326 karma · joined January 4, 2014
Note that recently a big clean up of the openssl codebase has taken place so openssl master no longer exposes the internals of structs etc. meaning it's both more auditable and more maintainable. This code is not yet released however.
At the moment, I'm not that impressed with the testing since even making it build actually requires patching it! This is just due to one of the examples, but from the git history it's been broken since January.
Take a look. You'll see that for example openssl uses perl to generate assembly, and nettle also uses native code. This is needed if you want to use things like the AES instructions on modern CPUs.
This is rubbish. If I use custom assembler then that's what gets run. Even if I use C code then I know what the result will be since I can actually check.
> The paths should be identical for both failure and success states. That's fundamentally how you "fix" timing attacks.
That's certainly the ideal. But it's impossible - one result will succeed the other won't. The aim is to make sure both take the same time which is an achievable goal, however to do this you need to know what will execute. You might have that guarantee in practice on a particular JVM for example, but the whole point of using something like a JIT is that it will be smart about optimising stuff based on what actually happens. That's normally great, but this is a situation where all that needed is predictability not performance.
I think using native code for the low-level implementation of the ciphers, padding etc. would be a good move from a security point of view and is the only way to get constant time implementation. As you say, there's nothing that prevents that in the design of Java.
I completely agree with you there. X.509 is a nightmare and it's not an area where constant time matters at all. Being resistant to buffer overruns and general logic errors is much more important there.
"What does that even mean? If you write your fail and success states to follow the same exact code paths (i.e. no branches, breaks, returns, or similar for failed) then you've created a "constant time" function."
Well, if you've got a JIT that is analysing which code actually executes, and no control over the optimisations then how do you achieve this? If the hotpath is normally the success condition for example then the JIT will optimise that more. The rare and more dangerous condition will be optimised less. If this happens of course will depend on the engine, but you can't control that without working at a much lower level than managed code offers.
Heartbleed was certainly easier to exploit, than a timing attack - no disagreement there. But the Java SSL stack is pretty flakey and largely seems to be unused. It has lots of interoperability problems with other implementations and generally seems immature. It's not something I'd trust in production myself.