211 karma · joined April 10, 2022
This, however, doesn't apply to the code generation phase with LLVM which is already parallelizable at the codegen unit level (the number of codegen units is configurable), but that's the “back-end”, whereas this new parallelization applies to the “front-end” of the compiler.
> Any losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund to support uninsured depositors will be recovered by a special assessment on banks, as required by law.
suggests other banks will effectively pick up the bill?
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/09/europe/gallery/mariupol-h...
By the way, the very reason Russia invaded Ukraine is because Ukraine is on a relentless path to successful democratisation, deoligarchization and, yes, reduction, slow or not, of corruption. Russia wouldn't care if Ukraine was to stay _like_ Russia, corrupted and undemocratic. Russians invaded precisely because Ukraine was demonstrating it was (and is!) becoming European, adopting the European standards of the rule of law and a healthy market economy. The last thing Russia wants is a successful democracy at its doorstep, especially in a country that it claims (however falsely) it shares historical heritage with.
¹ https://www.transparency.org/en/press/germany-state-governme...
Except these things aren't even true, at least not in Poland. Corruption in the classical sense hasn't been a problem here for decades. Nepotism at the upper level of governance (especially in state-owned companies) – true, it's re-emerged. Mixing it up with supposed wealth-amassing, however, makes even less sense because the most egalitarian shift in Poland's economic policy – with empirical observable effects – has so far, for the last 7 years, precisely coincided with the EU-sceptic right-wing populism.
> wealth amass in a tiny sliver of the population
Yeah, right. /s https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=P...
> their political spectrums can be resumed as ‶corrupted right-wing guy sucking on the EU tits″
No, it can't, it's more complicated than that. I think your language alone says a lot about how much thought has gone into your statements.
In short, Poland has seen a shift in its policy towards the EU after around 2015. A lot of it can be attributed to pre-Brexit Conservative Party-style anti-EU populism (and, if that's the case, why make it appear like a post-Soviet phenomenon alone?), but a part of it is genuinely related to the general debate about the future of the EU and its policies. The last words quoted, aside from their vulgarity, are just totally inaccurate. One thing to consider is the cohesion funds (which, by the way, the European Commission has blocked, and rightly so, from Hungary) and the pandemic recovery fund (which it has barred Poland from, also rightly so), but you can't reduce the discussion to those, especially in the recent weeks when Poland has shouldered the lion share of the European cost of welcoming Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.
And, of course, the Polish political parties include a very significant pro-EU liberal opposition stronghold, usually just slightly trailing the populist ruling party in the election polls. So, no, your description of the spectrum is far from the truth.
I mean, even the three countries mentioned are vastly different from one another in where they stand. Today's Hungary, admittedly, has gone the farthest in terms of limiting the freedom of media and dismantling the judicial system. Poland's ruling party has not gone that far, and I would say it's very unlikely it will, for historical reasons – the anarcho-democratic political traditions are just too strong, as is the civil society.
So, in short, I'm all for being alarming when that's warranted, and there are things to be alarmed with, to various extent, when looking at last years' developments in Poland (can't speak for other countries). But one needs to stay truthful at the same time.