3,020 karma · joined March 15, 2010
https://signal.me/#eu/tJgEd9pEdyiankVrQI3j1y2n5jPNLW7y4cZ09RJ0Vhjh2mihvq9IwL6toyfg8Kma
If you restart, however, everything's dropped.
If the organization has 200 of those apps, it's unlikely a transversal security team is able to write patches for each one of them.
Organizations typically fail at security because they try to manage it as far away from the product as possible. That leads security and dev/ops teams to manage their goals in isolations: one cares about preventing incident, the other cares about shipping products.
If Agile & DevOps have taught us anything, it's that everyone in the organization should be focused on serving the customer, be it through features, reliable operations, or data security. The only good way to do infosec is to embed security with devs and ops and make everyone shares the goal of making the product better.
Ballpark, I'd say that's between 700 and 1,000 hits/second on the main frontend. I sort of doubt either AWS or GCP is so much faster than the other for this kind of load.
Without them, I'd pretty much never open the site.
Since they have so much money to burn, why don't they support worthwhile OSS efforts (like SSL, for example)?
The NSS library is supported by Mozilla and Red Hat, mostly. There are tons of little tools and libraries that we use in *nix land, that could benefit from some $$.
Mozilla is much more than just Firefox, Firefox OS and Thunderbird. Take a look at the hundreds of projects on https://github.com/mozilla/, for example. Mozilla should offer "Mozilla fellowships" or "Mozilla sabbaticals", where they support a developer for a year or two fulltime to work on their projects.
There are many internships, community supports and developer support programs at Mozilla. The foundation also donated one million dollars to various prominent projects very recently: https://blog.mozilla.org/press/2015/10/mozilla-launches-open... Most of Mozilla's work is done by volunteers anyways
I don't know if this statement is accurate. There are over 1,000 people employed by Mozilla directly working full time on the various projects.disclaimer: I work for Mozilla.
OpenSSL has classified this vulnerability as "low severity", which we agree with. In order to mount the attack, the attacker has to be able to run the attack code on the same machine that runs the victim code. CacheBleed is a complex attack and there are much easier-to-exploit vulnerabilities in personal computers that it is unlikely that anyone would use CacheBleed in such an environment.
Note that frameworks that embed OpenSSL, such as NodeJS, will need to be upgraded as well. https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/nodejs-sec/ORAkxchrT...
A breakdown of the type of target that have SSLv2 enabled would be useful to understand how they reached that number. It's possible that they scanned much much more than HTTPS on port 443, and found a lot of embedded devices with poor SSL configurations.
At any rate, you should verify the configuration of your websites. There are many tools to do that, and we publish configuration sample to make it easy: https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generat...
[1] https://twitter.com/jvehent/status/704657734810148864
[edit] the page https://drownattack.com/top-sites shows that sites like yahoo.com are vulnerable, but there are no details as to why it is listed vulnerable. yahoo.com does not allows connections with SSLv2, but some of its subdomains do, so maybe the top-level domain is listed because some of its subdomains are vulnerable?
[edit 2] according to one of the researcher, the scanner "check if pubkey (not cert) runs on SSLv2. Then mark all others with that pubkey vuln" (src: https://twitter.com/seecurity/status/704665265712308224)
> In the first quarter of its' operation then, Let's Encrypt has far and away been used more to secure previously-unsecured (or at least untrusted) websites than simply as a cost-savings measure.
iptables -t filter -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 53 -m connbytes --connbytes 512 --connbytes-dir reply --connbytes-mode bytes -j DROP
Bugzilla is a beast, for sure, and it takes some time to learn how to use it correctly, but few other systems come close in functionalities, and github is certainly not one of them.
For startups, the #1 risk is a vulnerability in some web app, or a forgotten admin panel, that leaks the entire database to an attacker. Not a complex attack conducted by a nation-sponsored offensive team.
But again, SSH security matters, you should take it seriously.
Most complex systems fail in unexpected ways, and the best way to debug is to grant the devs access to production machines. It can be temporary, monitored and through a secure channel, but it's still something most organizations can hardly live without.
It's also the least likely to happen. Attackers will have broken deep into your database due to poor webapp security before getting a hold of your ssh private key.
Not that SSH security doesn't matter. It's easy enough and carries enough risks that putting some effort into it is worthwhile.
That said, it's a serious issue, no doubt about that.