So it was time, and it was painful, but now we get to focus in on the fun stuff: making the service more awesome, and growing.
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nathaniel@spreedly.com nathaniel@talbott.ws
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So it was time, and it was painful, but now we get to focus in on the fun stuff: making the service more awesome, and growing.
"Even if you absolutely have to raise prices across the board, I think three months of warning is the absolute minimum amount of time to give a customer base before you hit them with the increase."
We're doing that, with a unilateral offer to grandfather customers for 90 days.
In general, I still think grandfathering is best when possible, but when you realize your business isn't growable (and barely sustainable) at current prices then something's gotta give. We've put this price raise off too long, hoping to soften it with new features, etc., but it's a chicken and egg problem. We can't do what needs to be done without the resources to do it. So prices have gone up, and it's the next day and we're in a better spot to help all our (remaining) customers rock.
Terralien does ongoing development work for six businesses for which we built the original technology. Their degree of success varies, but they all have in common that they're successful enough to have persisted 1+ years and are continuing to make progress. All of them rely on software for their core business to some varying degree, but in none of their cases is the software itself rocket science. It may be moderately complicated and there may be a lot of it, but a good hacker could pick it up without completely derailing the project in the meantime.
On the flipside, Terralien had one very tech-heavy business that we got off the ground, after which they brought development in-house in the form of a developer working for equity. It made total sense for them, since they were doing algorithmic work in the energy space so their technology was in a way "rocket science" and they needed to have that close.
I think anyone considering outsourcing the software build for their startup should look for a freelancer or devshop that is ready and willing to serve as their CTO for the long haul. You want a shop or an individual that understands technology as a tool that should serve the larger business purposes, and not an end in itself. That's the way we try to approach it at Terralien, and it seems to be working really well for our clients.
Good call on having the pithy 5-10 word description - that's on my short list now.
* Your PCI compliance burden is significantly reduced. * Card storage is a seamless process, and at the end of the day you own the card data. * You can easily switch gateways (or balance across multiple gateways). * Our API doesn't suck, which doesn't sound like much until you've had the misfortune to implement against a few gateway API's.
And there are other value props we'll be rolling out as time progresses - there's a lot of cool things we can do to improve the life of anyone collecting money online.
And trust me, you definitely want to fill out SAQ-A.
We see this as one of the significant value adds of Core - avoiding lock-in, including lock-in to Core itself.
So, we weren't quite ready to land on the front page of HN, but mission accomplished - we now have a whole list of smart people to invite into the beta, so thanks to bradleyjoyce for giving us that nudge.
I'm going to work through the questions that have come up in the discussion - good prep for the FAQ page I need to write - but feel free to email me directly if you have any other questions or just want to chat about Core (my email address is in my profile).
Building custom software is nothing like building a cookie-cutter tract house - completely agreed. In that case you're getting the same house as someone else, the builder has done it all before, and there are only a few options that you get to pick with the costs for those options known.
Building custom software is a lot like building a custom house, though - while there's an estimate going in, it tends to change a lot, and the final price varies widely depending on the buyer's choices during the project. Try being the general contractor on your own house construction project and you'll quickly discover costs are very variable regardless of the estimates up front.
There are a lot of stereotypes about how construction projects are "fixed bid" and "everything runs off of well-defined blueprints"; my Dad is an architect working on large healthcare projects, and I can tell you that those stereotypes are largely wrong. The projects do not go according to plan and even things "in the blueprint" change regularly mid-project.
If this comes off as an attack on Grasshopper Group - my apologies. I think what ya'll have done is pretty impressive, and I'd like to duplicate it myself. At the same time - Chargify wouldn't have ever gotten into the situation of supporting so many unsustainable free users if it (as a stand-alone product) was bootstrapped. That's all I'm saying. Calling that a "sugar daddy" was probably overly inflammatory.
From http://chargify.com/blog/why-we-changed-our-pricing/:
"Grasshopper Group has been supporting Chargify for 15 months, and Chargify is now supporting 3,000 merchants - again, the large majority of whom are paying $0."
And from the linked article:
"We should have shared the data we collected for over a year that demonstrated quite clearly to us that only 0.9% of customers were paying us at all, and that there was a direct correlation between those that did not pay anything and a high volume of support requests."
3000 merchants total * .009 paying = 27 paying merchants
Now, these numbers could be off in several ways, but even if they're off by an order of magnitude (and I doubt they are) - ouch!
So many lessons to be learned from this:
- Freemium's applicability is so over-rated. I couldn't be happier that we've had a (cheap) pay-to-play structure at Spreedly since the beginning. Personally I think freemium should always be a strategy introduced post-profitability, never before.
- It's been said many times, but I'll say it again: the "overnight success" is a myth. Most businesses take 2-5 years to reach any kind of profitability. Selling to startups? Better keep that in mind.
- Capital infusion causes market distortion. Not saying that's a bad thing, but it's worth recognizing. Spreedly noticed a definite drop-off in signups when Chargify came out, and why not - wouldn't you take the free option vs. Spreedly's pay to play? And wasn't that some great marketing they poured a lot of money in to? And yet their free option and their marketing were only possible due to the Grasshopper Group's investment.
- Put that all together and you end up with this: you've got to keep your burn low until you find your product/market fit and your scalable sales model. Or you've got to have a sugar daddy. Or you've got to win the investment lottery. Spreedly is still alive because we've only allowed costs to grow as we're able to handle them - that's the nature of the bootstrapped startup, hard as it can be at times.
One more bit of math: if my numbers above are correct, Spreedly has 6x as many paying customers as Chargify. And we've had zero outside investment. And, painfully, we're still not ramen profitable. But: we have a pivot in the works that will blow the doors off of what we've done to date (and it doesn't involve raising prices on existing customers - promise!). So stay tuned - this space is just starting to get interesting.
Oh, and if you're an angel investor: we'd love to have some capital to use to distort the market in our favor for a change :-)
In terms of support, what we're doing at Spreedly is focusing on providing excellent email support, and occasionally supplementing that with IM/phone support for critical issues. It's a trade-off that seems to be working well for us and our customers at this point.
Not trying to justify, just inform.
> Do you guys do segregated merchant accounts (one merchant account per customer)?
We don't do merchant accounts at all - that's pretty much a constant across everyone in this space. Businesses plug in their own merchant accounts - Spreedly just handles all the billing logic.
Here's the dirty little secret that Spreedly discovered about 18 months ago, and that I'm sure Chargify - like Recurly before them - has now found out for themselves: there are plenty of people who want to start subscription businesses, and out of those, the vast majority will not succeed and will actually end up costing more than they ever bring in. That leaves businesses in this space two options: either focus on successful startups and actively filter out the "losers" (by charging a minimum of $99/month, for instance), or minimize costs for "low probability" businesses - and they're all low probability early on! - and use "cheap to try things out" as a star search for the few businesses that will end up getting big.
Note that Chargify paired this price increase announcement with two other significant announcements that have largely been overshadowed by the hullabaloo: PCI Level 1 compliance, and 24/7 phone support. This pairing is not coincidence - I'm pretty confident that the pricing change is very firmly tied internally to these two new "features". PCI Level 1 compliance is a hefty upfront cost plus a large ongoing price tag. Good 24/7 phone support is crazy expensive to provide, and means that free customers would eat their lunch since so much of the support needs for one of these businesses is on the front end.
The ridiculously huge mistake I think Chargify made here was something I thought was just a given these days: they should've unilaterally grandfathered all of their existing clients, and quietly given the grandfathered plan to anyone who was already integrating but not yet launched as well. When Spreedly made our last pricing change - from percent of transaction fee to flat per transaction fee - it was a price drop for most of our customers. But not all: anyone with super low prices would've ended up paying us more, so we explicitly made it the minimum of $0.20 or 2% of the transaction. There's just no excuse for ticking off existing customers - it makes you look like a cell phone company. Even if you absolutely have to raise prices across the board, I think three months of warning is the absolute minimum amount of time to give a customer base before you hit them with the increase.
So, that's my $0.02 - hope it helps folks understand why I think this is happening. Questions, feedback, etc., welcome.
P.S. I think in some areas Chargify's definitely ahead of Spreedly Subscriptions in terms of functionality - all of that extra capital definitely shows in the end product. But that's because we've been focused on "what's next" after you figure out the naive business model doesn't work in this space. I said above that there are two options. That's a lie - we're working on a third option. If there are any angels reading this that would like to invest in a team that's been thinking deeply about this space since before Chargify and Recurly were a twinkle in their founder's eye, drop me a line.
Still not clear? Probably my fault! Hit me up at support@spreedly.com anytime and I'll gladly clarify.
FYI, in less than two weeks we've sold 30 of our "Kickstart" plans (http://spreedly.com/info/kickstart) - a lot of businesses are hopping on the Spreedly platform, and we're cranking away to build the best billing platform around. Come on in, the water's fine!