3,020 karma · joined March 15, 2010
https://signal.me/#eu/tJgEd9pEdyiankVrQI3j1y2n5jPNLW7y4cZ09RJ0Vhjh2mihvq9IwL6toyfg8Kma
How so?
Every time someone comes up with a new license, the review work must be redone to ensure it respects the philosophy of Open Source. Which is why I prefer project published under well-known licenses (GPL2/3, LGPL, Apache, Mozilla, BSD, ...).
[1] https://github.com/facebookgo/runcmd/blob/master/patents
There is a number of conceptual differences between MIG, GRR and OSquery. MIG does not retrieve data from endpoints, but instead focuses on answering yes/no questions.
For example: find hosts that have a file in /var/www that contains the regex '12345'. MIG will run the search on all endpoints and return the location of files and hosts that match. But it won't return the files themselves. Privacy is preserved, but investigators need to manually retrieve files if needed. MIG takes this approach to keep the search very fast (parallel AMQP runs in seconds across thousands of endpoints). Retrieving data at large scale is too expensive for Mozilla (bandwidth, storage, execution time), and we like to protect privacy.
I really like the SQL approach taken by osquery. I brainstormed something similar last year [1] but did not get around to it yet. SQL is very natural to use for a lot of IT/Security people, and it's great to be able to transfer that knowledge to search tools.
GRR and OSquery are awesome tools. And I can tell their authors are solving some really hard problems. We're competing a bit, but it's OK to have multiple tools with varying goals. And it's great for borrowing each other's good ideas ;)
[1] http://4u.1nw.eu/Presentation_workweek_20130916.pdf slides 10 & 11
That's not enough! Administrators still don't pay enough attention to their crypto configurations. We try to make this easier in Mozilla's guidelines [1], but it still is a complex and mostly misunderstood topic.
I have a lot of respect for DJB and for the way he always challenges the status-quo. This talk is an excellent summary of the current issues in the crypto industry. But he ignores the fact that we use AES, SHA and RC4 because _it's easy to use them_. And his solutions are never easy to use.
Make Nacl dead simple to use. Write clients and servers that use it. Integrate it into Firefox, Chrome, Dovecot, Nginx, Postfix, cUrl, etc... and people will slowly move away from TLS and its broken crypto.
NSS and OpenSSL are difficult codebases to work with, which may also explain why it's so hard to find people to work on them.
Bernstein's main point is that we need independent, peer-reviewed, cryptography that doesn't depend on government standardization. This talk is mostly a justification for his own work on ChaCha20/Poly1305 and DNSCurve, that were designed to be fast, constant-time and padding resistant. But the talk doesn't make mention of alternatives, except for Serpent that should have been a better cipher than Rijndael in the AES competition.
A good read. I would love to see broader adoption of ChaCha20 in OpenSSL and its standardization in TLS1.3. Google already supports it and it needs more attention from cryptographic before we start using it everywhere. It also seems that SHA-3 has failed to convince, and everyone is standardizing on SHA-2 instead, despite the computational cost. Maybe here too we need an alternative...
As a general rule, review your logs before disabling things. And ask your users to use modern browsers as soon as possible.
If you find any more of them, do you think you could publish their checksums?
But HTTP is a resource manipulation mechanism: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE/... It's not optimized for transporting data.
Postgres, however, does provide a protocol that is optimized for transporting data [1]. It's also very simple to use, and full of thousands of features that are bug free. Which is why I find it odd to try to recreate a stable and efficient protocol into something less optimized, just so that a minority of developers can use http requests...
[1] http://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/static/protocol.html
I've seen people refuse to use LDAP, and request a JSON (not rest) API instead, thus disregarding the security benefits of using a protocol that has 20 years of experience for dealing with access control and authentication.
Postgres has a tremendously powerful and efficient network protocol. There is great value in using and understanding it, because not every problem is a nail that can be hammered with a few GET requests.
MDN has been using persona for a while now, meaning that most accounts don't have passwords in the database. But older accounts still had the SHA256 salted hash that Django creates.
We traced back as much as we could. Access logs, netflow data, etc... We found that the tar.gz containing the DB dump had been downloaded only a small number of times. Mostly by known contributors. But we can't rule out that someone with malicious intentions got access to it.