1,531 karma · joined October 12, 2011
Cynical political response: "turning tricks" == good first approximation of dealing with a modern government
Entrepreneurial response: "turning tricks" + video cameras + fast uplink == revenue model
> it will be a slow death by a thousand cuts
It will be a slow descent into budget fugue, followed by an extremely quick death when we pass an inflection point in "the number of people who remember getting awesome value out of their local/municipal library system."
I bet when a lot of people here first started hearing about library closures in their old neighborhood, or wherever they're living now, their initial reaction was one of total shock followed by "well I guess I can see how that could happen."
When people hear about library closures now, they could be skipping the shock entirely, passing smoothly through "aw that's too bad", and fading into "well there's Google."
> [the library] need[s] to become the center of civic engagement
We need a center of civic engagement with both equality and equity of access. Libraries are a decent foundation on which to build such a thing, but there's at least one common feature of libraries that makes them awful for this: people are supposed to be quiet in the library.
There should be almost nothing quiet about civic engagement, finding a job, learning new skills, research, etc. Less giant rooms with rows of people not saying anything; more smaller sound-proofed rooms with whiteboards and projectors. Like a giant executive briefing center, only with fewer executives and more regular folks with something to ask/teach each other.
The cyclist on the team-sponsored, wind-tunnel optimized trials bike can still be drafted.
I'm not sure it's worth our energy to be so disappointed in Mozilla here. That "they're between a rock and a hard place" precisely is the spin within which they stood up against abuse of trust.
They have sent out a letter so far. One of your worries appears to be that it sets the precedent that companies who do what Trustwave did can expect (only) letters in the future. But (iirc, and perhaps even in the bugzilla thread) one of the stated purposes of the letter is to set the opposite precedent: to publicly warn commercial CA's that future bullshit will result in distrusting.
I happen to think Trustwave had plenty of warning without the letter, but this particular hard place is particularly thorny because Mozilla is such a central policy hub. That's a problem you touched on above, that we agree needs a fix, but it's the way things are today.
The other half of the hard place is that before Trustwave pulled this BS, they issued a whole lot of legit commercial certs to a predominantly innocent user population. And you know, they can and should all go acquire certs from someone else, but they can't do that overnight. So if we really want Trustwave to get distrusted, I feel like we should focus our energy on a) telling people that Trustwave sucks and urging them to migrate, and b) paying attention/effort to initiatives like the one you mentioned from MM.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=724929
There are a number of choice quotes, but my two favorites are from Jacob Applebaum (@ioerror if you aren't already following him):
"TrustWave needs to be congratulated and as a reward, I think they should have their CA distrusted."
And another commenter 'Philip' (sorry I don't lurk there and don't have more detailed identity info for him...his words more than stand alone though):
"Trustwave appears to issue certificates directly from its root - this is not good practice. The root should be kept offline and never - ever - have a path to the internet." ... "the trust chain was broken at the root level, so that is where this branch, and all leaves, must be pruned"
So I guess this is where I break slightly from tptacek's opinion: I'm not yet 100% convinced that the issuance of CA=YES certificates by public CA's is an abusive practice.
Installing organization-specific self-signed roots in all company devices is more than just 'a pain'; it's fundamentally impractical for any organization that wants to let employee-owned or public devices onto its network. So just don't do that? Or just put all the uncontrolled devices onto some airgapped public network? Well, airgapped according to whom, and as of what last physical audit date? Should all organizations that implement DLP have physical security measures similar to DoD installations, where a guard with a gun makes it clear that your iPad should be left locked in your car in the parking lot?
Not saying everything's cool, just saying "it's complicated." What is clear is that Trustwave added at least a couple extra layers of supreme jackassery in this case.
Trustwave's issuance of a CA=YES certificate directly from their topmost root is the most distressingly unprofessional method they could have chosen. That choice alone, in my view, is a coherent argument for why a) their root should be distrusted, and b) they deserve (at minimum) a long cool-down period before an alternative Trustwave root CA becomes a candidate for addition to the default trusted set.
Wholesale changes in OS or environment runtime? Changes in underlying processor architecture? Forced update to full 64-bit support? Customers wanting to operate on files that are an order of magnitude larger?
If these apps have any claim to being worth hundreds or thousands of dollars per seat, and charging hundreds of dollars for basic compatibility updates, their developers should Pro-up and deal with this change like they've dealt with others.
And given the motivation for the change, I think they should skip the complaining step and lean into the work.
No more /Developer folder or uninstall-devtools script? I sure hope that means it won't periodically decide to fuck itself like every previous version of Xcode, prompting one or more full-reinstall attempts.
I wish I were kidding. This is like taking the ejection seat boosters out of the fighter jet to save weight.
Sorry I can't point to individual forum threads at the moment.
With great power comes great "you guys better not fuck this up."
Can I get an amen for free code signing certificates that derive from the Apple Root CA? Not $99, not $5, free.
Overall: more like this on more OS's.
This is a common enough claim that it could be considered "common knowledge," and I wouldn't be in a good position to refute it even if I could figure out what exactly the claim is.
Is the claim that it takes specific domain knowledge to convince people with money to invest in a business? That it takes specific domain knowledge to scale up a sw/hw infrastructure to handle top-tier web application workloads? That is takes specific domain knowledge to hire teams of engineers?
All of those things are true, of course, but in what way is any of that domain knowledge particularly concentrated in SV or the Bay Area?
The concentration of already-exited former-founders is higher, and that's real, but at the end of the day we're still talking about Software Businesses. Is the problem of converting value-laden software to revenue streams really all that exotic and complicated, such that only people in a particular social network have cracked it?
> the gap is growing every day
Again, a) by what metric, and b) even if true n-1 of the last n days, it's a big world out here and a lot of it writes code and attacks problems.
Cheers-
More granularity might be nice also. They could have a separate "names only" entitlement, or allow users to identify address book contacts / fields that should never be shared; that are redacted in content returned by the underlying APIs.
Important to note that this still does not address the wholesale detailed export and persistence of contact data by developers. Could be opp for a new provider there.
And when they do, they move to Silicon Valley or the Bay Area, where talent is more expensive than anywhere else on the planet?
WTF?
I live in Boston and dig it, but this sort of article screams "trying too hard." Anyone who even considers the possibility that Boston might not have enough talent for their startup is a crackhead. Basically any place with a university and access to the internet is a good enough place for the right founder to build something of quality.
Even if their ToS reserved the right to start charging for the service at any time, and explicitly wrote in crazy terms that disclaim them from notification periods, methods of notification, etc., their odds of collecting actual dollars by force are infinitesimal.
Sadly, their odds of collecting actual dollars by threat of force might be pretty good. How sticky is their solution?
Still, an explicit "sponsored app links" section would be much better than inflation through bot-pumping.
How indie is indie?
$5k - $15k may not be considered a "large wallet" by internet advertising standards, but it's a whole lot of money by "I just wrote a great app in my spare time and want people to see it" standards.
Exonerates? Not at all!
My point was just that (contrary to the article) Twitter doesn't make any claims whatsoever about how long they hold your Address Book data.
In fact, since it's mentioned along with other "data with which users may customize their account," that sort of implies that they consider it an integral and permanent part of your customized account profile. If someone told me that the data stays around until I choose to delete my account, I don't see anything in the privacy policy that would contradict that.
That's sort of beside the point, though. The question is: How does uploading my Address Book information provide a much more efficient or complete solution to that set of problems? I don't think that it does. In each case, you're dependent on heuristics and sometimes those heuristics are going to miss a match. If I were Twitter, I'd happily accept those misses in exchange for hitting the matches where people spell each other's first names and email addresses consistently (for example).
> how much effort are you willing to spend running your users' batteries down for something that you'd never yourself use?
You lost me there. My point was just that for Twitter, my iPhone CPU/battery are an "externality." So while they might spend more cycles doing server-side comparisons on the hashes my phone sends over, at least they're not paying to compute the hash values.
If they built such a service to let people test their own public keys, the service would actually provide a much bigger service to attackers than it would to users.
Public keys are public, right? There are huge LDAP databases out there just brimming with certificates (i.e. signed public keys) just waiting to be harvested. And most of the people whose certificates are in these databases would not be paying attention to this news, but an attacker certainly would.
You probably see where this is going.
Feral, Chimp, myEmail, myDeskPhone, myCellPhone
H1 = sha1(Feral-Chimp-myEmail-myDeskPhone-myCellPhone)
H2 = sha1(F-Chimp-myEmail-myDeskPhone-myCellPhone)
H3 = sha1(Feral-C-myEmail-myDeskPhone-myCellPhone)
H4 = sha1(F-C-myEmail-VALUEOMITTED-VALUEOMITTED)
...
...
So flexibility is available, it's just more computationally expensive for the server to do the extra comparisons. The hash calcs use a little extra battery per user, but I'm much happier to donate some of my processor/battery than I am my Address Book contents.
Twitter is the only one of these services I use, and when I read that line it took me 5 minutes to decide whether to actually uninstall the Twitter client from my phone. I decided to try to get this bad news from the horse's mouth.
https://twitter.com/privacy contains Twitter's privacy policy. Does it actually say what the article claims?
TL;DR: No.
The number '18' occurs exactly once. It is used in this context:
Log Data: Our servers automatically record information ("Log Data") created by your use of the Services. Log Data may include information such as your IP address, browser type, the referring domain, pages visited, your mobile carrier, device and application IDs, and search terms. Other actions, such as interactions with our website, applications and advertisements, may also be included in Log Data. If we haven’t already deleted the Log Data earlier, we will either delete it or remove any common account identifiers, such as your username, full IP address, or email address, after 18 months.
The word 'contact' appears 5 times, in these contexts:
1. If you have any questions or comments about this Privacy Policy, please contact us at privacy@twitter.com.
2. We may use your contact information to send you information about our Services or to market to you.
3. If you email us, we may keep your message, email address and contact information to respond to your request.
4. If you become aware that your child has provided us with personal information without your consent, please contact us at privacy@twitter.com.
5. Page footer: © 2012 Twitter About Us Contact Blog Status Resources API Business Help Jobs Terms Privacy
The phrase 'address book' appears once, in this context:
Additional Information: You may provide us with additional information to make public, such as a short biography, your location, or a picture. You may customize your account with information such as a cell phone number for the delivery of SMS messages or your address book so that we can help you find Twitter users you know.
Your lookup table just got a lot bigger.