323 karma · joined July 7, 2010
[1] https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/7958...
Your attack scenario assumes an attacker who wants to extract a financial gain from his advantage while keeping a long position.
However, there are scenarios where an attack might benefit from a crashing bitcoin or the ability to deliver a plausible threat to trigger that crash
An example could be a nation state who would like to remind its negotiating partner, how easily they could establish control over a network that holds a substantial amount of foreign wealth. China obviously. Another one would be an investor who wants to short bitcoin in a massive scale (This has been done before, think of George Soro's 10bn GBP bet against the Bank of England)
Crashing seems a lot easier that trying to double spend. A majority hasher could simply ignore all blocks that are generated from the minority and mine only their own blocks, containing nothing but dummy transactions between the attackers wallets. The minority miners would at a 50% chance mine a new "honest" block and at 50% mine an attackers block, giving the attackers blockchain an 75 over 25 advantage. Since there are no real transactions in the attackers blocks, there would be no way to move bitcoins around anymore, holding them literally hostage.
If there is a way to make a profit from a large scale attack, then that large scale attack will be made some day.
Currently, it will cost around $2bn to buy the hashing power to control Bitcoin - that's the price of one Stealth Bomber.
Yes: https://whattomine.com/coins
Actually, I'm using a computer mining Moneros at 2000H/s in a closed room to help dry a damp wall. The rig converts 250W Power to heat (for the wall) and produces Moneros worth $200/m - leaving me $100 after paying for electricity the computer and the air dehumidifier consumed.
Changing the PoW algorithm (your example) would require these powernodes to vote for their own abolishment, if their $100M worth of ASICs can't support the change. So it's very unlikely.
I don't think so. As long as PoW is in place, the level of work required to create a block must be high, no matter what the reward is. If the blocks are too cheap, then a determined attacker with the incentive to destroy, control or harm bitcoin (a state actor who loves capital controls and hates money laundering perhaps?) could easily buy enough hashing power to squeeze out the honest miners, who need to be profitable to stay in business, and eventually control a majority.
https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption#assumpti...
Also, their yearly estimate was only 26 TWh a month ago. If we project this into the next year, then we'll end with 130 TWh at the end of 2018 - or roughly 40% of what the UK consumes.
See here: http://streamcomputing.eu/blog/2012-08-27/processors-that-ca...
Also, the boards for the backers feature a ZYNQ-7020 SOC by XILINX which sports a 1.3M Gate FPGA, available to the user. This ain't bad either.