Totally agree, an easy read and a great reaction by Cox. I also like that the discovery and the bug itself were not communicated in a negative or condescending way, which is sometimes the case.
I think Aurora has to go through the same development process as every database. They changed essential patterns in the database, and there are severe side effects that need to be addressed. You can see the same with Aurora Serverless and the changes in V2; there were some quite quirky issues in the first versions.
Yes, but how should ServiceNow create session tokens if it is not part of the SSO system? I don't know enough about ServiceNow, but I think every large company has some products that are not part of their-SSO system. So that makes sense, but I am not sure about the next step.
Yes, that's also what I think must have happened—missing 2FA. But it seems it's also not mandatory within Snowflake accounts also, from what I understand from the general message.
I've never used Snowflake and assumed that because you push all your data into it, it probably has 2FA enabled by default. Is it optional?
Generally, I like the page and the openness of the API behind it. It is much more common for people to talk about haveibeenpwned as a source for leaked credentials, but the site claims to have over 20 million computer entries from log stealers ... and every computer has XX password.. But yes probably this was written in a hurry to catch the wave?
We tried to make the article fun to read. In the end, we could have omitted our hint about our product, but honestly, we have gathered a lot of know-how there for anyone who wants to build passkeys on their own. Our blog and this article are one of the better resources to start with, and even without it, our product offering is obvious. But: We are very commited to help anyone implementing passkeys.
It is difficult to say, but there are some reservations people have because sometimes they are not sure what exactly happens with social login, or they have one Google Account associated with the wrong email, and they do not want to use it. Google Social is particularly strong on Android, of course, but in general, there have been different numbers published ranging from a 15-65% take rate depending on the product, the target group (age), and how strongly it is positioned within the product. In our own numbers, we can see that when offered social in parallel to passkeys, 30-40% go with social sign-up but much less for login when a passkey is added (of course, on our page, there is a heavy early adopter skew pro passkeys).
Well, you can store your passkeys in a password manager like KeePassXC. Open-source password/passkey manager actually means more or less self-hosting your credentials as a third-party provider.
We use email or phone number as the identifier. We recommend verifying on sign-up, but it is actually a configuration option. We have other customers who want to request OTP on the next sign-in. Not validating the identifier on sign-up comes with a long list of potential security/ux race conditions further down the chain (especially if you also support social logins). What is your approach?
As a password manager user, nothing really changes. As you pointed out, you can use them on any major platform to actually hold your passkeys. The thing is, in the broader scale, password manager use is very low among average consumers. Passkeys are a form of built-in secure password manager for all consumers, without any action needed. This thread is full of different views, and there are also downsides to it, but in this sense, it's a free upgrade in security for the majority of consumers.
Thanks. We have heard that also and we would appreciate it. In my experience, it is already difficult to find a technical compromise within a team of 5 people who like each other and work together for years. Finding a solution on the current scale of passkeys is really a big effort and at the end it also needs to be implemented, so I would not be surprised if it takes a long time for this to happen. Do you have an estimate?
Our blog is full of examples of implementation analysis, and we have not encountered one implementation that is bug-free or leverages the complete toolset (same for us: we have just identified a bug in our implementation that relates to WebKit's user-gesture requirements on iOS versions before 17.4). That's not because of them being sloppy, it's just very difficult to get it right; that's exactly the point. For example, Uber and Amazon both did not get it right (until today). Of course, it is possible to implement passkeys without any external resources, and to be honest, we appreciate any effort, be it open-source, tutorials, or commercial applications. If you have been on an authentication team in a big B2C company and truly want to retain the trust of your customers, then you appreciate passkeys immediately as they solve one of the biggest problems... So we are also happy to see a half-good implementation as it improves security.
When using a passkey as the only factor, it gets complicated, but I think that will be the future: Email and SMS as fallbacks with additional factors like risk-based location checks (or local storage hints) to have a viable recovery mechanism parallel to passkeys. I think Github has a nice approach that we use as a role model: Collect as many fallbacks as possible in a convenient manner. Adding passkeys on any new device and regularly reminding people to check their fallbacks. That's still way more secure than passwords only, where the fallback is practically always a form of email OTP. Also social logins from Google or Apple can act as a fallback as they are (mostly) 2FA.