5,429 karma · joined July 14, 2015
If you don’t care about that (which is not “military level security”, laptop thieves stealing creds is a thing), just don’t use FDE or use it with an on-boot password every time. No point in the theater.
`FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE`’s equivalent on Posix is just rm. Windows doesn’t let you open new handles to `FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE`ed files anyway, so it’s effectively the same. The inode will get deleted when the last file description is removed.
NFS is a disaster though, I’ll give you that one. Though mandatory locks on SMB shares hanging is also very aggravating in its own right.
It’s also worth noting that Rust doesn’t prevent integer overflow, and it doesn’t panic on it by default in release builds. Instead, the safety model assumes you’ll catch the overflowed number when you use it to index something (a constant source of bugs in unsafe code).
I’m bullish about Rust in the kernel, but it will not solve all of the kinds of race conditions you see in that kind of context.
Someone will of course bring up XNU, but the microkernel aspect of it died when they smashed the FreeBSD kernel into the codebase. DriverKit has brought some userspace drivers back, but they use shared memory for all the heavy lifting.
I do this for GitHub in particular, because of tools that connect to the remote multiple times. Works with anything that uses the actual ssh executable under the hood.
To be clear, I don’t think institutional real state investment is a substantial part of the reason housing prices are so high. I’m just trying to push whatever argument they were thinking of toward something quantifiable.
Because if I saw a house 15% below market where I live, I would buy it (to live in). I don’t imagine I’m the only one. Institutional investors can’t stop me from doing that if it’s offered - can they stop the seller from offering that?
For that purpose they’re pretty good, though there are advantages to a more signature-oriented boot security option like Apple’s Secure Enclave. But that only works so well because Apple simply doesn’t permit altering parts of the macOS boot process. For Windows/Linux, you have a variety of hardware, firmware, and OS vendors all in the mix and agreeing on escrow of keys for all of them is hard.
A TPM’s primary function works by hashing things during the boot process, and then telling the TPM to only allow a certain operation if hashes X & Z don’t change. Depending on how the OS/software uses it, a whole host of things that go into that hash can change: BIOS updates being a common one. A hostile BIOS update can compromise the boot process, so some systems will not permit automatic decryption of the boot drive (or similar things) until the user can confirm that they have the key.
China was already leaning on passive DPI and L3 blocking before TLS 1.3 complicated (but as I said, did not preclude) downgrading to PFS ciphers. The reason being that for about the last 10 years, many sites (including default CDN settings) used SSL profiles that only allowed PFS ciphers. For such a server, downgrade attacks are already not useful to the Great Firewall, so adding TLS 1.3 to the mix didn’t change anything.
> So did they? Remember, I'm not talking about some hypothetical future, this technology is actively in use today and has been for some time.
Google Chrome (for example) will now use ECH if the website has the relevant DNS record - but it doesn’t use the anti-censorship mechanism in the spec to make requests to servers that haven’t enabled it look like they may be using ECH. This, combined with the fact that China can just not serve the relevant DNS record by default, means it doesn’t really impact the great firewall.
This is actually a good example of the non-technical side of this: Chrome could send a fake ECH on every request, like the spec suggests. This would perhaps make China block all Chrome traffic to prevent widespread ECH. But then Chrome would lose out on the market share, so Google doesn’t do it. Technical solutions are relevant here, but even the most genius anti-censorship mechanism needs to content with political/corporate realities.
For ECH, China can just require you turn it off. Or distribute their own blessed distribution. It’s the more marginal censorship regimes that will be in an interesting spot. Especially ones where the ISPs are mostly responsible for developing the technical measures.
> The popular Javascript React framework has 15K direct and 2K indirect dependencies - https://deps.dev/npm/react/19.2.3
You’re looking a dependents. The core React package has no dependencies.
Outside of embedded, this kind of reuse is a very marginal memory savings for the overall system to begin with. The key benefit of dynamic libraries for a system with gigabytes of RAM is that you can update a common dependency (e.g. OpenSSL) without redownloading every binary on your system.
They’re only really useful if you’re distributing multiple binary executables that share most of the underlying code, and you want to save some disk space in the final install. The standard Rust toolchain builds use them for this purpose last time I checked.
In theory, sites could eventually require ECH to serve anything at all. But we're very far from that.