1,578 karma · joined February 8, 2011
FOSSA (acquired EdgeBit) - Head of Applied AI
EdgeBit (YC W23) - CEO - https://edgebit.io
Red Hat (acquired CoreOS) - Director of Product
CoreOS (YC S13) - early employee
Contact me: robszumski.comMy opinion is that while these policies are fuzzy and lack specifics, it's just the first round of pushing industry in the correct direction without mandating specific tools or methods.
In the EU, the proposed Cyber Resilience Act has maybe cast too wide of a net, snagging any open source contributor as a software "manufacturer".
1: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-action... 2: https://edgebit.io/regulations/
I want my doors to lock every night at 10pm in case I forget.
I want to bring up my favorite temperature and fan settings.
I want to lock just some doors.
I want the windows down just the right amount.
When do we get to take advantage that this is all software?
https://medium.com/@ToryBrunoULA/the-secrets-of-rocket-desig...
if you did `docker tag supersecret/app:latest && docker push` instead of `docker tag registry.corp.com/supersecret/app:latest` guess where your code just went?
Same on the pull side, if you wanted your corp's ubuntu base rather than just `docker pull ubuntu`.
You're right that the active/dormant detection needs to be customized per type of runtime. It ends up being a mix of both access and execution, and we'll get more sophisticated with eBPF over time. We cover rpm/deb, python and java with the node and others coming very soon. The compiled languages will be our main focus next. For example, Go binaries embed some dependency metadata in the binary itself.
Also related to this effort is the "in-toto" integrity chain: https://in-toto.io/in-toto/ Since we're already connecting build to run, we aim to complete the chain.
Agree that you have to be skeptical about studies like this.
You can read more about our "realtime SBOM" concept as well: https://edgebit.io/blog/realtime-sbom/
https://www.spiceworks.com/it-security/vulnerability-managem...
edit: it's gone
edit: I've also updated the page with the price. We're starting at $15/server/mo and volume discounts apply
This makes it possible for the SaaS to do the thing that you pay them money to do, but retain control if you want to walk away. Plus it guarantees that they are doing some sort of field/row encryption to be able to mix in keys.
The crux is that to do BYOK securely, you need guarantees that the key is handled correctly and in an ideal world, some sort of verification. That doesn't mean code auditing by every customer...I favor granting access to a key that can only be released into a secure enclave for sensitive SaaS operations to reside within.
And a more secure software supply chain is possible with device attestation and cryptographic measurements of software.
You should absolutely be able to crypto-shred your data from such an important service. This experience sounds awful.
We're exploring secure enclaves as the protected runtime env and the code attestation generation: https://github.com/edgebitio/enclaver
This post has made me add pgsodium to my reading list :)
(ex Red Hat)
You can read more here: https://edgebit.io/enclaver/docs/0.x/architecture/
Very cool to see the physical hardware interconnects for resetting the system. Also the PCI bus as one of the isolating boundaries.
I have worked on an open source project for managing Nitro Enclaves (https://github.com/edgebitio/enclaver), so it is cool to see how these build on this foundation to provide even more protection.
- memory protection and isolation for Vault while it's running
- unsealing without the parent host getting the key (can't be observed)
- having an unseal key that can't be used unless inside the enclave via cryptographic attestation