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rtempaccount1

305 karma · joined May 4, 2019

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rtempaccount1··on CVSS v3 Creates New Challenges For Developers (2018)
In general, I'm not a fan of vulnerability quantification efforts like CVSS.

The reason is that they provide the appearance of repeatability and objectivity when, in reality, many of the assessments used are subjective and opinion based.

A simple "critical", "high", "medium", "low" will generally provide enough actionable information without pretending to be something it's not.

For examples of the weaknesses of CVSS, you only have to look at the software that uses it like Vulnerability scanners.

In many cases they have different ratings for the same issue and also have ratings which are nonsensical

here's one example.

Telnet (totally unencrypted protocol) CVSS v2 5.8 https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/42263

SSL Self signed cert CVSS v2 6.4 https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/57582

So using an unencrypted protocol is worse than an encrypted one with a self-signed cert. (and before anyone says "ah that could be because people mis-place trust in the cert", that's not a factor in CVSS calcs) yet the unencrypted protocol scores lower.

rtempaccount1··on Jack Dorsey’s account was hacked
That's a view for sure, however it seems that some world leaders and corporations have decided that the trade offs are worth the risk...
rtempaccount1··on Jack Dorsey’s account was hacked
Hopefully if that's the case, more attention will be paid to the fact that using mobile phones for 2FA or identification on high value services is a bad idea :)
rtempaccount1··on Jack Dorsey’s account was hacked
I'd agree that there are always trade offs however, you could do a number of things to detect an active attack, changes in user agent, location etc can be detected and flagged for review. Now that's not possible at scale, but for high value users,it would seem like a not outrageous countermeasure.
rtempaccount1··on Jack Dorsey’s account was hacked
I'll be interested to see the post-mortem on this breach for sure.

As an outsider, I would have thought that the Twitter security team would have a set of high-value users (with @jack being at the top of the list) who'd they keep very close tabs on in terms of any unusual activity.

Realistically Twitter is where announcements are made by world leaders and major corporations, control of these accounts could have repercussions, although in this case it just seems to have been a general hack...

rtempaccount1··on CyberChef – Cyber Swiss Army Knife
I use this a lot for basic things like base64 decoding. Of course, nothing you can't do with A.N. programming language, but handy for quick checks.
rtempaccount1··on CyberChef – Cyber Swiss Army Knife
shouldn't be it's purely client-side. And of course, if you don't trust them, just stick a proxy in-line and watch for traffic.
rtempaccount1··on Rashomon of Disclosure
The last point is the one that really rings out to me as an Info/IT Security person.

While these incentives aren't aligned it is unlikely there will be a significant improvement in overall IT Security practice.

It's been proven time and again that the optimal approach for organizations is "move fast" and worry about security later.

Of course the problem from a societal standpoint is that there are externalities there, so the entities suffering from the consequences of this mismatch of incentives aren't the same as the entities making the money out of it.

rtempaccount1··on Bitcoin’s race to outrun the quantum computer
Whilst Quantum computing is an interesting topic, gotta say I think bitcoin's challenges are far more mundane and pressing that that.

No.1 challenge is how to stop centralized exchanges from extensive market manipulation.

Decentralized crypto currencies are never going to achieve their goals, whilst players like Bitfinex and Tether are in a position to "print" unlimited amounts of money and use them to purchase coins like BTC.

rtempaccount1··on Capital One attacker may have breached other major corporations
It's interesting that we're still in a place in 2019, where one motivated attacker, can compromise the security of major corporations, and access sensitive systems and data, and that those corporations don't realise/react to the breach until notified by external parties.

For security to improve, there needs to be a "mess up tolerance" of more than one (i.e. if a single mistake/vulnerability causes a major loss, you're in trouble)

Mistakes happen, vulnerabilities happen, security required defense in depth to be effective.

rtempaccount1··on Why Kubernetes Will Disappear
Looks like we're starting to see k8s slide down the slope in the typical "hype cycle", in the way we've seen Docker do so over the last 12-18 months.

It'll be interesting to see how well it weathers this part of the cycle and comes out the other side.

For me k8s is useful but overhyped, leading to many companies making use of it when it really wasn't needed (I've seen k8s cluster deployed for single applications !?!)

It has a lot of complexity (far more than just Docker/Docker-compose style stacks) which are only likely to make sense at scale.

The thing that makes me thing k8s will suffer, is that complexity is increasing not reducing. Things like adding service mesh layer, use of operators, CRD etc are all additional complication on top of what is a moderately complex product.

rtempaccount1··on Understanding Docker Container Escapes
I understand that Docker's user namespace support is relative basic, but the point I was looking at was that if you don't run your contained process as root (e.g. unprivileged) by specifying a USER in the Dockerfile, then I wasn't aware of major differences in the security of an LXC container as against one running under runc

ofc happy to be corrected, as I'm aware you'd know more about this :)

rtempaccount1··on Understanding Docker Container Escapes
I'm not sure I follow you here.

The Docker daemon runs as root (which is kind of inevitable, if you don't then you end up needing hacks like slirp4netns to hook up networking)

However, there's nothing innately inside Docker that requires contained processes to run as root.

Indeed it's a standard part of recommended Docker security guidance not to run your contained processes as the root user.

Docker also provide the facility to enable user namespaces at the daemon level, so that root inside the container != root on the host.

rtempaccount1··on Understanding Docker Container Escapes
I'd say "that depends"

For example if you're running Kubernetes, then if you have a user who has RBAC rights to exec into a privileged pod, but doesn't have rights to create new privileged pods, then this could be a privesc risk, as they can use something like this to escalate to the underlying node after exec'ing into the privileged pod.

It (as with all things security) depends on your threat model :)

rtempaccount1··on Understanding Docker Container Escapes
Out of curiosity, what makes you say that LXC has better security than Docker? What aspects of LXCs design or implementation provide additional security controls over those of Docker?
rtempaccount1··on Understanding Docker Container Escapes
Whilst from an overall security perspective, this may not be that meaningful (the pre-req's are CAP_SYS_ADMIN or --privileged), it's still a really neat hack.

Also a good demonstration of how runc container security is really just Linux security, and the isolation provided by that type of container, is dependent on underlying Linux features.

I could see circumstances where this would be of practical use, where you've landed in a privileged container and are looking for a relatively easy/universal breakout to the underlying node.

The ToB breakdown is cool too as the initial tweet was a bit hard to parse, unless your Bashfu is good.

(ofc the post from ToB I'm really looking forward to hasn't been released yet, which is what they found in the Kubernetes audit)

rtempaccount1··on Understanding Docker Container Escapes
There's some cases where it's use in Kubernetes. Some of the system pods will run privileged and also some CNI pods will too.
rtempaccount1··on Virtual Kubernetes
I'd say the amount of isolation to be sufficient, depends on the threat model. If you want some isolation but moderately trusted workloads (e.g. different departments in the same company) that's easier than the isolation required for "arbitrary customers can run any workload on a given cluster"

Multi-tenant, single cluster is tricky. You either need node pools per tenant, at which point why not run one cluster per tenant, or you need really good isolation of the workloads from the nodes, which requires PodSecurityPolicy or similar to prevent a breakout to the underlying node.

Also RBAC can be tricky in a multi-tenant setup as you need to be very careful with anything that would allow breakout to the underlying node or any cluster level rights.

rtempaccount1··on Virtual Kubernetes
(IMO) this isn't intended to be a product, it's an experiment in different ways to run Kubernetes workloads
rtempaccount1··on Making Containers More Isolated: An Overview of Sandboxed Container Technologies
I wouldn't suggest I am re-writing history. What's your definition of "production ready"?
rtempaccount1··on Mozilla Finalist for UK ISPA 'Internet Villain' Award 2019
I thought this was a joke initially, but it appears not.

It's quite something when the ISP association starts attacking an organization that supports user privacy and security.

Let's hope that some of the "feedback" they receive over this changes their minds...

rtempaccount1··on Will Bitcoin Make a Good Investment?
Any article which talks about Bitcoin as an investment without mentioning (at least in passing) the currently unregulated exchanges and the role of Tether in the price, is missing a large part of the picture.

The current set of exchanges which are setting the price are totally unregulated banks (effectively) and with Tether (a "stablecoin" that isn't 1:1 backed and which has been rapidly inflating it's supply) there are significant concerns about how much of the price is really reflective of demand.

rtempaccount1··on Making Containers More Isolated: An Overview of Sandboxed Container Technologies
The Docker team did quite a bit of work (e.g. establishing Apparmor/SELinux profiles, creating seccomp policies, deciding on acceptable capabilities) in the relatively early days of Docker. TBH those haven't changes much in quite a few versions now (AFAIK), so a lot of the foundational work was done early on.
rtempaccount1··on Making Containers More Isolated: An Overview of Sandboxed Container Technologies
So the Docker security team did a lot of work in the early days precisely because people felt that it didn't provide good security isolation.

As to root in a container == host compromise, what makes you say that? Absent a Linux kernel vuln. or mistake when running the container that's generally not easily possible.

(that's not to say that containers should be run as root, they should not, but that it's not necessarily trivial to breakout of one)

rtempaccount1··on Making Containers More Isolated: An Overview of Sandboxed Container Technologies
Whilst it's always good to see articles discussing the relative merits of various container runtimes for isolation, there seems to be a tendency to underplay the security benefits of standard Linux containerization (As used by LXC/LXD and Docker)

In the case of this article, in the Docker section there's no mention of the Apparmor/SELinux policy that gets applied to containers and no mention of the seccomp policy that's used by default to constrain some syscalls from a running container.

My general take on it is that Docker/LXC provide quite flexible security models, which can be modified to suit a user's process (e.g. by dropping unneeded capabilities from the default set or adding a custom seccomp profile)

gvisor provides a higher level of security due to additional layers being in place and once the Google team move to regular releases with a support lifecycle, I think it'll be quite a good option where it works to provide additional isolation for production workloads (for some production environments, the idea of picking a nightly build to use might not fit too well)

One tradeoff to consider for things like gVisor/kata/firecracker is that they don't have the same composable security model used in standard linux containers, so it's not always possible to remove a single part of the isolation (e.g. running with host networking) whilst leaving the rest of it in place

rtempaccount1··on Search the Full Text of Nonprofit Tax Records for Free
Cool. I had one question, what's the usual lead time for non-profit data to show up in this dataset (e.g. when would you expect that 2018 forms/data would appear)?
rtempaccount1··on Search the Full Text of Nonprofit Tax Records for Free
yes unfortunately all that these forms tell us is, more money is coming in and more money is being spent, not really what it's being spent on (and I'd imagine the 2018 numbers will show another big jump in revenue if the growth of CNCF projects has anything to do with it)

From having had a look round the Linux Foundation site, I couldn't easily see a lot of information about what they spend their increasing revenues on, although I may well have missed it...

rtempaccount1··on Search the Full Text of Nonprofit Tax Records for Free
Well sponsorships are part of conf. revenue in a lot of cases.

I've looked at the sponsor packs for the CNCF conferences, and those higher tiers do not come cheap.

Also don't underestimate smaller individual payments * very large number.

E.g. Kubecon Barcelona, tickets were $900+ each and there were 7700 people, so we're talking almost $7m from ticket sales alone.

Now the venue ain't cheap but that + all the sponsor cash == a fair profit, I'd expect.

rtempaccount1··on Search the Full Text of Nonprofit Tax Records for Free
The linux foundation results on here are quite interesting. they're showing pretty rapid "revenue" growth from $39M in 2015 to $61M in 2016 to $81M in 2017.

I'm guessing this is, in no small part, down to increasing conference/event revenues.

It'll be interesting to see what they do with all the additional cash.

rtempaccount1··on SEC Charges Kik With Conducting $100M Unregistered ICO
Ethereum has had it's share of controversies... not least the premine https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2018/10/vitalik-buterin-u...
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