1,887 karma · joined July 16, 2012
Aspiring mountaineer.
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/ejones; my proof: https://keybase.io/ejones/sigs/em0zaIvNe2TeZ3vgjRwX3qUC1zJEcJmUSPqaYuaVm-E ]
Founder of carbonremoved.com to make CO₂ removal accessible to everyone.
The M4 MacBook Airs are very tempting and I think the size & weight of the 15" is not as offputting as it once was. However I agree with the criticism in this article. A lesser quality display and lacking a little power (M4 Pro option would be nice).
A 14" MacBook Pro is the current draw. Slightly heavier but option for M4 Pro as well as more memory (up to 48GB) as well as nanotexture for out and about.
I love the idea of the Framework 13" machines with Ubuntu. Almost same weight as a 13" Air and with strong upgradeability. Disadvantages (to me) are the battery life on Linux is significantly less than an Apple device (although hard to find exact numbers), and even with the new Ryzen AI Max processors and the DDR5 memory, speed is much lower compared to the M-series soldered on a chip (although I'm open to counter points that this difference in speed is not worth it).
The Apple software ecosystem is a soft grab but to be honest there are options to Apple Photos which is the one I use the most.
Sometimes they just don't allow you to use it. In the past I've had ISP router that had a heavily restricted custom firmware on it and a "hidden" username password setup for authorizing with the ISP. I couldn't use my own.
In that situation I had to aim to use it as the modem and have a second router it unloaded to. Not ideal.
Now I can freely pick hardware with my current ISP. Just need to find the time/money to upgrade to fibre everywhere to capitalize on the 10Gb/s.
- The recent (Nov '24) mishap from Mattel printing a p*rn site on their Wicked dolls: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gz91pp5llo
- Or the numerous 'Click Here' or unreasonable long (e.g. https://example.gov.uk/some/sub/site/dGhlbi9hL3JlYWxseS9sb25...) that have appeared in UK government or NHS leaflets.
Stock doesn't matter for my case.
The browser has storage options to handle close and reopens.
Prices in each currency are all in ints (i.e. cents) to avoid float issues.
There are problems to address on either end that you have to be aware of.
My point is that if you are going to use a JS framework then it will do the same as HTMX and I don't have to remember where to draw boundaries of responsibility.
But I want things like an on-site calculator. I load in products and prices, users can adjust sliders to change the quantity and relevant number is calculated. I don't want to use HTMX for this to call the server each time, I want instant reactivity and state in the frontend maintained so when the user has tweaked as necessary they can just check out.
HTMX does not fit this use case so I use React to build widgets (or if even more complex SPA then Angular). If I'm using a JS framework anyway, then I don't need HTMX. It's just something else to clutter the project and remember to use.
HTMX has its place but with the user expectation for reactivity in the browser I personally find it too limiting.
How does this project compare to Apache Baremaps (incubating)?
I'll make a short shameless plug: If you would like to use generative AI (OpenAI/Google/Anthropic/Open source) but don't want to run everything yourself, Cognos[0] stores your conversations encrypted so there are no risks of hacks, leaks or your data being used for training.
Keep up the great work.
With this MVP I wanted to see if there was demand for something where privacy and encryption were enough of a USP to attract some early adopters. Maybe to also cross that hurdle I need to go fully transparent and open-source as well so that those with the technical knowledge can verify themselves that I am doing what I say I'm doing.
I'll also write up a long-form article with more details on the security and the encryption.
Mid-to-long term (and if there was demand) I could also get security audited & certified and hopefully build an increasingly trustful relationship.
Side note - somebody else replied to me drawing my attention to DuckDuckGo also releasing a Beta AI chat recently. It offers no storage, client or server, so if you refresh the page your chats are gone. I would imagine they are also testing the market for something like this.
Yes I try to make it as obvious as possible that this is not end-to-end encrypted. Using provider APIs over their products (e.g. ChatGPT) does already offer some privacy benefits and I do give the user transparent choice over where to send their prompt.
But I am (currently) an unknown entity. How could I improve my offering to build up that trust?
I'm happy to even have a video call to answer any questions if that would help :) I see myself as offering a similar service to ProtonMail so perhaps I also need to look at how they built up trust in the early days too.
That doesn't mean it should be the norm though. If enough people actually care about their privacy there is the possibility for cheap, privacy invasive and expensive, privacy respecting products to live in the market.
Shameless plug: I launched Cognos[0] a few days ago that encrypts your AI Prompts and Outputs. No risk of leaks/hacks/being used for training.
If you like generative AI but are worried about putting all your data into ChatGPT and don't know how/want to run inference infrastructure yourself it could be something for you.
I'm also curious. Privacy is something that everyone claims to want yet when it's on the shelf next to the competition it's often overlooked in favor of the shinier, more common products (Signal versus Telegram; Gmail versus ProtonMail etc.).
However I'm sure we're only one big AI data leak away for people to realize that pumping all your confidential data into a single company for it to train on is not such a great idea ;).
Of course generally it's not up to them, instead up to the management who sets the office policy but to describe the people who don't like going to the office as 'the good ones' seems a little short sighted.
Came here to agree with this.
Personally (and there is a heavy personal opinion to this as some people also do prefer the office life) I think a majority work from home but with the occasional mandated office day specifically for socialising is a good hybrid. I acknowledge that more extreme (for lack of a better word) introverts would like to avoid the office all together though.
I much prefer a well thought out text message rather than someone spamming their thoughts at me through speech.
That being said, for discussion points and fast iterations I agree that in-person is hard-to-beat, but for a lot of work this is the minority and doesn't justify forcing people to be there at all times just in case this is needed.
Hm I still would prefer plain text not leaving the device. There have been historical examples of plain text passwords ending up in logs (Twitter) so I would prefer encrypted on my device so there's no chance of interception (mistaken or purposeful) on the server.
Plus this would result in a loss of features - keys would then live only on a device for as long as the cookies/storage existed. New browser/device/clean storage the keys are lost and the ciphertext unable to be decrypted.
Could you correct me please so we're on the same discussion ground? Where does encryption happen and what mechanisms are used to ensure the security of keys?
Scenario 1: Attacker external to service
With TLS and server side encryption (generally at rest), if an attacker breaches the service they will have full access to all user data. The server has the encryption/decryption keys.
With client side encryption, if an attacker breaches the service they have access to many encrypted blobs that they need to decrypt. If the attacker wants to do this they have to create and plublish a malicious JS and update any resource integrity before waiting for the users to use the malicious version and even then will only get a subset of user keys.
Scenario 2: Attacker internal to service
With TLS and server side encryption, a malicious employee can generally get access to the unencrypted data. Once again, the server will have a copy of the key. Whether by accident or on purpose, plain text user data can be leaked into logs, dumped into backups etc.
With client side encryption, the attacker only has access to ciphertext. Again, they would need to publish a malicious library, bypass any resource integrity at the same time and wait - remaining undetected - for every user to log in so their keys could be siphoned away.
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It may be the case that the server needs access to plain text data in which case a more complex approach using a unique user key pair where the public key encrypts the data after processing so the server cannot decrypt it could be utilized. But even then, there will still need to be some JS sent to browser for that logic.
If there is no business reason for the server to see the plaintext data, client side encryption should be preferred.
It's also not immediately obvious to me where the company is registered or info about the people behind the company.
For a security focused company these are all things I would expect to be rock-solid and as transparent as possible for the initial due-diligence when evaluating services like this.
Because trust has to be given somewhere and my business would likely fail if I'm telling you it's encrypted but actually it's not.
Plus, if you were really concerned you could open up the developer tools, network tab and see the communication to the server and validate that it's only sending encrypted data that you know the server can't decrypt.
> the unencrypted stuff lives somewhere
Most likely the plain text will only live in-memory in the clients browser (depends on the implementation of the software using the library though). Unless I've mis-understood your concern?
> Apps that want "security after TLS" just encrypt it serverside, which is generally better
Why is this "generally better"?
With client side encryption I can see my data, the server and any third-parties cannot. With server side encryption I have to send plain text. TLS protects this from third-party observers but anyone server side - now or in the future - can access my data. There is also the possibility of future breaches as encryption at rest stops at attacker running away with a harddrive but does not stop an attacker accessing a running database and dumping all the decrypted contents.
There is an attack vector that the server offers a malicious JS file (something which any web based encryptor such as Protonmail is also "vulnerable" to) however this is also possible for other types of application too. App stores can send malicious copies of Signal (both for initial install or (auto-)updates). Future Thunderbird updates can bypass OpenPGP encryption. Dependencies can have malicious backdoors added to affect core encryption libraries.
Trust has to be accepted somewhere along the chain, it's up to you where.
Ultimately, plain text data should never reach the server and the server will never have access to decryption keys either. Row level encryption; encryption at rest etc. is not the same as in those cases the data arrives at the server in plain text which can end up in logs, can be directed to other parts of the business or in invisible changes the server may just stop encrypting the data.
By encrypting client side, I - as a user - can be sure that my data can't be mined, analyzed or leaked.
I acknowledge that there is the poisoned binary attack - serving malicious javascript files to future visitors - but this may happen somewhere along the supply chain for any application. Whether it's an app from an app store (e.g. Signal) or a desktop app (Thunderbird + PGP) at some point updates are provided to client apps and as we have seen recently, even dependencies to these apps are vulnerable. SRI and maybe clearly showing the version of encryption library being used would probably go a long way. Services such as Proton also rely on JS delivered to the browser.
In short, a lot of applications could benefit from adding a layer of encryption to their data. The truly paranoid may not be happy putting their trust in a javascript blob but the vast majority of people would benefit from having a little extra privacy-by-default in their lives.
Another curious entry on the list...
Reasonable design and interactivity have become the norm with no-code tools, templates and frameworks taking a lot of pressure of those who may have struggled with design if starting from scratch.
This proliferation also increases the standards of users who expect a more polished feel of a product (even if it's simple and barely works with a dumpster fire backend). Notable mention of Craigslist though which is only able to buck the trend due to lock-in. People using your product is the biggest signal that you are on to something but if potential users bounce because of your lacking UI/UX you may be less likely to pursue the development of your product.
Of course this isn't everyone and some of us are more than happy to put up with a less-polished UI in favor of the product itself (I'm looking at you *nix users). 'Show HN' states 'A Show HN needn't be complicated or look slick. The community is comfortable with work that's at an early stage.' and I feel that may be a portion of the users here but chances are higher that even those of us who are willing to use early stage products would prefer cleaner UIs.
Personally though - as someone who likes to launch products - it can be quite disheartening. On one hand I don't want to spend too much time on design however I fear that if I don't it will hinder me. My approach is to apply the 80:20 rule. Educate myself a little in design and use pre-made stuff as much as I can.