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ionfish

2,889 karma · joined February 27, 2008

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ionfish··on Peano arithmetic is probably inconsistent
Ed Nelson has now withdrawn his claim.

http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2011-October/015832.html

    Terrence Tao, at 
    http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2011/09/
    and independently Daniel Tausk (private communication)
    have found an irreparable error in my outline.
    In the Kritchman-Raz proof, there is a low complexity
    proof of K(\bar\xi)>\ell if we assume \mu=1, but the
    Chaitin machine may find a shorter proof of high
    complexity, with no control over how high.
    
    My thanks to Tao and Tausk for spotting this.
    I withdraw my claim.
    
    The consistency of P remains an open problem.
ionfish··on Peano arithmetic is probably inconsistent
One consequence of the second incompleteness theorem is that no consistent arithmetic theory of sufficient strength can express its own consistency. One way of proving such a theory inconsistent is therefore to find a proof within that theory of its own consistency.

A complete theory is one in which, for any statement φ in the language of that theory, either φ is provable or ¬φ is provable within that theory. Note that this is a different sense of completeness than that proven in Gödel's Completeness Theorem, which states that any sentence satisfied by all models of a theory is provable.

A consistent theory is one which contains no contradictions. Because mathematics generally employs classical logic it is explosive [1] and any contradiction allows one to derive any sentence whatsoever in the language of the theory as a theorem. Because of this an alternative way to say that a theory is inconsistent is to say that all the sentences in the language of the theory are theorems.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

ionfish··on Peano arithmetic is probably inconsistent
Flags are a binary mechanism just like voting, and as such are vulnerable to precisely the same epistemic problems. As you say, comments offer a way of demonstrating expertise, not merely asserting it.

For this reason someone interested in a disputed topic such as this will either have to read the comments, in the hope of discovering the main lines of argument and improving the likelihood that the picture they form is correct, or suspend their judgement until such a time as better evidence (in this case, peer review of the claimed proof) is available.

ionfish··on Peano arithmetic is probably inconsistent
Then don't read them; the community will figure out over the next few months whether Nelson's proved what he's claimed. The Peano axioms have stood for 120 years, it's probably not imperative that you find out whether they've been shown to be inconsistent right this minute.
ionfish··on Peano arithmetic is probably inconsistent
Gentzen's proof relies on transfinite induction up to epsilon_0, which is not a principle liable to be accepted by someone with Nelson's foundational views. A good primer on these can be found in his book Predicative Arithmetic.

http://www.math.princeton.edu/~nelson/books/pa.pdf

ionfish··on Running a startup on Haskell
ML's first-class modules let you achieve many of the same things as type classes. In fact, a lot of people in the Haskell community would like something a bit closer to ML (in other words, more powerful) in this regard.

Monads can be formulated in any language with first-class functions. Monadic I/O is more distinctively Haskellish, and of course Haskell has syntactic sugar to make using them easier, but as a tool and a concept they're far from unique to Haskell.

ionfish··on Tech recruitment: how not to do it
What, like Jon Harrop?
ionfish··on Caml Trading: Experiences in Functional Programming on Wall Street
Standard Chartered use Haskell. Don Stewart, Neil Mitchell and Lennart Augustsson all work there.

Tsuru Capital do FP and have advertised jobs on the haskell-cafe mailing list before.

ionfish··on Ultrabook: Intel's $300 million plan to beat Apple at its own game
The missing # key is annoying, although it's not the kind of thing that would make me change operating systems. Apple's chosen shortcut for the '#' character is Alt+3 which is frustrating for terminal users who use Alt as the meta key—for example, it makes it hard to enter channel names in Irssi.
ionfish··on Steve Jobs’ Personality is Integral to Apple
Ahh, nominative determinism!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_determinism

ionfish··on Apple Awards Tim Cook 1,000,000 Shares of Stock as CEO Bonus to Stay Until 2021
iBooks? PowerBooks? There was nothing called a "MacBook" when 10.1 came out in 2001. The first Apple laptop with that name was released in 2006.
ionfish··on Eric Schmidt criticises education in the UK
Unfortunately most people who frequent that section tend to forget the second half of the quote.
ionfish··on Why Haskell is Kinda Cool
> Is bob a value, because it takes no parameter? Is it a function because f happens to be a function?

Functions are values. But not all values are functions. Functions are values with abstract type a -> a. That's what a function is in Haskell. (Of course, I'm only talking about functions from values to values here, not about functions from types to types and so on.)

Whether bob is a function or not will of course depend on its type. For instance, consider the following definition for f:

    f = (+ 5)
Then yes, bob will be a function, with type Num a => a -> a. On the other hand, if you decide to define f as

    f = take (10^10) $ [1..]
then it won't. The distinction here is determined entirely at compile time: it's about what type a particular value has.

> Therefore, "f = sum [1,2,3,4,5,6]" and "f = 21" are completely conceptually equal.

Right. They're both values of some concrete integer type.

ionfish··on Why Haskell is Kinda Cool
He was, and I was trying to make the point that he was wrong. :)
ionfish··on Why Haskell is Kinda Cool
Great points! That we can treat infinite streams as having the same semantics as lists is of course dependent on Haskell's non-strictness—it's not the same in ML, for example.

For me one of the more convincing arguments that article puts forward is that Haskell only has unary functions; the type Int -> Int -> Int is just a shorthand for Int -> (Int -> Int), i.e. functions which appear to have more than one argument are considered for the purposes of the semantics to be of the form (λa.(λb.c)).

The core point that I think Conal Elliot tries to make is that as far as the denotational semantics is concerned, Haskell has values of many types, some of which (the ones of (abstract) type a -> a) are functions.

You are of course correct about Eq and partial implementations. For me the key point is that where one function is defined entirely in terms of other functions and class constraints which ultimately rely on the instance implementing those other functions, they encapsulate the logic of the typeclass—in other words, they define a property of the interface. So equality for values of a given type is ultimately defined by the instance, but the relationship of equality to inequality—a property of the concept of equality in general—is defined by the typeclass.

ionfish··on Why Haskell is Kinda Cool
Arguments of this kind are both wrong and dangerous. Becoming a good Haskell programmer isn't easy, but then neither is becoming a good programmer simpliciter.

The language itself is conceptually novel compared to imperative languages, but the concepts themselves are neither difficult nor abstruse. Actually I find Haskell refreshingly simple; it's a lot like Lisp that way.

I'm sure you'll agree that it's unfortunate that so many people are put off by a subject's alleged difficulty, rather than encouraged by it. However, given that this is in fact the case, wouldn't it be better if we concentrated on saying how enjoyable, intellectually stimulating and useful learning certain things was rather than discouraging people from even having a go?

ionfish··on Why Haskell is Kinda Cool
There are a few missteps in this article. To begin with, the author claims that a variable of type Double is "a function with no arguments". This is not the case [1]; not everything in Haskell is a function. A Double is just that: an instance of the numeric type Double.

They also say that "[T]he Ord "typeclass" ... implements comparisons." But of course the typeclass itself doesn't implement comparisons. A typeclass defines an interface which its instances implement. Consider the Eq typeclass:

    class Eq a where
        (==) :: a -> a -> Bool
        (/=) :: a -> a -> Bool
So to make a type an instances of Eq, we need to implement (==) and (/=) functions with the type signatures provided by the class. It's pretty obvious how this should go for the Bool type, so let's define that and make it an instance of Eq.

    data Bool = True | False
    
    instance Eq Bool where
        True  == True  = True
        False == False = True
        _     == _     = False
        
        a     /= b     = not (a == b)
This is all covered very well by Learn You a Haskell [2].

[1]: http://conal.net/blog/posts/everything-is-a-function-in-hask...

[2]: http://learnyouahaskell.com/making-our-own-types-and-typecla...

ionfish··on Why Haskell is Kinda Cool
Haskell syntax is actually pretty straightforward, once you know what you're looking at. It's difficult at first blush because of the weird infix operator symbols ($, ., <> etc.) but once you get used to them there's nothing too scary.

That being said, why not post any problems you have here? I'm sure plenty of people would be happy to help explain Haskell's syntax, and no doubt more people than just you would benefit from that.

ionfish··on Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity
I don't think it's by any means uninteresting, and I agree that complexity theory has a role to play in enriching epistemology. That's why I said elsewhere in this discussion that I think this kind of work is important.

However, it's not in any way obvious that there are metaphysical implications to the limits this sort of result would place on knowledge. Facts are (for present purposes) simply to be identified with physical states of affairs. If some physical state of affairs is unknowable (and "System S will be in state R at time T" certainly looks like a physical state of affairs), does that mean it does not (or will not) actually obtain? I have a hard time seeing how one could make that argument, although of course that shouldn't stop you, if you think you have a good angle!

To address the particular example under discussion: if you take free will to consist of the impossibility of predicting an agent's actions and conclude that because this prediction is impossible, we are free, you still need to provide a further argument that your definition of free will is the correct one.

I'm not prejudging whether or not you could come up with a convincing argument to that effect—it might well be possible. But to my mind, the point of the omniscient narrator example is to add determinism to the system: because our actions are known in advance, they can be known in advance; if they can be known in advance, they must be determined. I take this to be the implicit argument when people suggest that we're not free because God knows what we will do.

Obviously there are different ways in which we can understand the modalities of time, and I won't try to pretend that this isn't a contentious area.

ionfish··on Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity
I think that's a bit unfair to the compatibilist position. Ultimately an account of free will should include a definition of the concept, and an explanation of how it figures into our intuitions about particular cases. In particular it should explain situations in which the given definition conflicts with our intuitions, and obviously determinism is a big part of that.

The incompatibilist argument is at heart very straightforward: free will is incompatible with determinism; determinism is true; therefore free will does not exist. When pressed on the second premise, the incompatibilist can further assert that indeterminism is incompatible with free will, and that determinism and indeterminism exhaust the possibilities (this is just an instance of the law of the excluded middle). Therefore regardless of which one of them holds, free will does not exist.

However, even this argument requires a definition of free will, in order to demonstrate its incompatibility with (in)determinism. It thus suffers from the same 'problem' that you allege compatibilism does: the compatibilist can simply say that the incompatibilist is defining the problem into existence.

I'm curious to know what you think an answer which didn't suffer from the problem you outline would look like.

ionfish··on Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity
Your suggestion confuses an epistemic limitation with a metaphysical one. Just because no one knows what we're going to do next doesn't mean there isn't a fact of the matter about it.

While the idea of God looking down on us from on high is a compelling story, if you take God away but leave determinism it doesn't do anything to resolve the problem: our actions are still pre-determined and cannot be changed.

Of course, whether or not that makes us free is a further question. A compatibilist [1] would claim that we are.

[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

ionfish··on Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity
This looks fascinating, and in yours truly is guaranteed at least one reader, once I have some time to devote to it. I think there's a lot of room for interesting work in this area.
ionfish··on Polyglot Platform
Haskell could also fit easily into that table, especially since people already [1] have Haskell projects running on Heroku's Cedar platform.

Dependency management: Cabal, Hackage. REPL: GHCi. Embedded webservers: Snap, Warp, Happstack Server. Web frameworks: Snap, Yesod, Happstack.

[1]: http://www.yesodweb.com/blog/2011/07/haskell-on-heroku

ionfish··on Learn JavaScript
Please don't give out advice like this. I'm really fed up with having to deprogramme people who've written too much jQuery and don't actually know JavaScript, or worse, barely realise that there is such a language.

I appreciate that your suggestion is to learn jQuery and then go through a language reference, not to stop once you've done the jQuery bit, but trust me, that's just what most people will do.

jQuery is a very opinionated library, which is fine in and of itself, but that makes it a terrible introduction to JavaScript, precisely because it "hides most of the ugliness of the language", as you put it.

To understand why this is a problem, consider the following points.

1) jQuery is not the only DOM library out there. Prototype, MooTools, Dojo and YUI are just some of them. To be a good front-end developer one should know at least a couple, and be able to learn any of them. The easiest way to learn them is to know the language and just learn a library, rather than learning a bunch of different DSLs with perhaps a few unifying themes.

2) JavaScript is now used on the server as well, and to write server-side JavaScript one really does need to know the language.

3) If one ever wants to write anything beyond hacky little scripts—a real web application, for example—then one cannot get away with just knowing jQuery. Large applications must be structured. The rats' nest of callbacks that many jQuery programmers seem to think is sufficient and even appropriate application design will not scale to large codebases. The key skill here is knowing what sort of structure needs to be introduced and being able to use both use libraries which provide the necessary abstraction and write one's own where necessary.

ionfish··on New MacBook Air Now Available on Apple Store
There's a bit of sleight of hand on their Thunderbolt Display page [1]. The first image is of a MacBook Air hooked up to one of the new displays, but when they talk about "The ultimate docking station" they show a MacBook Pro.

This is because the Thunderbolt and power ports are next to one another on the MBP, but on the Air they're on different sides of the machine, which is going to make it a lot less elegant.

[1] http://www.apple.com/uk/displays/

ionfish··on OS X Lion Now Available in the US Mac App Store
They have.

http://www.apple.com/macbookair/features.html#backlit

ionfish··on 10 Javascript Shorthand Coding Techniques
Aside from the fact that it's basically blogspam which does a poor job of explaining common JavaScript idioms, articles like this are dangerous because of what they don't say.

In (2), for example, they suggest using the short-circuit feature of the || operator in assignments, and mention that a null, undefined or empty string value on the left will make the assignment fall through to the value on the right hand side. What this fails to mention is that any value that converts to false will trigger the fall-through: this includes 0, false, and NaN and well as the values already mentioned.

(9) is really pernicious since it neither explains the real uses of the arguments object, nor mentions how it can screw up the public interface your functions provide. For example, if a function has no named arguments it will have a length property of 0. This can screw up all kinds of handy stuff like higher-order programming.

ionfish··on Floppy Disks: It’s Too Late
Baked clay tablets, like stone inscriptions, are exceptional. The records of the past are largely gone.

Unbaked clay tablets tend to simply disintegrate. Those at Knossos and Ninevah were baked by fires that destroyed the buildings in which they were housed. Mycenean tablets appear to have been reused each year, so the 'expiration date' in that case was man-made rather than imposed by the material.

Papyri have also survived more by good fortune than by design, being preserved in tombs and rubbish heaps. They lay undisturbed in an environment where the temperature and moisture content of the air remained stable over time, in a range conducive to the survival of the material.

ionfish··on A Philosopher Every Programmer Should Know: Susanne K. Langer
I think you're confused. There are clearly normative questions; "Should I do X?" for any value of X is a normative question. You might have intended to contend that there are no normative facts: that there is no "right answer", as it were, to normative questions, merely what we choose to do.

However, this is not something that science can prove, at least without adding the claim that the only facts there are are physical facts. You're basically suggesting that we open up people's heads, look around, go "Nope, no norms here!" and take that to be evidence that they don't exist. This is problematic at best, since were they to exist, normative facts would seem to have properties quite at odds with physical facts, and your assertion starts to look question-begging.

Metaethics is not my area, so I'm afraid all of this is rather rough and ready, but the SEP article [1] is a pretty decent starting point.

[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/

ionfish··on A Philosopher Every Programmer Should Know: Susanne K. Langer
How will neuroethology answer normative questions?
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