2,572 karma · joined January 22, 2015
matt.ucc.asn.au
In Perth, Australia
I could see it being more of a problem for signing.
Idle thought - wonder if there are perfect hash-like constructions they could use for revoked certificate lists.
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/windows-secure-boo...
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/...
Really it seems like having any expiry date for these certificates is a mistake. The one thing it might protect against is a compromised signing key, but if you have to wait 15 years for a compromised key to stop being valid, it's not very useful!
Don't worry, the replacement MS certs expire in 2038 (a couple of months after the 32-bit unix time rollover).
Of course it's going to take time for different agriculture regions to get set up.
But it's the same kind of problem as general environment vars - rather than just a name, maybe it needs metadata of where it came from.
To be clear, I'm talking about the unprivileged to allow_active CVE-2025-6018, not the allow_active to root.
Here's an example of measuring packages that report warnings for software that has suspicious conversions. Compile with `-Wconversion` with both 32-bit and 64-bit time_t, and see what the difference is. https://github.com/mkj/yocto-y2038
That is using yocto, but you could probably do something similar with other less-embedded distros too, if you can rebuild the world.
FWIW I didn't find much interesting with that apart from busybox dhcpd.
\* These are the negative, (1 - phi) = phi\*2 = (3 - sqrt(5))/2,
\* which is very slightly easier to multiply by and makes no
\* difference to the hash distribution.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/lin...