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qrmn

248 karma · joined April 7, 2015

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qrmn··on Questions about the Sunday Times Snowden Story
And that's no coincidence: the prospect of Scottish independence was seen as a grave threat to the United Kingdom by HMG; so, yes, they conducted information operations against it.

I am quite sure that seeing the results that the SNP got in the General Election, however, may give them pause for thought about how such things may backfire.

qrmn··on Withdrawal from the Recording Media Business
Indeed. Taiyo-Yuden were (still are, until December) one of the very best of the actual manufacturers of optical media: and they explicitly cite that optical media is losing its relevance as why they're ceasing operations in that market.

I think this is of historical significance: it's a sea-change moment, with a leading manufacturer essentially conceding that optical media is no longer relevant and can never catch up, destined to fade into the past.

Those of us of a certain vintage will remember a similar thing happening to floppy disks - and there are lessons to be learnt from that. Grab a few of these and carefully hang onto them, in the dark and away from heat sources - while you'll still be able to get them in a decade's time, it'll probably be impossible to find any new good-quality media then: so on the basis that you might want one when you least expect it, have a couple handy just in case.

There's a certain melancholy here, having seen this technology through its entire lifecycle - but at least we don't have to worry about scratching USB mass storage devices. I think I have only one PC which still has an optical drive, and it's the one which still has a floppy drive.

Maybe we'll replace spinning rust, and flash memory, too, in time.

qrmn··on Questions about the Sunday Times Snowden Story
Unfortunately, nobody (especially in the intelligence community echo-chamber) wants to entertain the idea that some of what they have been doing endangers thousands of people directly, and all the Five Eyes and beyond indirectly, by deliberately sabotaging infrastructure they use themselves in an effort to "master the internet". It is truly amusing to read some of the bullshit posted by JTRIG and CESG supporting their ideas.

This is truly embarrassing work: half-baked propaganda, with overt lies in it. Shameful and disappointing.

qrmn··on Britain pulls out spies as Russia, China crack Snowden files – report
The mismanagement of security at OPM predates Snowden's disclosures. However, it's pretty much target #1 for any foreign intelligence agency.

The OPM data contains enough details that would allow a good intelligence agency to track down damn near every agent under non-official cover, and blackmail damn near every official under official cover. It should never have been on any network, ever.

If any element of this story is true - and I'm entirely unconvinced about it - then it's not Snowden's data that's caused this, but the OPM breach.

Don't insult our intelligence, JTRIG. This is some oldschool Правда shite. You've gotten sloppy. I'm very disappointed in you all. You don't have to wag your tail every time Theresa May barks.

qrmn··on 1980s computer controls Grand Rapids Public School heat and AC
Richard Karsmakers used "virii" to describe a plural of computer virus in the 16-bit era, largely on the basis that it was shorter. It isn't correct Latin, but it is a VX scene thing, so is absolutely correct in this context.
qrmn··on Mass snooping fake mobile towers 'uncovered in UK'
IMSI catchers are transceivers. They are not hard to find, they are easily triangulated: they literally broadcast their location. Honestly, denying their usage is remarkably pointless.

If you want a location, then I suggest: grab a spectrum analyser; head to Knightsbridge; tell me what happens when you get close to Hans Crescent; then look on the corner and guess why.

And, don't take your phone. Obviously.

qrmn··on Add Amazon root certificates
I don't think CRLs usually are, under current infrastructure anyway.

How can you verify the certificate of the server when it's signed by the certificate you want to fetch; or check that it hasn't been revoked when what you're connecting to is its own CRL/OCSP? What about the risk of infinite loops?

Cross-signatures, or multi-signatures, perhaps; or going opportunistic and simply not minding on that occasion?

Nope, for now they just use HTTP, and pin what they need to, to the fingerprint.

They should, however, specify an SHA-256 fingerprint. SHA-1 doesn't really cut it anymore. But that's what Mozilla currently require, so that's what Amazon provided. https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Information_checklist

qrmn··on LibreCrypt: Transparent on-the-fly disk encryption for Windows. LUKS compatible
The best option would be to add a MAC or authentication tag correctly, for example with an AE mode like CHACHA20_POLY1305, AES_256_GCM, AES_256_OCB, or one of the new CAESAR candidates, etc.

But then you'd need extra space for the MAC/authentication tag, and disk encryption often isn't placed somewhere in the driver stack where you can get away with, say, a 4080-byte logical sector for a 4096-byte physical sector. Nothing expects that. Performance problems, stuff complains, even crashes, as anyone messing with 2352 byte sectors on CD-ROMs has maybe experienced. (Has anyone tried doing it anyway in more recent years? The last time I tried to implement it was back when ckt was working on PGPdisk, and it didn't go well.)

You could put the authentication tag somewhere else, but you have to be very careful with that, and it also means seeking: you could do that better if you were a filesystem, but as a transparent block device filter, as basically all FDE is, XTS is probably about as good as you're going to get - but remember that it is helpless against malleability or historical snapshots.

qrmn··on GIMP-Win project wasn’t hijacked, just abandoned
100% scummy. Question is, what do we do about it?

I wonder... Is bundling adware installers with GPL software a violation of the GPL? (If not, should it be? v2?/v3?) Where's the installer's source? It wraps it in one linked executable file and presents itself as an installer for it, so I am not clear that any "mere aggregation" defence would hold?

There's also a reasonable argument that this brings the official project into disrepute: The GIMP may not be trademarked, but would it have to be?

Firefox, of course, is trademarked. I dearly hope they've never wrapped Firefox installers with adware, because Mozilla would not like that.

qrmn··on Ext4 encryption
A fair point. btrfs would have a much easier time of it. We then have the interesting consequence that we can observe times and sizes of COW updates, but in truth SSDs have that anyway.
qrmn··on New monitoring powers 'to tackle terrorism' proposed
Not many years ago - just 3!

The Tories have a slimmer majority now than they had in the coalition, and a Lords which isn't all roses and flowers about this. And the Lib Dems (in one of the few promises they actually kept) sent the Draft Communications Data Bill rejected last time over to an independent parliamentary committee - which promptly savaged its drafting and lack of consultation, amongst other things: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/...

If the Tories come back with the same draft or worse, it will have a very hard time.

I've written to my MP already - and got a copy-pasted bit of Tory party manifesto back, which indicates how much thought she's put into it so far I suppose - but it does at least contain a paragraph about not wanting to propose sweeping mass surveillance legislation obviously, which this in fact is, so I'm going to reply again when I have sight of the draft to pick out the specific problems. I can at least try to get her to read it and reflect my concerns.

qrmn··on Ext4 encryption
But this isn't disk encryption! Filesystems have metadata: which is where a MAC can go, next to the filename.

There's just no way this should be unauthenticated XTS, this is simply the wrong mode to use, you should use an AEAD. ChaCha20_Poly1305 - RFC7539: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7539/ - makes much more sense. Faster, too, on the target mobile devices which have poor crypt performance.

I don't think this should be merged early or as-is. Unauthenticated encryption is against good advice and a bad idea. Standardising that is an even worse idea.

Edit: I do see that they're intending this as a minimum viable patch for Android 'M' and they intend to add GCM support later (again, I'd point to CC20 as a newer, better alternative), they're just waiting on a transactional update first. I do question whether shipping it broadly with this design as-is should happen in the vanilla kernel, however: Android uses its own patches anyway. Maybe let this one mature a bit first before merging upstream?

qrmn··on Firefox experimental build with support for LZMA2 compression (2013)
I can't think of many scenarios in which this would be a win which aren't usually compressed archive downloads of some sort anyway, or might be better presented as a torrent with a tree hash and some multisourcing.

LZ4 might be a better choice. It compresses moderately well, but the packing and depacking speed are much better. Has anyone investigated whether it's viable?

Also don't forget that you need to be careful about compression in a few contexts where attacker-injected data and a secret could share a compression context (the BREACH attack, for example). Compression is usually a good idea, but you should really salt new CSRF tokens every load. HTTP/2's header compression is context-free to mitigate the related CRIME attack.

qrmn··on True hardware random number generator for $50
Just to be clear, the SID's noise generator is NOT a TRNG - it's a XOR shift register, basically an LFSR with no 1-tap. It's predictable.
qrmn··on True hardware random number generator for $50
It may surprise you that the order matters - in the hands of a potential attacker, combining random sources is not commutative!

If your last random source comes from an attacker who can read your state, then they can manipulate your state freely (XOR) or partially (any PRF), which could lead to trouble. Source: http://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html

Combining with a proper PRF limits the damage a bit compared to plain XOR, which is why Linux's /dev/random was changed to feed in RDSEED/RDRAND like any other entropy source.

On the other hand, there's the school of thought which says: if the CPU you're running on has been trojaned in hardware, you're probably buggered no matter what!

qrmn··on Logjam TLS attack
Two parts to your question: 1. Yes, the NSA can likely break 1024-bit DHE at scale - as well as 1024-bit RSA or anything smaller. (Probably also the RC4 stream cipher, if you didn't listen and are still using that.)

2. ECDHE is totally different to traditional finite-field DHE. ECDHE over P-256 (or better curves) is not vulnerable to this attack.

qrmn··on Logjam TLS attack
Neither. ECDHE on P-256 doesn't have this problem, is available almost everywhere and is faster and safer: use that, or better still, Curve25519 and friends (in OpenSSH already, coming up in TLS later this year hopefully?).

There's very little reason in practice to bother trying to patch DHE, it's slow and old and interoperates worse (thanks Java). Chrome's just taking it out in the medium-term.

qrmn··on How the DEA took a young man’s life savings without charging him with a crime
Did happen with the Silk Road bitcoins, 30K BTC of which were auctioned off before the trial.
qrmn··on Under the hood: Facebook’s cold storage system
They're not even the most arcane. Consider reading up on rapid tornado (Raptor) codes, other fountain codes, Goppa codes… there are whole families of error-correcting codes with different sets of tradeoffs. And the decoding can be enlightening, too: the Viterbi algorithm and its progeny can be surprisingly useful.

Then blow your mind even further by looking up the principles of the McEliece cryptosystem (but don't use it as originally specified - modern developments have weakened and refined it a lot).

I warn you: this is one of those down-the-rabbit-hole subjects that has a deliciously large amount of literature to soak up, you could find yourselves with bookshelves full of it. (An alarming number of patents, too, for the unwary.)

qrmn··on CPU Jitter Based True Random Generator
Isn't this basically another take on HAVEGE[1]? I'm not sure I'd call that a true random source.

[1] https://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/; see http://www.issihosts.com/haveged/

qrmn··on Tmux 2.0 released
I'm also struggling to see any advantages to still using Sourceforge in 2015.

Firstly, they're well-known by now to be complicit in sponsored 'wrapper' installers bundling some pretty awful stuff - check out what they did with FileZilla - which is an even more intrusive advertising practice than that.

Secondly, they host a lot of executable code (and don't forget build scripts in source code, unless you check your Makefiles!), but they still don't use TLS, and don't even seem to have any plans to - which is by now negligent practice, I think, considering the widespread public knowledge of Hacking Team's (and GCHQ's) at-scale deployments of network-level file infectors.

qrmn··on PCI DSS v3.1: SSL and early TLS no longer considered strong crypto [pdf]
Microsoft could push a security update enabling TLS 1.1 and 1.2 by default?

(I'm not saying they will, but they could.)

qrmn··on GSMA: Network Management of Encrypted Traffic [pdf]
Mobile operators directly encouraging cleartext so they can fuck with traffic? That's the exact case made for encryption. (You can see how that went down at IETF 92.)

Interesting note about the Google data compression proxy. Can we get that bug fixed?

Again, an indicator that SNI really needs to be at the very least not cleartext in TLS 1.3.

qrmn··on An NFC PGP SmartCard for Android
A good, open, microcontroller design with no caches, USB (or something), a TRNG, an onboard voltage/clock regulator, registers/RAM which zeroises on faults/parity/intrusion sensors, a fresh approach to avoiding SPA/DPA attacks, some EEPROM (also with parity & zeroisation traps), and ideally a way for a host to automatically read (/audit) all the software running on it (Harvard arch?) would do the trick. It doesn't have to be fast, but it does have to be safe.

I gave it a try, but it really needs someone with actual ASIC design experience instead, I think! I'd love to see one of the vendors do something like that - as you can see there are plenty of waiting customers, but I'm not holding my breath.

Cryptech are probably the strongest contenders for now?

qrmn··on Please consider the impacts of banning HTTP
It won't just include it, at this stage it seems set to become mandatory-to-implement (not necessarily mandatory to deploy). We'll see.
qrmn··on 4Q: the final archive format
"The final archive format" is a very big promise that 4q doesn't keep right now. It falls short of 7z, RAR and tar.xz, and certainly isn't ready to replace them at the moment.

I'm not too familiar with Coffeescript, but it doesn't seem like a good choice of language to write an archiver. There's no actual draft file format spec I can see, either? But from a first pass, I have the following comments:

Crypto: Encrypted blocks: AES-256-CBC, random IV, with no MAC (!!!). You need to look at that again: that could be a Problem. Hashed blocks: SHA-2-512. Maybe OK (how's length encoded? Look out for extension attacks). That crypto is 14 years old and missing a vital bit: not "modern". Modern choices would include CHACHA20_POLY1305 (faster, more secure, seekable if you do it right); hashes like BLAKE2b (as the new RAR already does); signing things with Ed25519. Look into that kind of thing. You need a crypto overhaul. The keybase.io integration is a nice thought for a UX - but is an online service in invite beta really ready for being baked into an archive format?

Packing: LZMA2 is pretty good: 7z and xz already use that. For a fast algorithm, Snappy is not as good as LZ4, I understand? Neither is the last word in compression. Text/HTML/source code packs much better with a PPM-type model, like PPMd (7z has that, too, as had RAR, but removed it recently), but you need to weigh up the decompression memory usage. ZPAQ's context model mixing can pack tighter, but that's much more intensive and while I like extensibility, I don't like the ZPAQ archive format having essentially executable bytecode.

Other missing features that other archivers have: Volume splitting? Erasure coding or some other FEC? Can you do deltas? (e.g. binary software updates)

You've got some pleasant UX ideas for a command-line archiver (compared to some other command-line archivers!), but sorry, I don't think you're ready for 1.0.

qrmn··on Why we will not be registering easydns.sucks
Because directory hierarchies go from top to bottom - /dir/subdir/file.ext - or, globally, //hostname/dir/subdir/file.ext, or protocol://hostname/dir/subdir/file.ext etc.

That the hostname part's components, as presented to users, goes from bottom-to-top in DNS when the rest goes from top-to-bottom is an accident of history, but one it's too late to change (in DNS). Not everything made that mistake however - Usenet didn't.

As for what you're typing in your 'awesome bar', when you start typing, your autocorrect is ranking your visited history: there's no reason it has to start at the beginning, especially when the beginning isn't the root, but there's also no reason that doesn't make sense.

In fact, drifting back to topic: GOOGLE. is in fact a TLD now. If DNS were the 'right' way round, you'd be going to //google.news - wouldn't that make more semantic sense?

Of course, in practice, we're stuck with DNS the way it is because .com is now firmly in the public consciousness. But it could easily have been different, and if I were designing something new, I'd pick the Usenet way round.

qrmn··on Mozilla SSL Configuration Generator
You can find a list of nginx's versions simply from the download directory: http://nginx.org/download/ - I know that much.

By the way... DSS? Is anyone anywhere using DSS certificates on the internet anymore? (And would they still be 1024-bit?) Let alone anyone who might actually read configuration advice? I didn't see any hosts presenting one last time I ran a survey, but I wouldn't swear to that being complete (maybe they only present it to certain clients?).

qrmn··on Aquaris E4.5 Ubuntu Edition
MediaTek have not been historically known for engaging with the open-source community, documenting their chipsets, and complying with the GPL, to put it mildly.

Unless anyone knows that's changed in recent years?

qrmn··on Aquaris E4.5 Ubuntu Edition
That it's compatible is nice, but Telegram cannot be recommended as a secure messenger. Knowledgeable people have reviewed its cryptography and found it wanting, even "bizarre and nonsensical". You may want to look into other alternatives?
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