...or just be shot trying to illegally cross the border.
You’re literally suggesting some sort of self-genocide of 150 million nation.
189 karma · joined October 1, 2020
...or just be shot trying to illegally cross the border.
You’re literally suggesting some sort of self-genocide of 150 million nation.
There was an ECHR decision ordering Russia to free Navalny, but it was ignored by Russian government and Council of Europe did nothing about it.
The last elections to the Russian parlament were obviously rigged, and yet international community recognized them as valid. Russian opposition is fighting an uphill war with government for literally decades without any help from the other countries. Hundreds to thousdands of people are detained every day for protesting against the war.
Yes, support ratings for Putin are quite high — because there’s no free media and everyone trying to spread truth is promptly dealt with.
Nobody cared when Russia ignored the decision of ECHR to free Navalny. Nobody cared when Nemtsov was murdered. This situation is not new, it’s the result of the decades-long policy of “let Putin get away with any crimes against his country and international law as long as we get oil and gas”.
f : Char -> Type
f '0' = Int
f _ = Char
g : (c : Char) -> (f c)
g '0' = 0
g c = cThe problem with the Deno security model is that it’s hard to predict how granting any specific permission would affect overall security. For example, it may seem to be kinda reasonable for an application to ask for `--allow-write=~/.config` to create config directories & files, but it’s probably exploitable to escape the sandbox. Is `--allow-env` + `--allow-write=whatever` dangerous? I don’t know. If Deno runtime spawns a subprocess at some point, it could be used to execute arbitrary code via `LD_PRELOAD`. Is there a guarantee that Deno runtime will never spawn subprocesses? There is no way to know.
If you want to isolate your program, you should use an OS-level sandbox like bubblewrap or a lightweight VM like Firecracker. I’m not familiar with Apple’s JavaScriptCore, but if it doesn’t provide any access to the system (and instead relies on passing arguments from Swift code), it might also be a viable approach.
https://github.com/denoland/deno/issues/11964
https://github.com/denoland/deno/issues/9750
API-based access control can’t possibly work because it’s nearly impossible to predict the effect of any single permission. For example, “permission to run specific command” makes no sense without checking the integrity of the binary, controlling the environment for LD_PRELOAD-like hacks and evaluating the code of this command for possible escape hatches. If you want to isolate a program, you need to do it on the OS level.
Using SearX hosted by someone else is marginally better, but now you have to trust the owner of the server, which is probably not what you want for privacy-centered search engine.
Unicode in identifiers is just a bad idea.
1. It creates a security consideration with confusable identifiers (and lints don't always catch these)
2. It breaks tooling with RTL identifiers
3. It may not render correctly depending on fonts
4. It may be hard to type depending on keyboard layout
5. There really isn't a good reason to use non-ASCII idents anyway
If type inside of Option<_> has invalid values (like references which can't be null) one of these would be used for None, so Option<&T> is the same size as &T.
And having to type tons of boilerplate for any trivial task isn't "expressive simplicity".
There's another form of function coloring, "does this function take context or not".
- It's easy to call function-without-context from function-with-context (but it breaks cancellation)
- It's hard to call function-with-context from function-without-context (you must create context first)
- Some functions in standard library have context, and some don't
userbase is just a rare spelling, and also the name of some software products.