1,005 karma · joined June 15, 2013
If you look closely you can see all the paper towels the photog stuffed into the bag. (He also tried to steal one of the stacks, lol. It was his bag, and when he gave me the money back it was short. He accidentally “missed” one of the stacks.)
I believe some companies offer cash in hand or bitcoin payments, but by no means is that “the way it is done”
I understand that he is writing a book now, and I doubt many insiders will speak to him. I don’t expect it to be very accurate.
I had a lot of problems because of that article. Not just the death threats and such, but ... do not ever become interesting to states. They have a lot of resources.
When I wrote it Android devices never got patched (hence the advice to switch to a FOSS rom that would be updated, rather than a frozen in time factory ROM.)
Security involves a lot more than just access to the source code. That is simply a factor in the ease of some techniques for vulnerability discovery. Back then Android had poor process isolation, significant problems with its sandbox, lax SELinux configurations, insecure software architecture (eg not using “least privilege”)
For a regular user, a stock iOS device is safer than an Android device because there is very little iOS malware in the wild. For a user at risk, then they are safer using a secured device, which by default means modified Android.
Security is not a generic “thing”. It is a continuous process that provides countermeasures against threats by mitigating risks.
If you want a device that is safe by default, will always be patched, and is not vulnerable to indiscriminate exploitation or malware embedded in apps — use iOS.
You can achieve that with a Google Android device (starting with about v8 or so). Of course you still have to be vigilant against malware laden apps.
There is so much bullshit about the “highly lucrative black market” it is staggering. The market is not big. There is significant risk which gets factored into the payment structure, so the payments are lower than people imagine.
The market is not very liquid. If you have a Chrome capability for sale but your client already has a Chrome capability, they won’t buy it. If their capability dies, then they’ll want yours, but by then yours might be dead as well. Gross oversimplification, but that is generally how things work. The demand is very specific, the supply is very limited, and the product is very fragile (particularly time sensitive.) It is lucrative like making a startup is lucrative. You invest a lot of time and resources and sometimes, with luck, you win big, but the odds are not in your favor for a million dollar payday.
Most articles treat it like some sort of open market drugs bazaar. It is nothing like that at all. It is more like a handcrafted goods faire with a few wealthy customers looking for exactly the thing they need. Only they won’t tell you what they need, they simply want to see what is on display. Lots of window shoppers, as it were.
The product has an unknown shelf life.
The customer cannot tell you what they need, they will only look at what you have and possibly choose something.
For the developer they need to ensure that they provide sufficient information about the capability so the customer can make an informed decision. But they have to avoid revealing sufficient details that it can be reproduced from the ad copy.
Part of what a broker does is actually translating between two parties who don’t speak the same language. The customer needs a tor browser Bundle capability. The developer has written a UAF RCE Firefox that relying on JIT spraying for reliability. Someone has to translate from exploit dev speak into IC language.
For the IC, that TBB capability is a replaceable part in a larger program that enables them to achieve their mission objectives. For the exploit dev, that bug is a labor of love that they spent months working on. They have completely different views on the value of the capability. One side sees it as a component they need for a machine they want to use. The other side sees it as weeks of frustration and pain invested into a unique masterpiece.
They have different expectations, don’t speak the same language, and don’t trust each other. Things have changed a lot from when I was involved. It’s all very fascinating but, as I said, no one who knows about it will discuss it.
I’m being stupid and talking about it, again. But hopefully this will clear up some of the stupid myths about the vulnerability market.
For example all those “wow, a way to read a someone’s private messages on Facebook? That’s got to be worth millions!!” No, it is not. If a legitimate client wants to read someone’s messages on Facebook, they get a warrant. There is no ROI for cyber criminals, and whatever it might be worth to North Korea the risks associated with that sale are not worth it. That bug is worth whatever Facebook says it is worth. Dropping the 0day would make for some news, but mostly it would be negative. So the only rational way for a security researcher to make money from a Facebook bug is through the bug bounty system. (I’m not addressing cyber criminals discovering such a bug, because that is not relevant to the issue of vulnerability sales.)
As for backdoored Chrome, what is to prevent China using a modified version of Firefox that removes the backdoor? It would blind NSA to collection on the Chinese target.
There is no way you can use backdoors against hard targets. Hard targets are why they need 0day. It is an arms race because it is a conflict between states.
Whatever fears people have about 0day being used against them are, as I’ve said before, like worrying about ninjas rather than cardio vascular disease. One is something you have no control over, but almost no exposure to as a risk. The other requires regular work to stay safe.
Years ago I wrote “free security advice” and the basic concept is still relevant. I should update it now though. Android 9 is a much harder target that 4.4 was. I would actually rate Android as safer than iOS because all of these ridiculous articles about million dollar pay outs have driven most developers towards iOS, and iOS is a monoculture.
A hardened Android device (disclaimer, I’m making one for retail sale) is safer than a stock iOS.
Literally everything in the media is complete garbage. No one who knows how things work would ever discuss them again.
So yeah, that $15k golden egg. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
At thetime I did not know about phrases like “off the record” or that you could have corrections made to articles that had false information. Had I known I would have OTRed at the beginning although I should never have spoken in the first place. And I should have made them correct the inaccuracies.
But, c’est la vie.
0days are used against hardened targets. Think “Iranian nuclear facilities” rather than “grandma’s PC”
How would that make any sense? It is ludicrous.
There is no way you will ever hear authentic answers to your questions. The only time anyone tried to explain that the resulting article backfired on the interviewee. (Disclaimer, it was me)
Governments do not buy from developers. The paperwork would be insane. They buy from businesses like Raytheon. How Raytheon gets them is opaque. But they do employ hundreds of exploit developers. Read the r/netsec job postings and notice how many require having a TS clearance. Every interesting job that says “work on vulnerability discovery and exploit development” requires TS.
Governments generally speaking do not cheat on business deals where they want to continue having access to that market. It is like stiffing the company that sells you replacement parts for your government vehicles. You save money now, but in the future your planes can’t fly and no one will do business with you.
All of this I explained during the interview, but the objective of the article was not what I assumed it would be, which was to address the dynamics of how the market works. I was naive to think that, but in my defense I was genuinely shocked that people were unaware of the market (it has existed forever). Literally everyone who is an infosec rockstar has been involved with exploit sales [0]. Many still are because It allows them to work on what they enjoy — bugs and exploits — and remunerates for their expertise. They get paid a living wage to do what they want. Like any freelance developer. They are just smart enough to keep their mouths shut.
I haven’t been involved with the market for almost a decade now but you’ll still hear people saying shit like “how does it feel to sell weapons to dictators??” (Even On here there are a number of such comments.) I can truthfully answer that I have no idea. I only ever sold software to western governments who had a hard on for terrorists.
I’m still angry about it, but I have no one but myself to blame. You can’t unfuck the goat. C’est la vie. People want sensational stories about evil people, they don’t want stories about the dynamics of a grey market software industry. No one will ever speak about it again (lessons learned analysis! Protip, don’t be the lesson others learn from).
The market has changed massively over the years. It is nothing like the one I was involved in back then. However, as I said, no one will ever discuss it again. They saw what happened and they won’t speak in public about it.
What was, is, and will continue to be, the legitimate sale of vulnerabilities is now closed forever.
As a thought experiment, think of this. Let’s take it for granted that the IC counter terrorist units and the legal authorities hunting for child abusers are acting in good faith. That is, not every single person at NSA is desperate to see what you are doing on the Internet (literally, you are noise obscuring their signal). There are people who are going after child sex abusers, do you want them to have the capability to exploit a web browser or do you want web browsers to be safe tools for child abusers. This is not hypothetical [1].
There cannot be a discussion about a market where there is so much hysteria about fringe cases of abuse. Rather than trying to find ways of mitigating against abuse, the reaction has been to advocate for prohibition. Prohibition does not work, it simply drives reputable operators out of the market.
The conversation about vulnerability sales has been as even handed and rational as the conversation about marijuana in the 50s. Instead of marijuana madness you get “the FBI can hack your computer!!” ...I guess the upside is that at least this time the topic is not a proxy for racism [edit: I retract that statement. Pretty much every rationalization about banning vulnerability sales talks about African or Arabian buyers.]
And again, I have said too much. Try to explain something, get called a baby killer. I’ll bet there will be accusations of enabling dictators to spy on civil rights activists. To preempt the “you don’t know what happens after you sell it!” I say simply this — the point of having a middleman to handle the transaction is to ensure that you sell to the right end users. Exploit developers don’t want to sell to dictators, they find someone who can get them access to a market where their work will be used ethically. That can’t be said for all, of course. The jailbreak community in particular is essentially a vendor to the Chinese government.
But there you go. The most you’ll hear about it from someone that actually knows what they’re talking about.
[edit: haha, see? It was brought up before I even posted a response! [2] There is no accurate information. Literally every single paper on the topic cites newspaper articles rather than academic research. This is actually unique. It is the outlier case. Mara did a review of the literature and found that the majority of citations were to articles, far in excess of other topics)
[0] https://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2007/papers/29.pdf [PDF] — a paper from Charlie Miller talking about how difficult it was for him to sell exploits without a trusted third party to act as an impartial party to the sale. That TTP is called an “exploit broker” because that sounds far scarier than “trusted third party.” Incidentally, this is the environment I was operating in, and it was clear that no one involved in security considered it abnormal.
[1]: https://www.wired.com/2014/01/tormail/ ... look at the framing of the article. It is not “FBI screws up their operation and mistakenly collects data that is irrelevant to their investigation.” It is “if you used this secure email provider [hosted on the same infrastructure as a massive child sex abuse web site] the FBI has your inbox!!!!”
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20651348 .. feel free to read the article and think what you like. Andy Greenberg is a good journalist. I was an idiot. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
The drops get ripped so frequently there is a process for handling a drop that has been unloaded before the customer get there. The customer has to supply pictures of the drop location and the empty drop, then the dealer will send them to another place. Dead drops provide some security, but they’re a trade off.
I think the Gary Cooper videos are massively underrated for security principles. He explains how the adversary operates, how they think, and what their capabilities are, then based on that he distills core security strategies to exploit their operational limitations and mitigate their capabilities.
This is really great stuff for understanding how to counteract a threat, how to do proper counterintelligence analysis and apply it for security. The problem is that people see these as “stoner videos” rather than “the design and implementation of counter law enforcement techniques, by a former cop.” There is a lot to be learned, both from general security principles (such as compartmentation, cover, and concealment) But also how to analyze an adversary and develop a plan to mitigate their capabilities.
I was going to do a write up them years ago but someone scooped me by seeing my recommendation and then doing a (crappy) writeup before me. Just one of the things that killed my enthusiasm for sharing recommendations. But, I should do a write up. For a counterintelligence analysis they are sublime.
For more practical guides on how people who sell drugs avoid the negative repercussions:
• AlpraKing’s business guide is hard to beat. https://archive.is/K7j1U (It’s a great business guide in general, actually)
• Gary Cooper’s Never Get Busted Again and Never Get Raided Again shows practical use of dead drops for dealing.
I stand by my assessment at the time, but I haven’t checked Telegram since then and don’t know what, if anything, has changed.
After contacting the author he has removed the plagiarized content.
And I’m pretty sure comments like this are against HN policy as they degrade the quality of discourse.
“Plagiarism is the "wrongful appropriation" and "stealing and publication" of another author's "language, thoughts, ideas, or expressions" and the representation of them as one's own original work.”[1]
[0] https://twitter.com/Edu4rdSHL/status/1081971696431706113
The structure is the same and the section headings are the same. It is blatant plagiarism.
As for why Tor Browser Bundle sucks: https://medium.com/@thegrugq/tor-and-its-discontents-ef51648...
Plenty of things combined, but not least of which is that Mozilla only patches High + Critical bugs in long term stable release builds, so you can just chain Low + Medium known vulnerabilities together until you get access.
The only safe way to use Tor is with a router acting providing a secure middle point for "upgrading" all traffic to Tor. That way if the end point is compromised, it cannot beacon information back w/o being forced through Tor. This is why I don't like software solutions that provide Tor access and are tenant on the same hardware. It simply means that one additional exploit breaks the system. A Tor router (a good one, none of the commercial ones are) will expose only the DHCP server [optional] and the Tor SOCKS5 proxy port. Leaving an attacker with only a very small attack surface: the Linux kernel network stack and the Tor daemon. A software solution with co-tenant router (such as Qubes, or Whonix) has the same attack surface plus a hypervisor and (potentially) a shared kernel interface (i.e. the entire kernel API). Tor Browser Bundle is even worse as there is no Tor router, simply an app that is configured to use Tor, and if it is compromised then the code executed by the attacker can elect not to use Tor as the system itself is networked.
Tor has very few use cases IMHO, and since one of them is "purchasing drugs from a reputable source," I don't really see why Congressional candidates should ever use it themselves. A VPN, on the other hand, is different.
I would actually extend the guide by @idlewords and say "install the Freedome VPN on all your iOS devices, enable it, buy the $30 a year service, and forget about it. You'll have a secure IKEv2 VPN to a reasonably[0] safe end point that is doing active filtering for malicious sites as well as some trackers and ad blocking (the source of most 'drive by malware.') This one app will make all public WiFi safe[1] to use, it will increase your privacy [by aggregating your traffic with other people's exiting that same IP], and help to reduce your exposure to known bad websites that serve malware."
[0] 'reasonably safe end point' in that it is operated by F-Secure, not anonymous and potentially malicious agents. F-Secure has a reputation to maintain and actively sniffing traffic for secrets (e.g. Wikileaks) or inserting malware into downloads (e.g. various threat actors) would be the end of their business. They are probably capable of securing an end point as well as anyone else, and if you aren't technical enough to setup Algo VPN yourself then Freedome is a reasonable compromise. Vastly better than fly-by-night "bittorrent safe, logless!" "we put OpenVPN on a VPS" VPN companies.
[1] yes, nothing is truly safe, the NSA is logging all encrypted traffic for years, chemtrails don't care about IPSec and jet fuel can't melt APs, thanks for your pedantic observation.
The Thai Police were looking at huge publicity for arresting him. They would want him alive. Clearly he didn't have the connections he needed to be a rich criminal in the Kingdom otherwise he'd have evaded arrest (they had him under surveillance for a while.)
I think it is likely that he chose suicide on his own terms over a lifetime sentence in a US jail. Given the lifestyle he was used to, facing a lifetime in US jail would be pretty depressing.
If you sold 2 glocks to MS-13, you'd have problems.
It is someone without the right customers.