But there's a great deal of department needs that don't revolve around information processing infrastructure where there aren't many success stories to refer to. Especially relating to startups.
1,373 karma · joined October 2, 2023
But there's a great deal of department needs that don't revolve around information processing infrastructure where there aren't many success stories to refer to. Especially relating to startups.
Yes, Hack for Defense is a decade old now. But the DoD famously had not done much business with area startups for many decades outside of very specific success stories like the CIA's In-Q-Tel.
Turns out that start-ups can't wait several years for a contract award. They tend to die in that time if they have no funding.
Additionally - talk of electrical engineering work done for world war II / cold war radar technology has been a oft-repeated tagline by members of military leadership as well as Palantir representatives when talking amongst themselves about Silicon Valley or in their appeals to SV itself.
"We have so much in common! Here, why don't you open your history book and I'll show you!" - that's what the appeal comes off like.
I maintain that primarily relying on those examples is a poor choice in trying to establish cultural similarities.
The DoD doesn't get to neglect relationships with a community for decades and then talk of how much in common they have with each other. It's nonsense and transparently manipulative.
It's much more concerning when said practices are undertaken by the U.S.
Just because other countries do something isn't a justification to bring the practice into the U.S. despite that being a justification used with increasing prevalence these days.
Plenty of variants of "people who don't use AI will be left behind" are sprinkled around various threads about AI. It's an attempt to both manipulate via fear as well as sell.
The quality of LLMs depends heavily on, among other things, how you word your questions.
Knowing the correct questions to ask is not something most students know how to do given that it tends to require a fair bit of pre-existing domain knowledge.
It's SEO's fault that Google frequently prioritizes giving you results that are semantically or thematically related but ultimately irrelevant to what you searched for.
It's SEO's fault that Google refuses to place ads on websites not full of meandering irrelevant "content".
It's SEO's fault Google search all-but-ignores most single-purpose tool websites.
It's not the result of decisions made by Google's programmers and project managers - it's allllll the fault of SEO!
The SEO industry definitely isn't an all-purpose scapegoat for horribly unpopular decisions made by human beings at Google.
Maybe we'll get there eventually? But you should be more wary about making such absolute claims.
As always, the goal in convincing others is to take someone from their current understanding and bring them closer to yours. You can't get there if you don't start the topic at their current understanding of it.
Even back in 2014, malware was coming out that steals facial recognition data directly from smart phones themselves.
https://www.theregister.com/security/2024/02/15/stolen-ios-u...
The GDPR isn't a silver bullet.
Additionally - furtherance of facial recognition technology would impact travelling to foreign jurisdictions.
One of the most common ways foreign travellers get flagged when travelling internationally is for social media posts made under their own name that their destination country's government may not like. Traditionally if you've kept yourself pseudo-anonymous, you've largely been safe. But if we get to a point where pseudo-anonymous accounts are associated with pictures of people's faces, it will become significantly less pleasant to travel internationally for a lot more people.
It is all but guaranteed for Internet-based facial recognition services.
Hacked facial recognition data already is reportedly being used by scammers to not only bypass bank security but also to impersonate people to target their loved ones.
There is no lasting security gain by providing a selfie. There is a lasting security and privacy loss, however.
I don't care about their problem. It's their problem, not mine. They should not make their problem into my problem.
Aside from getting her fired from her job, they also tried to destroy her dad's business.
I get that less-than-10 years isn't a ton of time, but it also represented nearly half her life. People tend to grow up a lot in their teens even if it's still common for there to be some immaturity leftover in their early 20's
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Yeah, how dare someone do or say anything that some random crazy asshole could use to threaten that person's personal or professional life or even put them in danger of physical harm. To hell with gay kids growing up in very traditional religious areas in much of the world.
That person who made a racist joke on Discord when they were 13 years old? That should be able to ruin them when they're 30!
Someone confiding to a friend over social media DMs that they're in an abusive relationship with someone violent? Well - she shouldn't be surprised when her partner beats her within an inch of her life when he finds out. If only she did what she was told, right?
And let's not forget the cringiest or most sexual thing you've ever said online - make sure that your every utterance in private would pass scrutiny by your employer's HR department!
Seriously...I don't understand people like you. What a small, listless, and unusually safe world you must live in.
You may as well have asked why can't everyone think and act like you as well as live in your particular region of the world with the same friends, family, romantic, and professional opportunities that you've been provided throughout your life.
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Silly as they were trying to be, the concept still holds -
Facial biometrics can and do get compromised too. Your example of IDs taken from the homeless - what the heck prevents organized criminals from taking pictures or recordings of their faces too?
Already there's malware out there stealing facial recognition data from infected devices (ESET reported on this nearly two years ago). Unlike changeable passwords, once your facial recognition data is compromised then that's it. Scammers can now impersonate you on top of having defeated this additional layer of fraud prevention.
While ZKP is more useful in limiting how much info is provided and, depending on implementation letting you make sure of the full scope of information acquired....if it literally only validates age then there's nothing other than logistics preventing a single adult from authenticating the entire world.
Presumably there'd be no point in having procedures in querying for U.S. persons communications if they didn't have the information to begin with.
You are doing the equivalent of telling me to ignore all of those sources - to include the FISA court - and to trust you - random-person-on-Hacker-News-alluding-to-working-for-the-NSA.
If you are correct and everything else - to include the FISA court - are wrong - then that begs the question of why they would all publicly make material misrepresentations about the NSA's acquisition of U.S. persons' information.
Shall I assume that the NSA no longer collects information if one-end of a communication is foreign and the other American?
Or what of Americans that use VPNs even if the exit node is within the U.S.?
What of "incidentally" collected information (collected without a probable-cause warrant) on U.S. citizens' communication contained evidence of a crime?
What about Americans living on the coasts whose information may end up crossing a fiber line going overseas and then back again even if the source and destination are U.S. citizens? Are their communications acquired?
Don't you all still share unminimized data (to include what U.S. person data was not filtered out at the time of initial acquisition) with the CIA, FBI, and NCTC - agencies with their own rules on how long they get to retain U.S. persons' information they acquired from NSA-sourced data.
The 2023 PCLOB report on FISA Section 702 (see page 78) maintains that agents and analysts at the NSA and the three agencies they share raw data with typically do not affirmatively purge U.S. persons' information that has been incidentally collected that is not immediately recognized as having foreign intelligence or criminality information. Out of the possibility that the information might later-on be interpreted as being relevant to their agency mission, instead the information is generally kept until it ages out. Depending on an agency's individual procedures they may be retained for 5 years. Or 15 years. Or indefinitely.
I'm to understand it used to be a real significant problem for analysts to spy on U.S. citizens indirectly by looking up a foreign national the U.S. citizen was known to be communicating with.
I could keep going on, but I'd like to think I made my point.
Your agency's mission statement is not a shield to hide behind. Your actions are what matter. And a legal Rube Goldberg machine that results in an enormous amount of U.S. persons information being acquired by the NSA (and, by association, the FBI and CIA and NCTC) does not engender confidence that the agency actually gives a damn about the privacy of U.S. citizens.
Germany seems to have recovered quite a lot of trust following World War 2, to provide an extreme example of bad foreign policy.