You can do this quite easily on all the major OSes by opening a single dual-stack socket. On most Linux distributions that is the default, and then mapped addresses will work fine if the machine has a v4 address or a 464XLAT configuration. This has been the case for about 20 years.
This already exists in two forms, and has for basically the entire history of production dual stack deployments. The first are IPv4 mapped addresses (of the form ::ffff:x.x.x.x) which instruct the local machine’s network stack to use a local IPv4 address to communicate to the server. This still requires each machine to have a routable IPv4 address (though not necessarily a public one - it can be used with a NAT44 router).
If you don’t want the local machine to have a routable IPV4 address at all (which is a common practice on mobile networks), you can do something similar with a different prefix (usually 64:ff9b::/96) called NAT46. In this case the local machine’s network stack exclusively emits IPv6 packets, and the upstream router/network detects the prefix and performs stateful NAT using its own IPv4 address(es), just like NAT44. Depending on the use-case, the local machine doesn’t even have to understand what you’re doing at all. Instead you just have the local network’s DNS server return fake AAAA records with the corresponding 64:ff9b::x.x.x.x addresses when some particular domain doesn’t have native IPv6 support.
Yes, but CGNAT is an inherently stateful system and as a result will always be more expensive to operate per packet than a stateless router. The reason we are seeing steady (if slow) growth in native IPv6 is because the workarounds for IPv4 exhaustion cost money, and eventually upgrading equipment and putting pressure on website operators to support IPv6 becomes cheaper than growing CGNAT capacity.
How would this have worked in practice, in a way that the NAT464/NAT64 schemes that most mobile operators use haven’t? Would IANA have dedicated some blocks of IPv4 to be used for IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses on the public internet?
There are some reasons, which is why you do see IPv6 use increasing. IPv4 exhaustion means that almost all mobile (and in some countries landline) internet connections have to access the IPv4 internet through Carrier Grade NAT. ISPs have to buy the equipment to operate these and pay for their maintenance, and they have to do so in proportion to how much traffic is stuck on the IPv4 internet. At a certain point making the necessary investments to send more traffic over IPv6 end-to-end becomes a better bet than continuing to maintain a growing CGNAT stack.
The tough part is that while ISPs can largely control whether their mobile and residential users have IPv6 available they can’t really do so for their business users, let alone arbitrary website operators they have no relationship with. So the reality is that everyone is going to have to maintain both 4to6 and 6to4 basically forever. But as it becomes less common it’ll no longer need to be especially fast or efficient and the costs to operate it will come down.
I'm not saying there's definitely no coordination, but nobody had to get together to decide that 2026 was the year for 90s fashion to make a comeback. Human society is very prone to fads in all areas.
They may be including maintainers who are explicitly employed to maintain the respective projects (e.g. some RedHat employees). This is not common, but not vanishingly rare either.
Just because the US won’t literally run out of oil doesn’t mean the economy (or populace) will be unaffected by a supply crunch. As everyone in the country can already see when they go to fill up their tank.
Considering nobody blocks the entirety of Verizon, apparently a long time. You can act like this is some insane plan, but it’s happening all the time and while it can lead to annoyance for end users the internet chugs on. Which it wouldn’t if there was no way to mitigate DDoS other than rate limits.
Once an IP in a botnet attacks someone, it ends up on a blocklist and can’t attack anyone else who uses that blocklist. This is a big part of Cloudflare’s DDoS model: if you attack one CF property (with non-volumetric DDoS) you will not be able to attack any others with the same bot for an extended period. This makes attacks to CF properties limited in scope and way more costly, because you have to essentially “burn” IP addresses after sending relatively little traffic.
Large DDoS botnets will have hundreds of thousands of return-path-capable IP addresses. Your temporary blocks will have to be very sensitive (i.e. trigger on a relatively small number of requests within the time window) for an application-level DDoS to be usefully mitigated.
The law can be bad and a specific legal argument against it can be wrong at the same time. Would you logically accept (as opposed to mere political convenience) every potential argument whose conclusion is that this law is invalid? If not, does that mean there is something “wrong with you”?
On the object level: giving medical advice is a form of (literal) speech. If you want to practice medicine and give medical advice as part of that practice, there are tons of constraints on what you can say to patients. The argument you’re laying out here is clearly too general.
RAM is always storing something, it’s just sometimes zeros or garbage. Nothing in how DRAM timings work is sensitive to what bits are encoded in each cell.
Yes, but the attestation does not tell the RP anything about the browser. The whole point of the nightmare scenario above was for Google to sneak browser attestation in via passkey attestation. The browser being able to see the attestation doesn’t matter for that.
None of the password managers (including but not limited to ones built-in iOS/Android) work that way. The Apple one (and I think Google is the same) keeps the private key inside the secure enclave (security processor), but it is still copied to each new device - though it is end-to-end encrypted during that transmission.
As I said, the attestation structurally does NOT attest to your OS or your browser that are displaying the website performing the authentication. It attests to the device that holds the passkey's key material, which is usually not your desktop computer.
That's a matter of implementing an open standard. Google hasn't done anything to prevent open source browsers and OSes from implementing it, and nothing in the spec makes it difficult for Firefox/Linux specifically AFAICT.
The attestation actually has nothing to do with the browser, only the holder of the passkey's key material. You can satisfy the attestation by having a passkey on your Android device and doing the normal Bluetooth flow with your Firefox browser on your Framework laptop. So this mechanism is totally useless for enacting this plan.
The operating system doesn't manage attestation because that's totally useless for the stated goal of the attestation system. Enterprises don't want their SaaS vendors to accept passkeys from some random employee's BitWarden, instead of the hardware keys they issued the employee. If the OS manages attestation and doesn't send anything to the relying party, then it doesn't solve anybody's problem at all.
Most of these systems already do this, especially since very few applications have a flat encryption key hierarchy regardless of passkeys. The counterpoint would be that not everyone will set up multiple passkeys unless you require it on sign-up, but you're going to have that problem with any other method of storing end-to-end encryption keys. Might as well piggy-back on the password manager's replication methods.
How many people are doing a spring cleaning of unused passkeys in their password managers? We're talking like a kilobyte of data, nobody needs to delete these things in any kind of normal circumstance.
Sure, it would be great if users would store 5 copies of their encryption keys, with one in a lockbox on the bottom of the ocean. But that's just not going to happen at any kind of scale, so an automatic way of putting encryption keys in a replicated password manager makes sense. And compared to how people normally handle end-to-end encryption keys, it's going to result in a lot less loss data in practice.
What about this ban is anticompetitive? The only think I can think of is accusing them of dumping product (as opposed to price discrimination), in which case the remedy is going to be to making them charge the API price for everything.
Okay, but now you’re running a country-scale VPN service in Russia or whatever, and somebody has to pay for it. Or you have to acquire a botnet, again to handle the internet of a whole country. These are non-trivial barriers to overcome, and simply having transit to Russia does not solve them.
How useful is a GPS position for theft prevention? IME cops are not interested in doing more than filing a report after a theft, even if you have a live GPS location of the item for them. Do you try and go get it yourself?
If they mean a real proxy, that’s even more involved - you can’t just do that with BGP configurations and will need someone running what is basically a country-wide VPN in Russia or China (which will probably be very identifiable).
IPs owned by Iranian entities could be blocked straightforwardly by network operators at various levels. They could probably fudge the paperwork via Russian or Chinese entities and obfuscate the routes with cooperation from Russian/Chinese network operators, but that would take time.
Does the Iranian economy rely heavily on access to the global internet? They can’t trade with most of the world due to sanctions, so what in their internal economy grinds to a halt without global communications? I’m not saying I think that it wouldn’t, just that I don’t immediately grasp the mechanism.
Even if you don't have fiber all the way into your house, most cable internet terminates pretty close to the home these days. It kind of has to, since bandwidth has gone way up and as a result they can't put very many subscribers on the same termination system.
We didn't really understand this kind of thing when the Carrington event happened, so nobody knows for sure, but estimates for induced voltage on long conductors are usually something on the order of 20V/km. So for a 5 km long coaxial cable, you're only talking about ~120V of induced potential difference (i.e. the same voltage as a residential plug in the US). When people are analyzing the potential damage from this kind of electromagnetic disturbance (E3 is the term you'll see, based on analysis of nuclear EMP which has other components that you don't see in geomagnetic storms regardless of severity), it's mostly about really long conductors, like on the order of 100km.