577 karma · joined July 2, 2020
I think the best thing you can do is focus on yourself, particularly by cultivating hobbies that you enjoy—bonus points if they’re things you can enjoy alone and with others, because they’re easy inroads and great first dates (worst case you get to spend a bit of time doing something you like!).
The second thing I’d encourage is to get any potential dealbreakers out of the way early (e.g. religion, political views, desires for parenthood, career aspirations). It’s a slow path, but it’s helped me avoid the major pitfalls I’ve seen in my friend’s’ and colleagues’ relationships.
We're talking about different things. In "forward both, aft self" mode a front-seat-initiated ejection still ejects both seats in the normal sequence, while in "solo" mode it would only eject itself. For obvious reasons, you would never fly with a passenger in "solo" mode.
As you said though, the full picture will come out later. Hopefully they'll find some identifiable weapon fragments eventually.
Yeah, that seems like an eminently reasonable way to design a trim system. I don't think the MCAS concept is fundamentally unsound, but it blows my mind that they didn't design it with that kind of mindset.
Oh man, I wish more software was built to the standards of aerospace control system best practices...
For what it's worth, while I agree with your technical definition of a trim runaway, every time I've seen it in the sim or real life it's been a single, continuous event moving from steady-state flight trim to an extreme. I'd be willing to bet a few beers that this is what most pilots are trained to expect from a trim runaway, and what B737 crew see in the sim while getting type rated. I'm not disagreeing that if the LA crew diagnosed it as a trim failure and performed the EP correctly they would likely still be alive, and I'm also not arguing that they were an exceptionally good or even average crew.
I'm arguing that you can't really fault a below-average-but-still-acceptably-competent crew for not diagnosing the failure of a system they couldn't have reasonably been aware of as a trim problem on an otherwise perfectly functioning aircraft. There are plenty of atypical emergencies that require the crew to "do some pilot shit" to get the plane back safely on deck, but an easily foreseeable single-sensor failure shouldn't be one.
We'll probably just have to agree to disagree about how likely an average crew would be to treat this as a trim failure, but I like to think we can still agree that the likelihood was unacceptably low for commercial aviation safety standards.
...after their poorly designed system caused a plane crash.
If you have a 737 type rating and can speak to type-specific training standards I would love to be educated, but the defining characteristic of runaway trim failures that I've experienced is that the trim keeps going in one continuous motion until it can't go any further or you manually shut off the system. A momentary, uncommanded attitude change would initially make me want to troubleshoot the autopilot, rather than the trim system. This is exactly why you have to describe new systems and their failure modes in detail, even if they have elements in common with and use the same emergency procedures as existing failures.
Safely operating a poorly designed aircraft can be done, but it starts with explaining the deficiency in exhaustive detail in a bold typeface in a prominent place in the operating manual, with clear warnings to avoid certain flight regions, and a well-documented emergency procedure. For example:
MCAS FAILURE: If you experience repeated momentary uncommanded nose-down pitch excursions. 1. Conduct RUNAWAY PITCH TRIM procedure. 2. Do not reset pitch trim circuit .
Unfortunately that would have required new training.
That said, this is still pretty cool, and I could see something like it being one component of a much larger fully automated flight management system.
Edit: link should be fixed. If I'm still crushing it, the title of the lecture is "Children of the Magenta Line."
Duuuuude, the Fighter Mafia was active in like the '60s and '70s, and some of its members were involved in the design of the A-10 (in line with their strong advocacy against multirole aircraft). Do you have any evidence that current USAF strategic policy is dictated by the fighter community? Fighter pilots have lamented the loss of "l'audace" for decades, but despite their bravado I don't think any of them really believe that they deserve absolute strategic primacy.
It's actually a fairly old technology as these things go, developed in the '60s and deprecated in the '80s. My understanding of HGWs that are currently being developed/fielded is that their potential FOBS aspect isn't what's scary--it's that they're more maneuverable than MARVs on traditional ballistic missiles and may be able to evade many currently fielded ABM systems.
That said, submarine warfare is indeed insane.