TFA points out that this Apple AMX is similar to the existing Intel AMX, even (confusingly) using the same name.
787 karma · joined May 13, 2008
TFA points out that this Apple AMX is similar to the existing Intel AMX, even (confusingly) using the same name.
In this model, your compositor, input pipeline and (at least the UI latency sensitive part of) your applications would have to be ported to the RTOS, which makes this pretty infeasible. But it works really well if you have a some hard-realtime control loop talking to a bunch of non-realtime network IO or UI code. Would be a fun way to build a wifi controlled quadcopter.
These days you probably want to use Xenomai, or possibly RTAI.
The 5 million and 20 million rounds in 2000 were strategic investments from partners who were going to resell ESX, and were done for reasons other than needing working capital. IBM and Dell were the 2 partner investors, IIRC.
There was a wine derived thing that used to work on Win64 to run win16 apps, but something in later windows versions broke that.
some enterprise SCSI drives too. This was all back in the late 90's/early 2000's, no idea if it still happens with SATA or SAS drives...
Then bfitz proved in in 2005, and it turns out SCSI drives sometimes do it too: https://brad.livejournal.com/2116715.html
Wouldn't it go into the .rodata section, not .text?
You need a random id not the phone number, so other users can't do guesses unless they get that random id somehow. The ID is stored on the phone, and if you lose it, when you reinstall Signal, the signal server will give it to you after SMS phone # verification.
A sim-jacker could nuke your key, but that seems like a lot of work for griefing. Signal of course, has the plaintext random id, so they could nuke your backup, but there are tons of ways Signal can DoS attack their own service. Stopping paying for the servers, for one.
Each partition of the keyspace lives on a 5 node cluster, running RAFT inside the enclaves to ensure the pin guess count is consistent.
If a node fails, or is failing, or we need to do maintenance, we transfer the partition from the old nodes to new ones, which transfers the serviceid as well. If you start a new enclave from scratch, it'll generate a new serviceid, and clients won't talk to it, and existing partitions will refuse to transfer to it since it already has a serviceid. In fact, it won't even be listening for incoming transfers, since it thinks it owns the entire keyspace.
We can also do a partial partition transfer that leaves the source cluster live, which we use to split up the keyspace more when we need to scale up.
There is no persistence (wouldn't be secure, attackers could do many parallel enclave resumes to get extra guesses), so the 5 nodes in the cluster live in geographically separated data centers, and we're real careful about things that could kill a node or process.
To do this securely made the whole thing quite difficult, because it means we can never persist anything outside the enclave, or an attacker could unpersist into 1000 unmodified enclaves (who would never know about each other) and get 1000*N guesses.
The enclave is hardened against Spectre and LVI with this (BOLT/LLVM based), and other techniques: https://github.com/signalapp/BOLT
The last build step before signing is a verifier that checks that there are no missed mitigations, built using Intel Xed, to try to avoid potential missing mitigations due to an LLVM or BOLT bug.
Not going to get that sort of latency without extreme custom chips though.
SAI, like OFDPA and OpenNSL before them (and a few more, can't even keep track anymore) are giant closed-source userspace binary blobs that Broadcom released to try (and fail) to mollify folks who want open-source networking. If you're serious about feature set and performance, there is unfortunately still no alternative to the proprietary NDA'd SDKs.
Mellanox sells switches with Broadcom silicon, so certainly in the short and medium term there will be no changes there. Long term is harder to say. It is possible that once Mellanox/Nvidia's ASIC portfolio is sufficiently complete they'll stop adding support for newer competitor ASICs, but I have no special insight there.
Thanks for using Cumulus, glad to hear you're having a good experience with it!
Tapes don't have fast (by spinning rust standards) random reads.
Hinting in ext4 or NTFS is of course a waste of time, but CoW filesystems like ZFS or btrfs are in a much better position to handle host-managed SMR.
And a generic "SMRTL" layer that utilizes (hopefully mirrored) SSDs as a write staging area could do massively better than the dumb host-managed SMR on these drives.
Announce a trade-in for anyone who has a Red and has a problem with device-managed SMR, with a CMR Red. Many, many people won't notice or care (RAID1 users who don't do massive writes) Then reflash the SMR reds with the host-managed firmware they already have for the megascalers (who of course have their own highly proprietary software management layers to handle SMR) and sell those at some deep discount to anyone who wants them.
Announce a $100,000 bounty to anyone who adds host-managed SMR support (with some slightly ambitious perf target vs CMR) to ZFS, bcachefs, whatever.
They come out of this looking good (eventually) instead of looking like complete assholes. And end up with an expanded ecosystem that allows them to create a new product family using firmware work that they've already done years go!
N64 was literally SGI derived, but PS1 was at best "SGI inspired". This comparison overstates the similarities.
> After that Nintendo started using ATI for graphics hardware
Nintendo was using the ArtX designs before ATI bought them. It was a very different design than the native ATI line.
They tried the same playbook again with the PS3, but paniced when they realized how hard the cell SPEs would be to program to execute shaders effectively and added an Nvidia GPU. The PS3 was not sufficiently more popular than the Xbox 360 to justify the level of investment to really capitalize on the unusual architecture.
They have a strong vested interest in pretending that sharing compute resources across customers is a safe thing to do, so they're unlikely to rock the boat.
In all cases, Signal only uses SGX to improve cases where data previously was stored in plaintext. The idea is to change the required attack from "compromise signal servers" to "compromise signal servers _and_ compromise SGX".
KeypassX is a rewrite in C++, using QT. KeypassXC is a fork of KeypassX, as KeypassX was felt to be unmaintained.
When Broadcom uses the term SOC, they mean "Switch on a Chip" to differentiate their single chip designs from older multi chip architectures.
SiByte was MIPS-based, more like an NPU than an (Broadcom term) SOC.