phw

That's not necessary. Most of the relays in the report were already BadExited by the Tor Project. That means that the network consensus has the "BadExit" flag set which tells Tor clients not to select a particular relay as the last hop in its circuit. In fact, by interfering with your path selection algorithm, you reduce your anonymity over time.

First of all, it's not that big of a problem. While our list looks long and scary, there are around 1,000 exit relays, so the chance of selecting a bad one in your circuit is not high. Furthermore, Tor's path selection algorithm is weighted by a relay's bandwidth for load balancing (one of the many performance/anonymity trade-offs). Many of the fastest relays of the network are run by well-respected people and organisations such as the CCC. Also, the Tor Project "removes" malicious relays from the network (see Section 1.1 in the paper).

Finally, we published our scanner for a good reason: to crowd-source the hunt for more malicious relays :)

I'm one of the authors. We believe that the Russian relays are actually controlled by the same person/group. More details are in Section 4.2 of the paper.