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schanzen

98 karma · joined July 8, 2020

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schanzen··on The GNU Name System
Well, there is a section where we note this as well: https://lsd.gnunet.org/lsd0001/#name-abuse-mitigation

Abuse through name confusion is possible, of course. I do not think this can be solved while at the same time supporting i18n. The real question is: What is the attack vector and how can it be mitigated. A GNS deployment and the selection of root zones should eventually converge towards a trusted namespace (for each individual user). There is not really any incentive having a TLD zone in your configuration that would allow such odd labels as there is not much use beyond fraud in using them. The governance policies ("rules") of the zone are expected to "trickle down" the delegation chains or alternatively damage reputation of the parent zone.

schanzen··on The GNU Name System
> - are you people open to the idea of an IRC/XMPP chan or a weblog/gemlog? following from afar (without being on the ML) looks like there's not a lot of activity, although i can see with my bare eyes the draft spec has evolved a lot

Yes, the only reason why there are no posts on the ML and very little posts on the GNUnet news archive is that I do this in my spare time. Now, the draft is mostly(TM) finished. So I do not see a reason for blogging anymore.

> how confident are you in your DHT spec/implementation for scalability and security? are other people working on different implementations? is there a testbed one can run scalability checks with?

That is a good question. GNUnet is still figuring out the transport layer. Until that is in a state that we are satisfied with, we will conduct performance tests. That being said, looking at other DHT proposals out there we think that R5N (and especially the improvements we have planned) are far superior. It still has strong roots in Kademlia though.

> are you actively cooperating with other non-profit projects such as Tor? GNS sounds like it could be the missing piece in such crypto-secure routing schemes without memorable names ; i understand that GNS is part of GNUNet, but i'm asking about other ties/cooperations

Yes. I think there was some collaboration here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-grothoff-iesg-sp... But we are not in regular contact and tor seems to go their own route. There are, however, similarities: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/224...

> - why is it called "hyper hyper" local root? maybe i'm missing some context (despite reading about RFC7706 and froot), but "local root" or "user-editable root" sounds clearer to me

As this was confusing, it is removed from the draft. I think you can still find it on some slides when you look for it. In general, what is currently explained in the draft should be correct and there is no need to think about this too hard ;)

> - did i faithfully represent the technics/politics of GNS in those posts? if not please let me know so i can avoid to repeat the same mistakes: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30155773 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30156097 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30156175

I think so. There seems to be an understandable conflation of the technical means of name resolution (the draft) and the governance issues related to zones and names. Governance of zones (but especially root zone governance) is out of scope of the draft. But it is of major importance for any real world use.

> - how can we support GNS and help make it a reality?

My usual response would be: Install GNUnet and run a zone. But, we are currently in the process of fixing some major bugs in GNUnet and it is just not yet ready. As you correctly assessed, we are a very small team at the moment.

schanzen··on The GNU Name System
To 1) Yes, IF you know the zone key (which is a public key). You can perform a dictionary attack for common label values. This is discussed in the security considerations

To 2) This is a governance issue. Theoretically, you could deploy GNS with an ICANN root zone. BUT, the system is designed to give users the freedom to override defaults if necessary (see the root zone section in the draft). GNS clients will likely ship with a default zone configuration.

If you operate a zone and are a considered trustworthy third party, nobody can prevent you from taking coin for adding delegations to your zone or offering a platform on which you can trade the labels.

schanzen··on The GNU Name System
We did receive feedback on the concept in general and draft in particular. We reworked the crypto significantly from the initial draft, both the key blinding as well as the symmetric encryption. Notably, the crypto is now more agile (you can add new zone types if applicably cryptographic primitives emerge that allow for this particular key bliding)
schanzen··on The GNU Name System
Author here. The draft is currently in ISE review (there was not enough interest at IETF or IRTF). If you want to engage or need more info gnunet-developers@gnunet.org is a good place to start and ask questions. A lot of work has been going in over the last years to separate the protocol properly from the underlying stack (gnunet). We are currently also working on a spec for our DHT (which is a required basis for GNS). One of the reasons we specified GNS first is because of the order of fundings we receive(d).

happy hacking

schanzen··on The GNU Name System IETF Draft
Your comment does not make sense because it fundamentally says that the spec needs to define the DHT so that no 10 name systems exist. But that is simply nonsense. If you implement a new DNS stub resolver that follows the record wire formats but uses different root servers it will be effectively not the "same" name system as vanilla DNS. It will have different records under names and certainly different security properties. That is the whole point of hyper-local root for DNS. I am simply implying that you are wrong in that we have to specify the underlying layer. Anyone can (should be) able to use the spec an implement it. It could be done on top of Bittorrent (not Kademlia as that is the protocol, not the network!), IPFS (the DHT they use) or any other DHT. With the respective implicatoins on security. It will still be conforming to the spec.
schanzen··on The GNU Name System IETF Draft
This is not true. Please study, for example, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6537.
schanzen··on The GNU Name System IETF Draft
See 9.1.

If ECDSA or Curve25519 are broken (e.g. because of quantum crypto), we can simply introduce a PKEY replacement (such as PKEY2) and migrate.

EDIT: However, point well taken. This needs more space in the draft and is definitely a point to address.

schanzen··on The GNU Name System IETF Draft
That is actually a feature (zone privacy). The label should not be in plaintext anywhere.
schanzen··on The GNU Name System IETF Draft
Thanks, will be removed in -02 ;)
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