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milkshakes

3,605 karma · joined March 5, 2009

i'm just as lost as you #1B70E0
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milkshakes··on Nvidia dramatically reduces amount of OpenAI infra financing it may guarantee
inference is the cheap part; training is expensive. what compute infrastructure would train this mythical magic model?
milkshakes··on Kinney Drugs pulls back AI phone assistant after hundreds of customer complaints
see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pharmacy_benefit_management
milkshakes··on OpenChamber: An Agentic Development Environment
lately, i like to try to spend the morning talking through and framing up a few very detailed initiatives for parallel efforts that each spawn and orchestrate their own tasks, then feed them to /goals and go for a nice walk in the park, get some groceries, check in on the orchestrators and spawned tasks along the way, steer them from the phone.

so far it's been working pretty well for me in most cases, but not always. having a few parallel efforts in motion means that even if one goes off the rails, i can pause it and still make progress on the others, then fix it up when i get home.

milkshakes··on The OpenAI–Hugging Face Incident [video]
you can't downvote a submission it's just that nobody upvoted it
milkshakes··on The OpenAI–Hugging Face Incident [video]
> models are still relatively easy to monitor and constrain

are they?

milkshakes··on AI's top startups are barely publishing their research
they also have a pretty handy button right next to the error to ftfy
milkshakes··on How to Block Some of the Bots
i guess what i'm curious about is where you would draw the line, and why.

how do you define a user agent? is it desirable or not for users to be able to discover and access resources and communities on the internet using the tools, formats, and workflows that they prefer?

are search bots desirable?

the internet wayback machine?

how do you feel about browser extensions and greasemonkey scripts?

milkshakes··on How to Block Some of the Bots
i guess the thing i'm most confused about is what is the higher level goal here. 1 in 8 humans on the planet are experiencing the "web" through chatgpt alone. many have migrated to purely agentic workflows.

is the goal for your content to just be invisible to this growing population? is the expectation that all of this is just a fad, which will fade away? what is the end game to the tactics you have outlined? what is the strategy?

milkshakes··on UK AISI / Caisi Preliminary Assessment of Kimi K3's Cyber Capabilities
start, not finish
milkshakes··on DeepSeek pause fundraise after comments on compute gap to US leaked (transcript) [pdf]
http://www.incompleteideas.net/IncIdeas/BitterLesson.html

> One thing that should be learned from the bitter lesson is the great power of general purpose methods, of methods that continue to scale with increased computation even as the available computation becomes very great. The two methods that seem to scale arbitrarily in this way are search and learning.

milkshakes··on UK AISI / Caisi Preliminary Assessment of Kimi K3's Cyber Capabilities
start here: https://huggingface.co/blog/mlabonne/abliteration
milkshakes··on Most Americans say "not in my backyard" to AI data centers
what top comment?
milkshakes··on Most Americans say "not in my backyard" to AI data centers
nyt is no fan of AI, but they cover this: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/09/business/china-russia-ai-...
milkshakes··on OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
this is quite literally reward hacking. the model, under evaluation with cyber capabilities enabled, used those capabilities to simply bypass the exercise entirely and aim straight for the source of the flag. the CTF equivalent back in the day would be hacking the scoreboard.

in a street fight, the only rules are that there are no rules.

milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
who are you talking about? again, my question is concerned with the "second class labs" and the sustainability of the distillation-as-a-service model.
milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
it is not a required first step for training a model, sure. but that's not what i claimed. what i claimed is that is how they are so significantly _reducing the cost_ of training one! how else do you think they are doing it?
milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
the obvious difference is the massive scale of data and compute required to develop and evolve these models, and the costs they impose on those building them.
milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-preventing-dist...

Moonshot AI Scale: Over 3.4 million exchanges

The operation targeted:

Agentic reasoning and tool use Coding and data analysis Computer-use agent development Computer vision Moonshot (Kimi models) employed hundreds of fraudulent accounts spanning multiple access pathways. Varied account types made the campaign harder to detect as a coordinated operation. We attributed the campaign through request metadata, which matched the public profiles of senior Moonshot staff. In a later phase, Moonshot used a more targeted approach, attempting to extract and reconstruct Claude’s reasoning traces.

milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
i never assumed that, and i do keep up with the publications. i'm also not saying it's a dumb thing to do! what i am saying is that empirically, it appears that distillation of a more advanced model is a required first step for them to train a borderline competitive, cheaper model. in effect, their training is subsidized by the frontier labs.

if this were not the case, then we would be observing chinese models that far surpass frontier models in capabilities, rather than "almost as good, but much cheaper", and we would be having a very different conversation. what happens to these efforts when the subsidy is cut off?

milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
the question was: what is the endgame for the stated "second class labs" strategy of distilling their frontier competitors then undercutting them on price?
milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
the USG/NSA will fund chinese labs? to what end?
milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
> with budgets

and what will fund these budgets exactly? inference is cheap, distillation is cheap, training is what's expensive.

milkshakes··on The Kimi K3 Moment
assume you are a "second class lab" and you are in fact making progress by distilling the results of the frontier labs' efforts.

what is the end game for this strategy?

if the frontier labs shut down, or stop releasing to the public, and there's noting left to distill, how will you progress?

milkshakes··on Apple targets dozens of OpenAI employees with legal letters
is this a joke?
milkshakes··on Telegram's t.me domain has been suspended
in fact, telegram does support e2e encryption ("secret chats")
milkshakes··on Unauthenticated RCE in Motorola's MR2600 Router
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BrickerBot
milkshakes··on OpenAI DayBreak – GPT-5.5-Cyber
see my downthread post. kyc is the first step in the process, not the last. without verifying identity, none of the other steps can take place
milkshakes··on OpenAI DayBreak – GPT-5.5-Cyber
> The company has no way of knowing whether "find all security vulnerabilities in this code" is a request from a whitehat or a blackhat hacker

the system in place to prevent unauthorized abuse. by default, the guardrails are conservative. to reduce the guardrails you can jump through a progressive series of hoops to establish whether or not you have a valid use case. the entrypoint for establishing your use case is verifying your identity and background. if you don't want to do this, you are free to use Codex Security to identify and fix vulnerabilities, it is quite good at this. the harness and model are already evaluating the usage of the account and the nature of the code being examined and actions requested. but the again, the guardrail thresholds will be very conservative for anonymous users.

what is your proposal?

milkshakes··on OpenAI DayBreak – GPT-5.5-Cyber
> No, KYC has nothing to do with that problem. KYC doesn't help at all here.

that's a bold statement. how does it not help solve the problem? what is a better solution?

milkshakes··on OpenAI DayBreak – GPT-5.5-Cyber
take a look at this bug and the chain required to exploit it:

https://projectzero.google/2021/12/a-deep-dive-into-nso-zero...

https://projectzero.google/2022/03/forcedentry-sandbox-escap...

exploiting vulnerabilities on hardened targets isn't just in a different league from finding them, it is a different sport altogether.

put simply, it's the difference between an integer overflow leading to a sandbox escaping RCE and one that leads to a crash.

Codex Security and 5.5/5.6 are still very good finding vulnerable code -- they will identify and fix unsafe behavior, but they will refuse to help you with exploitation -- they will actively prevent you from taking any steps to weaponize the unsafe behavior that are not required to remediate it. they will err conservative here, but for the most part they will still let you discover and address a wide range and depth of vulnerabilities. you can verify yourself to turn off the most basic safeguards and sign up through a more rigorous process for a spectrum of TAC options.

obviously there is a balance here -- openai wants to empower defenders while at the same time not exposing capabilities to the adversaries that would overwhelm defenders. there is no "right" answer. it is a work in progress. this is an intentional and deliberate decision to provide defenders with a (temporary, dwindling) advantage.

the example i chose was pretty extreme, but the underlying principle -- enable visibility discovery and remediation, but make it difficult to weaponize and defeat countermeasures makes sense given the bigger picture, IMO.

this calm before the storm is not going to last for very long, and defenders need every advantage they can get to get their houses in order before these capabilities are widely commoditized.

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