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mcpherrinm

4,544 karma · joined January 24, 2010

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mcpherrinm··on 10 Years of Let's Encrypt
I'm the technical lead for Let's Encrypt SRE.

Publishing more about our resilience engineering sounds like a great idea!

I'll get that on our blogging schedule for next year

mcpherrinm··on MinIO is now in maintenance-mode
Versity Gateway looks like a reasonable option here. I haven't personally used it, but I know some folks who say it performs pretty great as a "ZFS-backed S3" alternative.

https://github.com/versity/versitygw

Unlike other options like Garage or Minio, it doesn't have any clustering, replication, erasure coding, ...

Your S3 objects are just files on disk, and Versity exposes it. I gather it exists to provide an S3 interface on top of their other project (ScoutFS), but it seems like it should work on any old filesystem.

mcpherrinm··on Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days
I don't expect we'll ever remove the other validation methods, and certainly have no plans to do so.

There are pros and cons of various approaches.

mcpherrinm··on Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days
Note that renewing certificates is generally exempt from rate limits: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/rate-limits/#limit-exemptions-f...

We are working on further improvements to our rate limits, including adding more automation to how we adjust them. We're not ready to announce that yet.

We wanted to get this post out as soon as we'd decided on a timeline so everyone's on the same page here.

mcpherrinm··on Testing shows automotive glassbreakers can't break modern automotive glass
We had (optional) safety training when I worked at Square, which included CPR training, going over office evacuation procedures, etc. One of the most fun parts was they had a virtual fire extinguisher training, which involved basically a video game fire extinguisher controller to put out a fire on a tv. It’s definitely not as exciting as using a real fire extinguisher training, but can also be done in an office meeting room.
mcpherrinm··on ISPs more likely to throttle netizens who connect through CG-NAT: Cloudflare
The Register is adding very little on top of https://blog.cloudflare.com/detecting-cgn-to-reduce-collater...

Previously discussed (a bit) at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45746509

mcpherrinm··on ISPs more likely to throttle netizens who connect through CG-NAT: Cloudflare
I wonder if that's not very visible in Cloudflare's data because those mobile devices will likely use IPv6 to connect to Cloudflare-hosted sites.
mcpherrinm··on RegEx Crossword
https://blog.nelhage.com/post/regex-crosswords-z3/ was posted a few days ago here and is an interesting way to solve these
mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
On some major OSes (like Windows and Mac), there’s a “platform verifier” which can handle some of this, including the fetching and sharing of out of band data. It doesn’t have to be tied to a browser.

Linux should probably get one too, but I don’t know who will lead that effort.

In the mean time, browsers aren’t willing to wait on OSes to get their act together, and reasonably so. There’s regulation (and users, especially corporate/government) pushing for post-quantum solutions soon, so folks are trying to find solutions that can actually be deployed.

Browsers have always led in this space, all the way back to Netscape introducing SSL in the first place.

mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
I think most folks involved are assuming the landmarks will be distributed by the browser/OS vendor, at least for end-user devices where privacy matters the most - Similar to how CRLSets/CRLite/etc are pushed today.

There's "full certificates" defined in the draft which include signatures for clients who don't have landmarks pre-distributed, too.

mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
Yeah. From the RFC draft:

> If a new landmark is allocated every hour, signatureless certificate subtrees will span around 4,400,000 certificates, leading to 23 hashes in the inclusion proof, giving an inclusion proof size of 736 bytes, with no signatures.

https://davidben.github.io/merkle-tree-certs/draft-davidben-...

That's assuming 4.4 million certs per landmark, a bit bigger than your estimate.

There's also a "full certificate" which includes signatures, for clients who don't have up-to-date landmarks. Those are big still, but if it's just for the occasional "curl" command, that's not the end of the world for many clients.

mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
Capture-now Decrypt-later isn't really relevant to certificates, who mostly exist to defend against active MITM. The key exchange algorithms need to be PQ-secure for CN-DL, but that has already happened if you have an up-to-date client and server.
mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
The migration here is going to be long.

Chrome and Cloudflare are doing a MTC experiment this year. We'll work on standardizing over the next year. Let's Encrypt may start adding support the year after that. Downstream software might start deploying support MTCs the year after that. People using LTS Linux distros might not upgrade software for another 5 years after that. People run out-of-date client devices for another 5 years too.

So even in that timeline, which is about as fast as any internet-scale migration goes, it may be 10-15 years from today for MTC support to be fully widespread.

mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
Yes, the rest of the cryptography needs to be PQ-secure as well.

But that's largely already true:

The key exchange is now typically done with X25519MLKEM768, a hybrid of the traditional x25519 and ML-KEM-768, which is post-quantum secure.

The exchanged keys typically AES-128 or AES-256 or ChaCha20. These are likely to be much more secure against quantum computers as well (while they may be weakened, it is likely we have plenty of security margin left).

Changing the key exchange or transport encryption protocols however is much, much easier, as it's negotiated and we can add new options right away.

Certificates are the trickiest piece to change and upgrade, so even though Q-day is likely years away still, we need to start working on this now.

Upgrading the key exchange has already happened because of the risk of capture-now, decrypt-later attacks, where you sniff traffic now and break it in the future.

mcpherrinm··on Keeping the Internet fast and secure: introducing Merkle Tree Certificates
Next week at IETF 124, there's a Birds-of-a-Feather session that will kick off the standardization process here.

I think Merkle Tree Certificates a promising option. I'll be participating in the standardization efforts.

Chrome has signalled in multiple venues that they anticipate this to be their preferred (or only) option for post-quantum certificates, so it seems fairly likely we will deploy this in the coming years

I work for Let's Encrypt, but this is not an official statement or promise to implement anything yet. For that you can subscribe to our newsletter :)

mcpherrinm··on ADS-B Exposed
Is there a good documentation (or maybe code) reference to the protocols that get used here? Running readsb is fine enough by me, but I'm just interested in how these systems work. I see some mentions of a Beast format. And then there's the mlat-client too
mcpherrinm··on ADS-B Exposed
It appears to be where "you" (website visitors) have loaded page tiles. I was able to draw a little picture on the map by zooming in and panning around!

The PR introducing it is easier to read than the whole repo: https://github.com/ClickHouse/adsb.exposed/pull/48/files

mcpherrinm··on A story about bypassing air Canada's in-flight network restrictions
I don't know specifically what skills you're interested in, but this is all pretty much networking fundamentals.

I think I learned most of what I'd need to do this in 'TCP/IP Illustrated: Volume 1'.

There's plenty of "network penetration testing" type books which might also be of interest, though I don't have a specific recommendation here.

There's a wider set of books at https://github.com/jacobian/infosec-engineering that's pretty good too, though it's a wider set of things than this.

mcpherrinm··on OCSP Service Has Reached End of Life
For Let’s Encrypt certificates which no longer contain an OCSP URL, I don’t think it’ll have any effect.

Firefox also already has more effective revocation checking in CRLite: https://blog.mozilla.org/en/firefox/crlite/

mcpherrinm··on Running our Docker registry on-prem with Harbor
It does seem mostly possible to host a Docker registry with static files and a bit of config:

https://github.com/jpetazzo/registrish

I haven’t tried running this yet, but it seems worth keeping in mind. It’s relatively simple software so the idea could probably be pretty easily adapted to other situations.

mcpherrinm··on SystemD Service Hardening
Do you have any references for doing similar system hardening under either of those?
mcpherrinm··on Vaultwarden commit introduces SSO using OpenID Connect
Everyone from the single-user homelab to the biggest companies should have SSO.
mcpherrinm··on Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 Incident on July 14, 2025
I've reviewed the privacy policy and performance of various DoH servers, and determined in my opinion that Cloudflare and Google both provide privacy-respecting policies.

I believe that they follow their published policies and have reasonable security teams. They're also both popular services, which mitigates many of the other types of DNS tracking possible.

https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/privacy https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns...

mcpherrinm··on Running a Certificate Transparency log
Yes, the static-ct api is designed to be highly cacheable by a CDN.

That is one of the primary motivations of its design over the previous CT API, which had some relatively flexible requests that led to less good caching.

mcpherrinm··on Getting ready to issue IP address certificates
If it was a blog post or announcement, we’d have surely included more context, and not a forum post really intended for limited distribution.

You just used HN without expanding that acronym! :)

mcpherrinm··on My iPhone 8 Refuses to Die: Now It's a Solar-Powered Vision OCR Server
It's the "for longer than a week" bit - Unless you have a paid developer account, you can only sign apps to sideload that last one week.

There's some tools to automate "refreshing" the app, but that requires you have some other computer that pushes a new app every week.

The "1 week" restriction is usually fine when you're developing (as you typically are continually rebuilding and updating when actively working on an app) but is clearly intended to avoid being a way to sideload apps without the developer account "nearby".

mcpherrinm··on Why SSL was renamed to TLS in late 90s (2014)
well, unless both client and server have sufficiently weak crypto enabled that an attacker can break it during the handshake.

Then you can MITM, force both sides to use the weak crypto, which can be broken, and you're in the middle. Also not really so relevant today.

mcpherrinm··on Why SSL was renamed to TLS in late 90s (2014)
No: while the handshake is unencrypted, it is authenticated. An attacker can’t modify it.

What an attacker can do is block handshakes with parameters they don’t like. Some clients would retry a new handshake with an older TLS version, because they’d take the silence to mean that the server has broken negotiation.

mcpherrinm··on Why SSL was renamed to TLS in late 90s (2014)
Well, my only real point is that it’s not the version negotiation in TLS that’s broken. It’s the workaround for intolerance of newer versions that had downgrade attacks.

Fortunately that’s all behind us now, and transitioning from 1.2 to 1.3 is going much smoother than 1.0 to 1.2 went.

mcpherrinm··on Why SSL was renamed to TLS in late 90s (2014)
The main difference is in the padding. When the POODLE attack was pre-announced as only affecting SSL3 and not TLS1.0, that was enough to predict it was going to be a padding oracle.

I think it’s fair to say they’re very similar, with a few “bug fixes”. It’s been a while since I’ve thought about either though, and might be forgetting a few things. I’ve only ever implemented SSL3 and TLS1.0 together, so there may be some details I’m forgetting.

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