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gedpeck

106 karma · joined December 5, 2024

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gedpeck··on Fermat's Last Theorem – how it’s going
You know more than me on logic so I defer to your expertise.

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4753432/g%C3%B6dels...

Andreas Blass in the comments says that the Incompleteness results don’t apply to the second order Axioms (tabling about PA_2 here and not Z_2) and that the second order axioms are not computably enumerable. Maybe that’s the correct concept I was remembering from mathematical logic class. Don’t know if computably enumerable is the same as recursively enumerable but given what you’ve said I’m guessing they are different notions.

Consider the standard model of ZFC. Assume ZFC is consistent. Within this model there is one model of PA_2. Collect all true statements in this model of PA_2. Call that Super PA. That’s now my axiomatic system. I now have an axiomatic system that proves all true statements of arithmetic. Surely this set of axioms is not recursively enumerable.

Full semantics, on the other hand, are categorical (there is only one model), but this has nothing to do with the axioms not being recursively enumerable -- it is just because we use a different notion of model.

If those axioms were recursively enumerable then the Incompleteness theorems would apply, right?

What Noah Schweber says here seems pertinent:

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4972693/is-second-o...

gedpeck··on Fermat's Last Theorem – how it’s going
I think you are wrong in your first sentence. Take the collection of all true statements and make that your axiomatic system.

Andreas Blass in the comments says that Incompleteness does not apply to PA_2.

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4753432/g%C3%B6dels...

gedpeck··on Fermat's Last Theorem – how it’s going
It shouldn’t and I didn’t say it should. I gave a fact and asked a question. Why is PA_2 computer science?

Computer science ought to be about computation, right? There are non-computable objects that mathematicians study. Is that part of computer science?

gedpeck··on Fermat's Last Theorem – how it’s going
Do you have a reference for the second order induction schema being recursively enumerable? My understanding - I’m not a logician - is that the second order Peano Axioms are categorical. The Incompleteness theorems don’t apply to this system since the axioms are not recursively enumerable. The second order Axioms are different than second order Arithmetic.

https://mathoverflow.net/questions/97077/z-2-versus-second-o...

In the following mathoverflow answer Nik says,

These are fundamental questions. We know that any computable set of axioms which holds of the natural numbers must also have nonstandard models.

The second order Peano Axioms are not computable since those axioms are categorical.

https://mathoverflow.net/questions/332247/defining-the-stand...

Are you of the opinion that mathematics is computer science? I have a hard time believing that the Jacobian Conjecture is computer science.

gedpeck··on Fermat's Last Theorem – how it's going
What false assumption did I make? I just pointed out a fact and asked a question. How many false assumptions could I have made with just one statement of fact and two questions? If you don’t have a valid answer to the question then don’t respond.

I’m a mathematician and not a computer scientist. The first order PA axioms are recursively enumerable. Hence it’s clearly something of interest to computer scientists. The second order PA axioms aren’t so…are they part of computer science? What do computer scientists think about proofs in second order PA? There are no computable models of ZFC so wouldn’t it be the case that while computer scientists deal with ZFC that ZFC isn’t part of computer science? what is your definition of computer science? Physicists deal with a vast amount of mathematics but math isn’t physics. In the same way mathematics isn’t computer science.

Overall I think most mathematicians would not consider mathematics as part of computer science.

gedpeck··on Fermat's Last Theorem – how it's going
There are statements provably true about the natural numbers that can’t be proven in first order PA. Are such statements part of computer science? If so, how?
gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
It’s not a settled issue in the sense that the experts overwhelmingly agree on one side vs. the other. My link was posted to show a contrarian view. Lots of research papers arguing on either side have been written about the Chinese Room. Your argument is similar to a Christian telling an atheist it’s a settled issue since the book “The Case for a Creator” covers the issue.
gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
I don’t believe you are engaging in a good faith discussion. Your previous comment is worthy of further contemplation but not this one. A computer can not emulate a person’s brain. At least not now and there isn’t sufficient evidence to believe that is even theoretically or practically possible to do in the future.

Your response here implicitly admits there’s difference in human thinking and computer “thinking”. A chess program that just searches a vast number of possibilities and chooses the best one is not thinking like a human. It’s not even close.

* > How will a computer prove such a thing? I have no idea*

If you knew about these things you’d know that it isn’t possible to have an algorithm that halts in a finite number of steps that determines whether or not a given statement is an axiom in 2nd order PA. A computer is incapable of reasoning about such things.

gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
...something's hard is not a reason to expect it's magic.

Something that is impossible to accurately be modeled mathematically is not magic.

gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
Thanks for the response and perspective. I'll contemplate it more later.

While I personally may not have come up with the Incompleteness results humans did. The discussion is about human intelligence in general (particularly applied to bright people) not about my own intelligence and its limitations.

The second order Peano Axioms are categorical while the first order Peano Axioms are not. The first order axioms are used precisely because it was the dream of Hilbert and others to reduce mathematics to a computable system. The dream can not be realized. We humans can prove things like Goodstein's theorem. A statement that is true in the second order PA. How will a computer prove such a thing? There is no effective, computable means, for determining if a given statement is an axiom in PA.

I don't know anything about the chess algorithms but my understanding is that they rely, essentially, on searching a vast number of possible outcomes. Can a computer beat Magnuson with the number of computations the computer can do limited to within one order of magnitude of what a human can do in the allotted time?

Thanks for the discussion. I'll contemplate what you've written and any response you care to make. I won't respond further since I'm delving into areas I know little about.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room

gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
You are claiming to be able to mathematically model consciousness or that it is theoretically possible. So what’s the model or proof that it can theoretically be modeled. Your statements regarding were lacking.
gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
Yes. It’s a basic result proven in any mathematical logic course at the senior or beginning graduate level.

If a Turing Machine can’t prove that it can’t prove the consistency of its axiomatic system from within that system but that it could from within a larger system but I can then this is evidence against your belief. At least as I see it.

I have the minority view that the Incompleteness results (the proof of them) are a limitation of artificial intelligence.

gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
..physical laws that are, in principle, fully modeled by mathematical theory that can be simulated on a computer.

Consciousness so far appears to be something that can’t be modeled mathematically. Can a Turing Machine conclude that while it can’t prove the consistency of the axiomatic system it works under if one embeds that system in a larger system then it could be possible to prove consistency?

Aren’t you assuming super determinism? What if consciousness is not “computable” in any meaningful way? For example suppose the theoretically most efficient mathematical model of consciousness requires more variables than the number of particles in the observable universe.

gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
… our brains are physical systems which themselves can be modeled by mathematics..

How do you know this? What is the model? Can an AI come up with the Incompleteness Theorems? It can be proven ZFC that PA is consistent. Can an AI or Turing Machine or whatever do the same?

EDIT: I’m equating “our brians” with consciousness.

gedpeck··on The Google Willow Thing
So go back to the 1950s and the point stands. What does it matter when the actual start date is in terms of the point being right or wrong?
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