150 karma · joined November 20, 2019
> PRESS RELEASE The Danish Intelligence Service completes special investigation of the Defense Intelligence Service (FE) on the basis of material submitted by one or more whistleblowers In November 2019, the Danish Intelligence Service came across one or more whistleblowers in possession of a significant amount of material concerning FE, which the Authority has not had so far. knowledge of or opportunity to provide. The material is of such a nature that the Authority decided to focus its control of the FE in order to carry out an in-depth investigation of the present circumstances. With this announcement, the Authority publishes the unclassified results of the investigation. On the basis of the Authority's investigation of the submitted material, the Authority submitted an analysis in four volumes to the Minister of Defense on 21 August 2020, containing the Authority's conclusions and recommendations. Throughout the process of the special investigation of FE, the Authority has kept the Minister of Defense informed. The Minister of Defense has regularly expressed support for the Authority's in-depth examination of the material. The Authority's assessments and recommendations deal with matters which are wholly or partly assessed to be within the Authority's legality control in accordance with the FE Act and rules issued pursuant thereto, as well as matters which the Minister in the Authority's opinion should be aware of, cf. section 16 of the FE Act. , PCS. 2. Based on a source-critical approach to the study
Conclusions
> That FE has on several occasions since the Authority's establishment in 2014 and until the summer of 2020 - in connection with, among other things, the Authority's specific inspections and meetings with the head of FE - withheld key and crucial information for the Authority and provided the Authority with incorrect information regarding the service's collection and disclosure. of information. It is the opinion of the supervisory authority that the statutory duty to provide information is absolutely necessary for a functional supervision, and that it rests on the trust of the legislator that the FE complies with the obligation in all respects. The result of these repeated breaches of the statutory duty to provide information is that the legality check which the supervision under the FE Act is required to carry out and which contributes to the legitimation of FE's business, does not work as intended. That at central parts of FE's collection capacities there are risks that collection can be made unjustifiably against Danish citizens. That the submitted material indicates that FE's management has failed to follow up on or further investigate indications of espionage within the area of the Ministry of Defense. That there is an inappropriate culture of legality in FE's management and parts of the service, where the service's any unjustified activities or inappropriate conditions are sought to be shelved, including by failing to inform the supervisor of matters relevant to its control. That the submitted material indicates that FE before the supervision was established in 2014 has initiated operational activities in violation of Danish law, including by obtaining and passing on a significant amount of information about Danish citizens. That the FE has unjustifiably processed information about an employee in the supervision.
(1): https://www.tet.dk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/PRESSEMEDDELEL...
Or we will set up e2e encrypted telegram. Or not talk.
> What if I have a very good memory, and follow conversations by writing up their details
You saying that you remember I said something, even took a screenshot vs you can prove I said something, is a big difference.
If I am doing a snowden, I might go to a sauna. If I am planning to overthrow my boss, I think e2e telegram is okay. Because I can delete the conversation it might even be preferable to signal.
Use cases and threat models...
In telegram it is understood that 'secret chats' constitutes confidentiality. As such, both parties, I believe, ought to be able to delete everything.
I kind of see you point about non-secret chats.
But then we are back with a opt-in model for privacy.
Personally: what I tell you at the coffee machine, in confidence or not, is ephemeral. I would probably not talk to you at all if you where taperecording all conversations, as you want to do with messages... so I think both.parties.should be able to delete text conversations. And privacy should be on by default.
However, for me, the problems are: Maps. Google Maps are great. Calendar: my calender provider online has ICS calendar sharing, not e.g. itip.and imip.
When you use gmail you conflate the standard with the app.
Signal also makes trade offs in order to het crypto to the masses.
Edit: really interesting. That makes sense. But also a very strict set of requirements.
Thanks.
But any ways... it seems to me, one would allways design for flexibilty (t2). And then just create views for the special cases you describe?
But I've never had the need for 'special sql'.
Is this 'cubes' all over? I understand cubes as basically views precalculated to perform faster on mostly to charge more?
But OK... If need to work on datasets bigger than e.g. 5 GB you begin to eat RAM fast. Is this the use case? Then why not simply say that?
Firefox --no-remote