192 karma · joined May 18, 2023
e-mail: lambda at supernetworks.org
I've held the same view that this stuff was sketchy because of the previous mistakes in recent history but I do not work in the field
if theres defense in depth it may be worth checking out L2 forwarding within a project for unexpected pivots an attacker could use. we've seen this come up in pentests
I work on SPR, we take special care in our VPN to avoid these problems as well, by not letting docker do the firewalling for us. (one blog post on the issue: https://www.supernetworks.org/pages/blog/docker-networking-c...).
as an aside there's a closely related issue with one-hop attacks with conntrack as well, that we locked down in October.
this secondary issue with docker is a bit more subtle, it's that they don't respect the bind address when they do forwarding into the container. the end result is that machines one hop away can forward packets into the docker container.
for a home user the impact could be that the ISP can reach into the container. depending on risk appetite this can be a concern (salt typhoon going after ISPs).
more commonly it might end up exposing more isolated work related systems to related networks one hop away
Here is Satya's May Post, https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/05/03/prioritizing-sec...
1) devices one hop away can route directly to the container network, for example the WAN interface can make requests to 172.17.0.2
2) INPUT firewall rules won't help. with docker's defaults the DOCKER-USER chain needs to filtering
3) container networks have access to private subnets upstream of the container. this is a common problem in many homelab setups
4) browsers can be a springboard for malicious websites to attempt to exploit testing docker containers on adjacent networks with default credentails
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa...
I work on SPR @ https://www.supernetworks.org/,w e keep data self hosted, instead of a database in someone else's cloud.
So the randomization bugs we have reported are specifically about stations, namely: mobile smart phone devices failing to randomize their WiFi MAC address.
As for the study this thread's topic concerns, I do not have reason to believe that there are bugs with MAC randomization in cards running as APs that would make the randomization of BSSIDs fail.
The probe responses and beacon contents appear to consistently use their randomized MAC address in the cards we have tested. There could be underlying actively triggered bugs an active attacker could uncover, to get the non randomized address, but I do not expect such bugs would affect the BSSID + Positional databases of this study.
We are currently looking at banana pi over rockchip but we are very happy to assist if someone has this gear.
I don't have access to Qualcomm information but if you have those chips it will be under the output of 'iw dev'.
We've also reported mac leaks to vendors -- we found stations would transmit packets with their non randomized state in certain scenarios, we'll blog about it when vendors release their fixes.
But more importantly I also want to say that I do not expect the MAC leaks are happening in most beacons & probe responses, which is what Apple and Google and others collect for their positional database with wi-fi SSIDs and BSSIDs. There's still ways to fingerprint, from digital fingerprints, to signal fingerprints unique to the radio and antennas and board, where machine learning can cluster and classify devices that are going to be very hard to anonymize for privacy.
Projects like https://www.nzyme.org/ actually apply fingerprinting techniques for defense to detect Rogue APs that could manifest in an actively attacked environment. They can pick up wifi implants as well as the Rogue AP attacks.
For use as a travel router the UI makes it simple to randomize both the AP BSSID/MAC as well as interfaces working as WiFi client stations for internet uplink.
the simons foundation will have influence on machine learning and medicine for many decades to come though and will hopefully be a force of positivity in these fields
previously macos just worked way better given that the apps were developed with apple's framework and polish, and accessibility was part of that
anyway, it was IDA Pro, and they had spent some upfront time on tuning the layout to optimize their flow. I do not remember specifically but yes their IDA looked very different than the default setup.
you can think of unprivileged namespaces in general as a bunch of attack surface that was previously root to kernel only and hadn't had much scrutiny. these bugs will take decades to eliminate without a rewrite of linux.
"A first offense is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a $10,000 fine and/or up to a year in jail. Subsequent offenses are felonies punishable by up to 2 years in prison. In practice, this might result in only a civil action by the FCC. But it is forbidden by Congress and can be punished by imprisonment." https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/94617/is-deliberate-....