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spr-alex

192 karma · joined May 18, 2023

On a mission to make networking secure and simple. https://www.supernetworks.org

e-mail: lambda at supernetworks.org

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spr-alex··on Hold on there: WPA3 connections fail after 11 hours
There's a misunderstanding in the article and the comments worth clarifying for people on SAE/WPA3 and the 6Ghz/6-E Bands.

WPA3 is only required when operating on the 6ghz bands.

For 802.11ac/ax its not required on the 5ghz bands.

So it is possible to spin up an AP on 6ghz with SAE only, and another AP on 5ghz in WPA2/3 mixed mode. It's not an all or nothing choice for the pi which first of all only supports 802.11ac and secondly does not support 6ghz with the builtin wifi card.

In terms of range and capabilities we've found the mt76 series to be very reliable and support wifi6 and 6-e on the pis with speeds easily reaching 600mbps.

These are the A8000 cards from netgear and the ALFA AWUS036AXML. They're pretty good for what they are. I only wish they were Dual Band Dual Channel.

WiFi 7 will see clients gaining Multi Link Operation capability, they'll be able to simultaneously hit 5ghz and 6ghz and 2.4ghz bands for 2-3x throughput.

spr-alex··on WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit mode at home
Somewhat related -- with the project I work on, https://github.com/spr-networks/super, we do support wireguard peers (and also support combining that wireguard identity with a wifi peer identity as well).

Devices are provisioned by assigning or generating a wireguard keypair in the API.

Next the peers are routed together by policy and by default can't access one another. There's support for bidirectional network groups or one-way firewall rules with NAT.

One area of improvement is multicast support with wireguard, it's doable, just not ready yet.

spr-alex··on WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit mode at home
Right, although the article did not mention how to stop the spoofing. I started this thread to raise awareness and point out that the details around RADIUS can really matter here when not using a secure AP because some of the security assumptions about radius clients do lead to hilarious security failure
spr-alex··on WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit mode at home
it's worth noting that hostapd has a built-in EAP server as well for running Radius. check the config sample for "EAP server" https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/plain/hostapd/hostapd.conf

As for securing them, there's several labs security researchers provide for breaking into "enterprise wifi"

https://github.com/sensepost/shinai-fi https://github.com/r4ulcl/WiFiChallengeLab-docker

spr-alex··on WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit mode at home
Correct, a wifi station client would not be attacked this way. As for the radius client -- the answer is it depends.

For many radius clients used by a common consumer AP, it's been possible for the spoofed radius to just say "okay, authenticated" to authorize itself -- and the shared secret is never used. It's worth noting that RADIUS may use MD5 with that shared secret, which is vulnerable to cracking attacks as well but I have not had to go down the rabbithole that far.

It would be interesting to try this against the Unifi AP brand named in the article and see how it handles it. My understanding is they run a custom Openwrt image so maybe they provide source code.

spr-alex··on WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit mode at home
shameless plug: https://github.com/spr-networks/super is a project I work on that makes it easier to handle per-device wifi passwords on a single SSID, and it supports WPA3
spr-alex··on WPA3 Enterprise 192-bit mode at home
EAP-TLS is generally a great practice, as EAP-PEAP is vulnerable to MITM issues (fix proposed in https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-t... but never adopted).

For the use case cited -- blocking MAC spoofing, EAP-TLS doesn't quite solve it, it mainly only solves authentication. The outer layer is not wrapped with TLS and is instead based on an ephemeral session key. Additional work is needed to stop the spoofing. The RFC states explicitly that channel binding, which would help stop the MAC spoofing, is not implemented https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5216. What it does prevent is a client from being man-in-the-middled.

What's even wilder is that on some access points, when set to bridge mode, with an upstream Radius Authentication Server, as described, they may be vulnerable to ARP spoofing of the upstream radius server IP. This is something we've reported to vendors and were told "won't fix". Names include Netgear and TP-Link, though we don't suspect all routers from them are affected by this. We have not tested with the unifi access point referenced in the article.

So to restate the attack, cause it's so ridiculous, you should know about it: an anonymous, unauthenticated wireless station associates without a password. Next it would begin the EAPOL negotiation but it instead then proceeds to perform ARP spoofing to claim the IP address of the upstream Radius that is supposed to only be routed over the uplink interfaces. Even without knowing the shared secret, it's possible for the client to pretend to be the radius server to the AP, and authenticate itself onto the network. One thing you want to be very sure of when setting up 802.1X Radius Auth, is that your access point is not going to be misconfigured to allow clients to do this.

spr-alex··on iOS Wi-Fi Profile Generator
Unfortunately this is also an issue with the QR Code format which is underspecified, and this extends to a bug we've been begrudgingly waiting for apple to fix here.

The QR Code format is something like this ``` type = 'WPA' return `WIFI:S:${_ssid};P:${password};T:${type};${hidden};` ```

So the long standing bug (feedback id 9991042) we have filed with Apple is about a downgrade issue with QR Codes. If an iOS devices connects with a QR Code it will successfully connect with WPA3. But when the device goes to reconnect it has saved the SSID as a WPA2 network only and will incorrectly only authenticate with WPA2. This is very unfortunate because the zero-knowledge aspect of dragonfly in wpa3 is a huge step forward for wifi security. Although I guess it's all still resting on AES CTR at the end of the day :-)

spr-alex··on I told the flight attendant "the WiFi isn't working"
Yes, although it is part of our upsell and not in the core FOSS project. We need to update our documentation to be more clear as we have been getting this question more often.
spr-alex··on I told the flight attendant "the WiFi isn't working"
neverssl.com
spr-alex··on I told the flight attendant "the WiFi isn't working"
Yes, this is part of the story of how SPR achieves this.

So the hostapd configuration for SPR has the following components: - ap_isolate=1 - per_sta_vif=1 - unique passphrases for devices - firewall rules

ap_isolate stops the AP from doing L2 forwarding between clients using the pairwise keys. the per_sta_vif=1 will also ensure that each client has a unique GTK so they can't use group key encryption to communicate without the AP.

Next, unique passphrases are used. Without this, it's possible for a malicious device to decrypt WPA2 traffic passively or spin up a Rogue AP to capture traffic from peers.

And lastly -- firewall rules with default deny connect devices by policy.

That ap_isolate alone is not enough is kind of interesting, as it's possible to instead push packets to the router that will then forward to the client destination. Most off the shelf routers have forwarding on without a default deny policy, enabling this. The subtlety here is the attacker uses the router as the L2 destination instead of the other wireless client. At the very least attackers can send UDP packets to bypass the intended isolation. This bypass is especially powerful when changing mediums between Wireless and Wired as the Wired victim receiving packets will be responding back to the router, and on many consumer routers a full TCP connection will be possible then.

spr-alex··on I told the flight attendant "the WiFi isn't working"
SPR supports receiving VLAN tagged packets over a wired LAN interface today.

Soon we are planning to support an OpenWRT package that will allow people to link up into SPR from lots of APs, provided the AP card supports AP/VLAN mode which is critical for the segmentation.

We have no plan to work more closely with managing RADIUS right now, enterprise wifi authentication is difficult to deploy securely without client-side certificates for authentication. So that makes it less appealing due to our goal of supporting any kind of wifi capable device.

Lastly, SPR does have an upsell feature where we support leaf node APs running SPR that have backhaul into a primary instance.

spr-alex··on I told the flight attendant "the WiFi isn't working"
I work on SPR, http://github.com/spr-networks/super, we make it easy to use distinct WiFi 3/ WPA2 passwords to authenticate devices on the network for policy based access
spr-alex··on Radio Architecture Matters: A Review of RF Sampling vs. Zero-IF
I am looking for PCB designers with RF experience. If this is what you're good at, please reach out
spr-alex··on Securely Chaining WiFi Routers (2022)
Would love to hear from you if you'd be interested in chatting you can find us on the discord or outreach [at] supernetworks.org. I assume your comment is about SPR's micro-segmentation and not the blog post if I understand?

SPR does support mesh nodes with backhaul which is currently for PLUS members -- however, we have not explored supporting multiple independent routers with micro-segmentation.

Would love to hear your use case, we have an API which should already make it possible for users to automate and code up what they need to sync up disparate SPR instances on distinct routers, for example.

For affecting the 802.11 spec that's out of scope for our reach today.

spr-alex··on Securely Chaining WiFi Routers (2022)
We too were once apathetic about locking down networks. But no longer
spr-alex··on Securely Chaining WiFi Routers (2022)
HI, SPR team here, let us know if you have any questions
spr-alex··on Securely Chaining WiFi Routers (2022)
Hi, SPR team here -- i'm afraid the paragraph is out of order from the diagram. Our apologies. the text should be interpreted separately
spr-alex··on Securely Chaining WiFi Routers (2022)
Hi -- this is the SPR team, we actually did not push this on ycombinator and are happy to see it being discussed. We've previously made one post about SPR here, under Show HN:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35990030

The post in the link does not pertain to the user PSK but it is about the difficult trade offs that users have when they need to chain routers together.

Imagine someone has a router that they want to put all the IOT stuff that does not get security updates and has poor code quality compared to the rest of a network.

Should that router be the first router that has access to the internet? Or should it be connected to the router that does. The answer is not so simple and that's what the blog post discusses.

In SPR we provide users a mechanism to block upstream RFC1918 addresses by default and selectively enable them.

We have also found numerous flaws in Guest WiFi systems that totally break isolation between the Guest Network and the main network. This affects many routers on the market today, in particular when a medium is bridged between wired and wireless, but also in general.

As seibol commented -- VLAN tagging per SSID is a valid approach as well if a router supports it. Thats a lot stronger than how many routers implement their guest isolation.

As for Multi-PSK -- the use case is creating micro-segmentation in a network with zero-trust, where the identity on the network is rooted in that password.

Without Multi-PSK, if it's not clear, every device that has the WiFi password can sniff encrypted traffic with WPA2, make a Rogue AP to attack WPA3 in case its in use, and can perform ARP spoofing on the network to interfere with other devices.

spr-alex··on OpenWrt Project: a Linux operating system targeting embedded devices
Plugging a project we've been working on -- https://www.supernetworks.org. It's dockerized router software tailored for privacy & security that will happily coexist on a general purpose system.
spr-alex··on Show HN: Supernetworks' Secure Programmable Router
For people interested in learning more about network security & wifi, we have also been releasing self hosted CTF challenges at

https://turtles.supernetworks.org/ & https://www.supernetworks.org/wifiturtles.html

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