292 karma · joined July 7, 2009
Regarding macros: it's quite clear that they simplify the job of the compiler writer: you can provide more features, more efficiently to the end user. But every feature has a cost, and increasing the end user's surface area onto the language by providing 1) macros, 2) new features enabled by macros, is very much a double edged sword. Being enabled by a compiler flag definitely helps to minimize end-user exposure to the former.
Macros in lisps can be used as a replacement for many of the features that Scala provides, including call-by-name parameters, (certain types of) implicits, and many uses of generics. If we could deprecate some of those features in Scala by replacing them with macros, then this would seem like more of a net win to me. But that doesn't seem likely: instead we will probably have all N, and Scala programmers will need to decide which of the growing list of ways to accomplish cat-skinning is best.
Only funds that you have daily access to need be vulnerable to the latter point, as physical security (air-gapping) is sufficient when you do not need to -send- funds.
> And it is much easier to accidentally lose bitcoins than gold, pirate tales notwithstanding.
Strongly disagree. Can you keep N redundant copies of your gold? Combined with secret splitting, you could require that at least K of N secure locations be accessed.
A lot of awesome work has gone into Cassandra 1.0: many thanks to the Datastax team.
The percentage is (bitcoin_days_ever_destroyed / bitcoin_days_ever_created). Today there will be ~7.2 million bitcoin days created, because that is how many BTC are in circulation.
There are other attacks that rely on the receiver being fenced off from the wider network, but those are even harder to coordinate.
If Bitcoin UIs allowed you to specify how much you trusted particular sending addresses (in terms of confirmation numbers), things like green addresses would fall out naturally. Also, providing these trust numbers is a great usecase for a web-of-trust system.
I can't tell how this diminishes security, assuming the normal practice of using one-time receiving addresses is still used. EDIT: And assuming you are comfortable having a middleman like Instawallet involved.
The ideal system/algorithm would exactly match the amount of Bitcoin in circulation to the growth of the economy, which would keep prices stable. Bitcoin pioneered most of what you'd need to create such an algorithm in a new system, but what does "growth of an economy" look like in terms of transactions between anonymous addresses? You'd need some concept of identity to determine the number of unique players, and the value flowing between them.
A system that solves this problem at scale is the economic holy grail.
To achieve actual anonymity, receivers need to use a one-time-address for each sender, and senders need to not leak information about which addresses they own.
An insecure computer means an insecure life.
If you don't trust the value of the Bitcoin currency, that doesn't stop you from using the Bitcoin system as a replacement for Paypal et al. for 1) anonymous transactions, 2) payments to a trusted recipient, and 3) micropayments.
Exchanges will compete to convert Bitcoin into your "trusty" local peso/lira/drachma, although their primary customers will probably be speculators for the near future.
Say what you will about EPA numbers, but at least they involve standardized measurement.
Local graph databases avoid the extra seeks by keeping extra copies of the destination vertex immediately next to the source vertex on disk, but I don't think Riak is doing this, or that it is actually practical in an eventually consistent system.
Crossing Utah is no problem: http://maps.google.com/maps?q=rv+park+near+Utah