The only downside of TOTP to FIDO and friends (from a security perspective) is phishing resistance
336 karma · joined October 8, 2021
The only downside of TOTP to FIDO and friends (from a security perspective) is phishing resistance
Not sure how many of the gnome (mutter) people are paid. Last I checked, the nvidia support was donated by nvidia (paid) for both KDE and Gnome.
I think KDE got some work sponsored by valve (before gamescope), though I'm not quite sure on that.
Overall, outside the sway/wlroots group I was a part of at the time, people generally worked adjacent or directly on wayland for day jobs.
I.e. no traffic beyond my legitimate saturation can reach the ISP
I have saturated my link with quic or wireguard (logical or) plenty of times.
The lack of any response on high data rates would be an indicator I've only tried that once and it failed gloriously due to congestion. I don't think there's many real protocols that are unidirectional without even ACKs
Though I don't think it ever supported docker. And wasn't really expected to, since the entire namespaces+cgroup stuff is way deeper than just some surface level syscall shims.
It has the slightly odd behavior with trying to get all configured links up. This can lead to some unexpected behavior when there's more than one.
But yea, the upstream stance is essentially "don't rely on network to be up before you start. That's bad software. You have to deal with network going down and back up in practice either way." Which is often not super useful.
I.e. don't think fancy language shenanigans that do negative indexing. But negative offset from the beginning of the array memory access.
When there's some inlining, there will be no function call into some index operator function
This feels like it'll have none of the community character that makes maker's spaces what they are
And more of a rental machines co-working space sort of character
> Again, not really, except for all the misinformation online. If trans woman have such an high advantage, why haven't they dominated the Olympics for the last 20 years?
Not really sure why you specify 20 years, but I'm too lazy to go through the history of IOC positions to figure out the one 20 years ago.
Because looking at the current one already provides the answer. The IOC doesn't take the position that it is a simple topic.
The wording in https://olympics.com/ioc/human-rights/fairness-inclusion-non... (and click through) is quite clear that they see a tension between inclusion along the axis of sexual identity and a continuation (or successor) or male/female category split.
The preferred form to make modifications on.
Envoy as TLS terminating reverse proxy, and then locally it does http2.
The monotonically is important because it says that at every zoom level the function is increasing, while it being increasing just says it about the function shape in general.
Use proper title case in titles.
1. Minor mistake. 42% marginal is at 60k~ish, the 278k number is 45% 2. The effective income tax rate around 100k is in the area of 25%. When there's numbers thrown around above 40% they usually include the 19% sales tax, CO2 tax etc. it's a slightly odd number including government induced cost.
My understanding of that model is that the services themselves still just do unauthenticated HTTP, this gets picked up on the client side by a sidecar, packed into mTLS/HTTPS, authed+unpacked on the server sidecar, then passed as plain HTTP to the server itself.
This is great when we have intra-host vulnerabilities I guess. But doesn't allow to e.g. have code sanitizers that are strict on using TLS properly (google does this).
And while it is a real gain over simple unauthed with untrusted network between nodes, with cilium taking care of the intra-node networking being secure, I don't quite see how the added layer is more useful than using network policies strictly.
(besides some edge cases where it's used to further apply internal authorization based on the identity. Though that trusts the "network" (istio) again.)
I.e. even if the communication is entirely between components inside a k8s (or borg) cluster, it should be authenticated and encrypted.
In this model, there may be a reverse proxy at the edge of the cluster, but the communication between this service and the internal services wouls still be https. With systems like cert-manager it's also incredibly easy to supply every in-cluster process with a certificate form the cluster-internal CA.
-- Googler, not related to this project
There's some (namespaces) knob to avoid that, but the lack of nod to it makes me worried.
OTOH containers as security boundary is iffy. But I still like them to not be root in case of compromise
Even then, IME he's building software for 99% of users, which this covers. It can be quite annoying when he makes life hard for the remaining 1% (or fraction thereof), but I'm not as antagonistic to him as others.
Also, he kinda mentions it in the "Anything Else?" section. Not the firmware that doesn't ship with the MS keys at all, but the ability to insert your own keys and distrust the MS ones.
If everyone did authentication well, then centralized IDPs might be questionable from a computer security perspective. But most aren't doing it well.
On top of that, humans generally work best if they don't have to remember lots of truly random passwords. I.e. in realistic settings, there's a maximum of expected passwords either way. And the true gain of having dedicated auth everywhere is minor.
There's some consideration for things like FIDO/WebAuthn/PassKeys, but they mostly just shift the issue from a single provider in cloud, to a single (hardware) token. Harder to copy than browser cookies, but still a single point unless it's combined with MFA.
In systems with frontend UX validation and backend functional validation, errors from the backend tend to be aimed at devs. I.e. might expose the reflex that's known good over having nice words for the approximate test done in the frontend.
It'll be a host<>prflx connection pair. Though if the host can be reached that way, I'm unsure what the benefit of WebRTC is.
Mostly a tech-demo, or primarily to plug a p2p layer onto existing servers?
Via cloud when necessary, "local" (by WebRTC) when possible. While we could just open a local port, using the cloud to arbitrate gives us a common product vision, and proper authN/authZ.
Also allows us to pull the latency down to single digit milliseconds. The regional relays are double digit. When we use relays that aren't regional it's a couple hundred.
While SELinux can be set up somewhat orthogonal to the running system. OTOH systemd should make it easy to confirm every service process
How do you do this on modern commodity hardware without secure boot?
Or do you assume something in the category of embedded systems that allow to blow some efuses to get similar trusted boot?
Saying that it's what should be fine is useless. Since it's not instructive.
Don't fix implementation issues because that just papers over design issues? Great. Now we just need a team that never makes mistakes in design. And then a language that doesn't allow security issues outside business logic.
Some of them might be worse for privacy, but if they offer better (or cheaper, which can be a quality) features, that's up to people.
If this was "the olden days", it would be a legitimate concern. But mobile OSs have long forced Apps to request permission to use various features explicitely and fall back graciously when some aren't provided. So outside security concerns that exist either way, they really can only claim to care about misinformed users.