I don't know if he believes that himself. But I can tell you with extreme high confidence that this is not going to happen, and it's not even close to anything remotely realistic.
16,731 karma · joined March 7, 2014
I don't know if he believes that himself. But I can tell you with extreme high confidence that this is not going to happen, and it's not even close to anything remotely realistic.
What people don't realize: key size recommendations are surprisingly stable over long timeframes, and have not changed for a very long time. In the early 2000s, some cryptographers started warning that 1024 bit RSA is no longer secure enough, and in the following years, recommendations have been updated to 2048 bit minimum. That's now been a stable recommendation for over 20 years, and there's not the slightest sign that 2048 bit can be broken any time soon.
The only real danger for RSA-2048 is quantum computers. But with quantum computers, increasing your RSA key sizes does not buy you much, you have to move to entirely different algorithms.
In other cases, it's considered criminal if a company deliberately puts out false information about itself. E.g., if you lie about your companies products (like Theranos), it's pretty clear that this is not legal.
I don't see why it should be legal to lie about your job opportunities.
If someone collects data and the study outcome is not preregistered, you can assume p-hacking. It would be implausible not to. And in most fields, preregistration is not common. (And even if there's preregistration, regularly people just switch their outcomes, and nobody cares.)
And to play the devil's advocate: psychology is probably doing better these days than most other fields, because it's been the posterchild example of the replication crisis.
The fix was released today, and FF says they received the report 25 hours before that: https://infosec.exchange/@attackanddefense/11328207943028074...
That's a wildly optimistic number, and almost certainly too low for the carbon sources yoU're naming. Equinor estimated over 600USD for gas burners at an LNG plant, under almost ideal conditions (existing nearby storage site, company with lots of experience): https://industrydecarbonization.com/news/is-carbon-capture-a...
The Shattered attack was an actual demonstration of a long-known weakness in SHA-1 that allows creating practical collisions.
This one is more an exploration of the question whether a malicious actor can create a standard that looks good, but is actually weak. Those questions got quite a bit of attention in that time due to the Snowden leaks, and the realization that this actually happened at least in one case (Dual EC DRBG, which, technically, was already known before Snowden, but only got major attention afterwards).
It's a very unfortunate outcome of phasing out CFCs that they have in many instances been replaced by powerful greenhouse gases. HFCs are slowly phased out as well, but there are still a lot of harmful gases out there.
For decades to come, we won't have 100% clean energy systems everywhere. Even if you power your AC 100% by solar energy, that solar energy won't be used to displace dirty energy elsewhere. Even if you make absolutely sure you have additional solar energy (I don't know how you'd do that), you still have production emissions for the solar panels.
For the forseeable future, if you can do X with less energy than before, that's an improvement.
expat, the xml library underlying python's etree and other xml interfaces, has either mitigated these standard xml vulnerabilities or disables the dangerous features by default.
The python docs are still a bit confusing there, but if you look at this table: https://docs.python.org/3/library/xml.html#xml-vulnerabiliti...
While this table has a lot of "Vulnerable" in it, they all come with footnotes saying that up-to-date versions of expat are not vulnerable.
So... if you want to have more secure xml parsing in python, make sure you use an up-to-date expat library or one where security fixes have been backported. You don't need anything else.
If you want more technical details, we've put up a webpage back then, and published a background paper on those vulns: https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/
I understand there's probably a problem creating a clear separation, but in times where lack of movement and exercise is causing major health problems, we probably shouldn't disincentivize young people using fitness devices.
"4. Does this mean CockroachDB is no longer open source?
CockroachDB will remain source available under a new license. While the new license is a proprietary enterprise license, the source code will still be available for viewing and contributions."
I mean... "The answer is kinda sorta 'No', but we really would prefer not to phrase it like that."
It may be worth noting that choosing the algorithms that are now chosen, which are primarily lattice-based, is already kinda a compromise. They're not the ones with the highest trust in security, which would've been McEliece and SPHINCS (though the latter has been standardized as a fallback). But those come with key and signature sizes that are entirely impractical for the most common use cases.
It appears most of the crypto community came around thinking that the somewhat-smaller lattice algos are now "almost certainly secure". But surely there's at least one famous cryptographer raising his voice that he still has concerns.
That's kinda a "you had one job" situation. Yes, it's hard to review security reports, and separate legit ones from bogus ones. But that's what these plattforms advertise they do. They regularly do a very bad job.
Look, I get it. Deprecating things has tradeoffs. But NPN looks like an incredibly safe thing to deprecate. It has only been used for a very short timeframe. Its only use case (SPDY) has a fallback (HTTP/1.1) making sure things still work if it's not supported. Your story about OpenSSH ciphers has nothing to do with it.
I am of course well aware of backwards compatibility issues. But I don't see how they'd impact NPN.
You might have to update some code that hard-codes NPN functionality, but well, OpenSSL has done API changes in the past, quite significantly so.
When SPDY, the precursor of HTTP/2, got introduced, it needed a mechanism to signal that within TLS, a different protocol (SPDY instead of HTTP/1.1) was spoken. That mechanism was originally NPN. I don't know the exact details and motivation, but eventually people seem to have decided that NPN wasn't exactly what they wanted, and they invented a new mechanism called ALPN.
Now, that was a decade ago (the ALPN RFC is from 2014), so the question is: why do we still have NPN code in OpenSSL? I don't think anyone uses it any more. Shouldn't it have been removed long ago?
To put this in a larger context: it appears to me that OpenSSL still has a strong tendency to bloat. Heartbleed was essentially a "we added this feature, although noone knows why we need it" kind of bug, but it doesn't look to me they've changed. I still get the feeling that OpenSSL adds many features that they probably just should ignore (e.g. obscure "not invented here"-type algorithms), and they don't remove features that are obsolete.
Pandemia is a podcast started during the Covid pandemic, but regularly covering all kinds of diseases and health issues.
Here's the article: https://industrydecarbonization.com/news/is-there-a-place-fo...
I had posted it on HN, but didn't get upvoted.
Just look at the data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/electricity-production-by...
And even pumped hydro isn't in a great spot. Batteries are essentially competing for the same market (intra-day storage, few hours, high round-trip efficiency), and improving fast.
CSP is a mitigation for XSS vulnerabilities. Yeah, if you always sanitize everything in the right way, you won't have XSS vulnerabilities.
CSP was born out of the recognition that people fail to properly sanitize everything, even if they know that this is what they should do. Because it's complicated, and there are so many corner-cases and different ways to have XSS. CSP is a mitigation on top, in case your "we sanitize everything in the right way" goes wrong.
Making the point that you don't need CSP if you don't have XSS vulnerabilities is like saying C is secure as long as you know know how to use it and don't write code with memory safety bugs.
In 2020, the last coal power plant was connected to the grid (Datteln 4). It was delayed, as it wasn't clear for quite a while whether it was even legal. But the decisions that have been made to build these plants were made 15-20 years ago.
This is about a special law that allows oil companies to compensate carbon reduction requirements. Which, to be clear, is a big deal, and a major case of fraud. But the headline makes it sound like the majority of all climate efforts in Germany are fraudulent. That's... a very different claim, and not the one in this article.