gain takes the form of 5 lbs one year, 5 lbs another year, and so on.
And surely you also agree with the science that we now have drugs that are far more effective at reducing obesity than any diet known to man.
Again this shouldn't shock us, because we know hunter-gatherers across the globe eat tremendously varied diets that come in all sorts of extremes. Yet, modern diseases of affluence (heart disease, diabetes, etc.) are virtually non-existent in these populations. The only thing they have in common is a lack of obesity and non-sedentary lifestyle.
This is a critical question, because GLP-1 agonists like semaglutide are far more effective at weight loss (with much lower dropout rates) than any diet known to mankind. So if the benefit of the Med diet is mediated by weight loss, who cares in the age of GLP-1 agonists? It's like arguing about the fastest hot air balloon after the invention of the jet engine.
[1]https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Obesity-Mediates-the-A...
As for HFCS, there's basically zero evidence that they're a major contributor to obesity versus other types of sugar. (In fact, honey consumed by the Hazda has almost the same balance as sugar as HFCS). We have multiple points of evidence to counteract this. 1) Mexico uses substantially less HFCS compared to other types of sugar, but Mexican obesity rates are as high as the US. 2) HFCS, and sugar in general, consumption has declined over the past 20 years. Yet obesity continues to increase. 3) HFCS was widely consumed in the 1980s, when the obesity rate was de minims.
Most people will have a +/- 25 lbs window, where the feedback loop is minimal. But once they step outside this window the nudges become increasingly strong. This is why it's generally easy to lose 15 lbs, but really hard to lose 50 lbs. Also why many can lose weight under very targeted lifestyle interventions, but rapidly snap back as soon as they relax even a little bit. Finally it's why the vast majority of normal weight people don't need to count calories, their metabolic setpoint intuitively matches their appetite to their caloric needs.
"Eat fewer calories" is technically a solution, in the same way that "stop drinking alcohol" is a solution for an alcoholic. The problem is someone who has an obese-level metabolic setpoint will literally be ravenous 24/7 once they get down to healthy weight. If you haven't experienced this yourself, try fasting for 48 hours, putting out a bowl of chips on the table in front of you, and resist the urge to eat even one while you try to do something else. That is what it's like to be an obese person trying to lose a large amount of weight.
GLP-1 agonists work by short circuiting the hormones that regulate hunger. It's basically the equivalent of moving your metabolic setpoint 100 pounds lower. The need to explicitly count calories no longer exists, because your appetite will naturally limit itself well below the point of caloric expenditure.