1,747 karma · joined May 6, 2022
> The mask argument to statx() is used to tell the kernel which fields the caller is interested in.
https://manpages.debian.org/bookworm/manpages-dev/statx.2.en...
https://github.com/lukasstraub2/intercept-anything
Go is hardly the only thing where LD_PRELOAD doesn't work.
Auto screen orientation only works 50% of the time, because the whole thing is based on a pile of shell scripts.
There is no lock screen included.
No, I'm not kidding.
[1] https://sxmo.org/docs/gettingstarted/
[2] https://man.sr.ht/~anjan/sxmo-docs/USERGUIDE.md#strongglobal...
Android phones are more open than ever with the recent EU laws and Google anti-trust rulings. Android and iOS are not at all comparable in that aspect.
Android phones receive longer updates than ever.
Android phones are more innovative than ever with all these foldables.
Android phones consistently have better specs than iPhones at the same price point.
There is, with cgroups: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/net_cls.t...
(Too much for my taste.)
Then you have to factor in that (far) fewer users are going to use/pay for their products if it's a subscription.
It's a though calculation for sure.
[0] https://thenextweb.com/news/heres-how-much-money-you-made-go...
You can read my praise of ChromeOS here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41178525
To add a few, Chrome was the first browser to introduce process isolation: Every browser tab, every site (second-level domain) and every iframe runs in its own sandboxed process.
With that it's the only end-user software (alongside the other browsers) that actually is secure against Spectre and Meltdown. Operating systems only protect against Specre/Meltdown leaks between processes.
Google invented Certificate Transparency and Chrome enforces CT since years. Firefox added CT enforcement only a few days ago.
CT solves the following: For example, if a rouge Chinese Certificate Authority decides to issue a cert for google.com to the Chinese government for Man-in-the-Middle attacks, CT blows their coverand makes it known to everyone that the CA issued a fraudlent cert.
Now, I didn't read the source code, but Mozillas wording implies they use a custom pki to sign extentions.
Given that most (all?) root programs only certify host names or email addresses (S/MIME), it is reasonable for Mozilla to run a custom pki for this. And that neccesarily requires shipping/pinning the root certificates.
Actually this whole discussion is moot, because Firefox uses (and ships with) the Mozilla Root Program. So it can not not pin certificates, because that is the whole point of a root program.
Looks like we all learned something today.
Can you elaborate on that?