stvswn

That experience isn't true in my experience. I was in college pre-Uber in an area unserved by public transportation and it was common knowledge that you cannot schedule a cab and expect them to actually come, and when they did you could expect a very tense price negotiation accompanied by indignation about where you wanted to go.

To push back on taxi apologia elsewhere -- Years later I lived in Philadelphia during the cab era and the city passed a law that the cabs needed to accept credit cards, but the cabs wouldn't unlock their doors unless you promised to pay cash. Even still, they'd often ask where you wanted to go and speed away if you said the wrong thing. Around the same time, in D.C., there was a "zone system" where cab fares were set around how many zones the cab traveled through, and so every rider got used to knowing the tricks cabs would play to go out of their ways to enter and exit unnecessary zones and surprise you with a high bill. They also had the right to pick up additional passengers whether you liked it or not. In NYC it was common knowledge that you just can't expect a cab to take you to the outer boroughs.

The author is mixing political arguments related to public transit funding, unionization and classification of workers with an analysis of Uber's financials and strategy, and I think it weakens the argument.

Travis understood that Uber doesn't deserve its multiple without self-driving cars, he thought it was such an existential problem that he conspired to launder trade secrets from Google in order to jumpstart his program. His reasoning, I think, was that Uber's business model precludes it from being the exclusive platform for drivers (because of their IC status), meaning that he could never raise prices past the point where it entices a new competitor, nor can he lower payouts to the point where drivers abandon Uber. Uber has to do the heavy lifting to convince local jurisdictions to allow ridesharing and then any newcomer can swoop in and compete if Uber gets too greedy. Uber's greatest asset is that it's first and has a massive userbase, but for a cheaper ride many would compare prices in a new app without much thought.

This doesn't mean that it's not very helpful to consumers to have on demand ride apps! I'm glad they exist. I live in suburbia and the other day I had to travel to a train station that was about 20 miles away. Public transit would have meant an hour and 2 bus transfers, Uber got me there in 25 minutes for the same cost. Lots of criticism of Uber compares it to dense urban areas with a taxi fleet, but there weren't taxis here before Uber, there were only car services at much higher prices.

From a consumer standpoint, we should be happy that these platforms exist at relatively low cost, we end up getting rides via a very convenient app for only a 25% markup on what the driver grosses per ride (less including tip) -- and that middleman fee is likely to continue to get squeezed.

The author presumably gets that they are popular because their very popularity seems to be an issue -- it's argued that the public is less likely to want to invest in public transit when Uber is available. One can't also argue that the general public is ditching Uber. It's sort of a Yogi Berra argument -- "That place is so crowded no one goes there anymore."

As a PM at a large tech company, I often describe the value of my role as this: we pay engineers a lot of money for their specialized skills. It is great if they can meet with customers, but that can't be 50% of their time, or even 25%. Even worse, they should not be spending their time communicating to executives via slide decks, writing documents for the sales teams, meeting with lawyers, meeting with other teams to negotiate turf battles -- etc., etc. Big companies need PMs because someone has to do all the "stuff." Yes, in the course of doing it, the PM gains some power to set the product strategy and roadmap -- by virtue of being the nexus of all the information -- but this is almost always done in close collaboration with the engineering team anyway. It makes no sense to compete with other companies for valuable engineers who can actually create software and then use up their time doing things that I can do for them. Someone who used to write code but now manages all of the business isn't an engineer anymore, he or she is a former engineer who is now a PM (or an executive perhaps), regardless of the job title.

I don't really agree with you characterization of where our taxes go -- federally, 64% of the government budget is related to mandatory spending, almost all of which is social security, medicare, and medicaid.

15% of the budget goes to the military. That makes the U.S. the largest military spender in the world.

15% of the budget may seem expensive, but it's not fair to compare it to Western Europe. NATO is a big reason why western europe does not need to spend more on their own defense.

I believe that's a good thing - it's in the United States' best interest to avoid rearmament in Europe, and Europe has never been at (relative) peace for so long as it has been since the emergence of the post-WWII consensus -- but they do in fact have more money for more non-defense discretionary spending than we do as a result. The Euro area spends 1.4% of GDP on military spending while being protected by an umbrella of security provided by the U.S., which spends 3.7% of GDP on the military.

Again, I think this is good for the U.S., we benefit from the liberal world order that we enforce, but I think it has to be taken into context when the EU is described as a great example of how to spend tax money on wise social programs.

I find it interesting that you frame income inequality as "wealth polarisation." Are you implying a bimodal distribution of some sort?

My personal theory of "inequality" is that it isn't necessarily a bad thing. A distribution of income levels will always have a long right tail as you cannot make negative income but there is no theoretical limit to the maximum income. If all wages grow by the same relative amount, you would see increased inequality.

I think it is a problem if wages aren't growing for all portions of the distribution, but that is precisely because of the lack of growth for some and not because of the existence of growth for others. So, yes, I do think that growing income inequality may be a societal issue, but only if it is an effect of wage stagnation for middle and lower classes (which it is).

I do not believe that the rich getting richer is the cause of the stagnation, though. If anything, automation and globalization have been the main reasons for stagnation among middle and lower income levels. Automation and globalization may also be the cause of the continued growth in the very high wages. Even if they share the same underlying cause, one didn't cause the other.

I understand, but don't agree with, the argument that increased inequality causes social problems on its own. According to this theory, as I understand it, you can't have the differences among people be too great because it will cause too much power imbalance and resentment and eventually the masses will rise up and destroy the system from within. I don't agree, I think social problems come from the difference in reality compared to expectations of how one thought their future would go -- in other words, it is much worse for someone to see low wage growth in a stagnant economy where their standard of living is declining relative to their parents than it is to see moderate wage growth in a growing economy but there are some other people getting super, super rich. I don't think one's life relative to rich people is that important compared to one's life relative to personal expectations.

So, in that sense, I don't agree with redistribution schemes that intend on fixing a symptom of a problem (that rich people exist) rather than fixing a cause (wages are stagnant).

If the idea isn't to just reduce the inequality, but rather to supplement lower incomes -- there is absolutely no version of "taxing the mega rich" that we could do which would raise enough money to redistribute to the rest of workers such that it compensates them for the lack of wage growth at the lower end. It can't be done, there's not enough money. Eventually you have to tax the (productive) middle class.

From that perspective, I prefer policies that focus on wage growth for the lower and middle classes, even if that's a harder problem to solve.

It says "some" lawyers expressed concern, according to interviews with 15 of them. Nothing about that sentence alleges that all 15 they spoke with expressed concern. Some could be 2 or 3 and all 15 were aware of the concern.

What burden of proof are you talking about? You're saying that a burden of proof needs to be met before what, exactly?

I am not saying they have met a burden of proof, I'm saying that we don't censor news articles (even sensational or thinly sourced ones) because they haven't yet met a burden of proof.

The meta-story about how Giuliani got the emails aside, what portion of the actual story (related to Hunter's dealings) do you consider disinformation?

What do you mean by disenfranchise, while we're at it? Even if we were to stipulate it's a lie, is it your position that to lie during campaign season is literally the same as taking away the right to vote?

So far, there doesn't seem to be much that hasn't already been confirmed. One new piece of information is the email that implies a Burisma exec. was at least introduced to Joe Biden. The Biden hasn't issued a categorical denail of this, only to say that such a meeting "wasn't scheduled."

What substantive allegation against Hunter Biden are you disputing, exactly?

This is often the nature of stories in the public interest. No one ever proved a single portion of Christine DeBlasey Ford's accusations against Brett Kavanaugh but the fact that she was making the accusations were newsworthy enough.

In this case, the following are true: (1) Hunter Biden was a highly paid board member of Burisma while his father handled Ukraine policy for the U.S. (2) A computer repair store owner claims to have his data and to have given it to Rudy Giuliani (3) There was a Grand Jury summons to seize the computer as evidence in an unknown investigation.

This is far more than is usually needed to cover a story.

The provenance of the documents is fishy. They could have easily been hacked. But, what portions of the actual story are false?

The Biden campaign's refutation was not to say that the emails were doctored. They only said that they have checked the official schedule of Joe Biden from the day in question and there is no mention of a meeting with the Burisma executive (they don't say categorically that he did not meet with him, just that it is not present on the official schedule).

Other then the meeting w/ Biden, I'm not sure there's a detail that has been specfically contested.

I thought of this. The serial number of the laptop is included in the grand jury summons docs released by the New York Post. The serial number can be used to lookup the model. It was a mid-2017 macbook pro, the T2 chip started shipping in 2018 models.

Honestly, I don't think that there's a general expectation in the digital or brick-and-mortar world that when you buy something from a merchant the information related to that transaction is "your data" and they cannot use it. Certainly there are businesses that promise discretion, but that's normally a selling point for a particular reason. On the other hand, there is a reason to expect privacy when you are using Facebook for personal communications, photo sharing, etc. This scheme, then, is the more privacy safe way to do it. The T-Shirt company isn't saying "hey, Facebook, can you tell me some interesting personal info about my customers so I can target ads better?" and Facebook isn't responding with "here's all the stuff they're into based on their Facebook activity." Instead, they say "here are my transaction records" and Facebook says "OK, we'll use this to show your ads to people who are likely to want your T-Shirts." So, yes, to some extent Facebook has data on lots of stuff you do in the world because the businesses you interact with opt-in to share the data. This doesn't really bother me, just like my credit card company knowing all of my purchases doesn't bother me. If it bothers you, though, it does really work to a) periodically reset your IDFA/AdID on your mobile device, and b) delete cookies on your browsers.

Your point about childcare being difficult is absolutely correct, but I don't know if you're correct that a "LOT" of women (I assume you mean counterintuitively more than the commentor implied) would not want to stay home to raise them, all things considered. Based on personal relationships with my wife, sisters, and close family and friends I believe it is very, very common for mothers to find returning to work very difficult (even though it's a lot of work to stay home). I don't think anyone intends to imply that there aren't men who feel this way, that there aren't women who don't feel this way, or that the reason for anyone feeling this way is because work is hard and staying home with kids is easy.

I agree generally (I believe you may be discounting that many women do want careers and the joys of motherhood and it's hard). I disagree with some commenters that this is an overly gendered idea: while it's true that there are plenty of exceptions, it's definitely true that men and women, as a broad generalization, feel differently. While many men feel a sense of pride if they are able to work hard enough and be successful enough to support their family, many women in the same situation feel guilt for missing out on their kids' upbringing during the day (again, since someone is going to say it, I'm aware there are many exceptions). I think the author missed another difference compared with past decades, however: it used to be more common than it is now for grandparents to cover childcare of young children while both parents worked (or in part-time support of a busy mother with many kids). This seems to be less common than it once was, and it might be because we are now two generations into a trend of people waiting much longer to have kids than they once did. As a child, my grandmother was in her 50s and 60s, and was able to take on a good deal of childcare in her retirement. If two generations each wait until 35 to have a first kid, then the grandparent of a 5 year old is 75 and less likely to be able to be relied upon for childcare. Added to this is the fact that the labor market for childcare looks a lot like the labor market for elder care in that both are career options for similarly situated applicants, and there just isn't enough labor supply.

But you concede that some jobs would be automated if the labor prices were higher, and yet you think that's fine? Do you acknowledge a trade-off whereby fewer workers can get higher wages OR more workers can get some wages and prefer the former?

For argument's sake, let's assume that no jobs can be automated. The cost to the franchise owner to operate goes up, and in response they raise prices -- but at some prices they're going to really start losing business, so they also have to lower costs elsewhere or simply get lower profits. How does it all shake out? The fact is that it has to be paid by someone, and it'll likely mean fewer McDonalds are opened because it'll just be harder to make them profitable.

Maybe you're OK with that trade-off, but it IS a tradeoff that will happen, and it means fewer jobs.

Your analysis presumes that the business owners can and will absorb anything without reacting, as if more value can be extracted but there won't be a new equilibrium. I assume that the franchise owners aren't making the kinds of profits where that is true, I assume they're mostly bumping along on fairly low margins.

You are asserting that there is broad academic agreement that Piketty's major points still stand, but that is far from true -- in fact they never stood under serious scrutiny at all. Outside of simply describing tautalogies, his major point is that inequality is rising because the rate of return on capital is exceeding the economy's growth rate, from which he makes a logical leap that inequality will increase inexorably without intervention. This point fails to consider that people spend some (and sometimes a lot) of their earnings from capital, which dissipates their wealth back into the economy. Historical data show that wealth does not end up growing faster than income because of the effect of spending the wealth (you have to spend basically none of it to maintain a growth rate that is greater than GDP). A good number of serious academics have raised this and other points. His book is best understood as a popular argument for specific political ends, and since it gives a veneer of academic seriousness to those ends it has been popular.

But, you like accessing content for free, correct? That content doesn't exist and then ads are layered on, the context exists BECAUSE of ads. Like, no one would produce the content without the plan to make their money back via ads.

This is how mass media has worked from the get-go. Radio stations were built by advertisers for the purpose of advertising. Entire genres of popular music wouldn't have happened otherwise.

Online advertising did not create the notion of advertising being the predominant media funding model.

And, just because you'd rather ads not exist, it doesn't mean there's something "evil" or whatever about a business promoting itself. I'm going to guess that if you ever find yourself needed to market a business you'll be happy if there's an option to advertise effectively.

what's hard about that?

When you are approaching your limit they give you a warning and link to this: https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6374270?hl=en

Well, yeah, there's spam detection and similar features that are enabled by not having client-side encryption. If all of the features that are enabled by cloud-based email aren't worth it to you, fine, but most people like them and you have other options.

It's amazing to me how much Europeans do not identify with management, as if management is a class separate from them and not just people who were like them before getting promoted. Do Europeans see themselves as confined in their careers to a "class," and not invested in the competitiveness and profitability of the company they've voluntarily joined?

I'm sure these sorts of things are more common in Europe, and it's amazing to me how Europeans don't independently realize that it's not a coincidence that the battle lines are about trying to exact concessions from American companies, since there aren't really any relevant European tech companies anyway.

You are attributing the profitability of software companies to what you think is the "underpaying" of its workers? And you think that unionization will lead to higher wages? I'm just trying to understand the argument.

If the software industry were to unionize, the union would want to collectively bargain for seniority-based job security rules and other schemes to prevent lower-paid new-hires (people not YET in the union) from taking work from existing union members. Other versions of this effect come in the form of union-imposed certification schemes in the trades, "tenure" rules in education, seniority precedence in picking hours in healthcare, etc. The net effect is that the experienced and powerful members make it hard for the young to get into the profession.

I have a problem with that, ideologically. But, in more practical terms: collective bargaining only works to increase wages when the counterparty has no other option. This works when you're talking about workers at the docks: the docks are not going anywhere, the ships need to be unloaded, and you can't exactly bus in some scabs and expect it to work out. With software, what do you think will happen if a union somehow manages, via Swiss law, to unionize one Google office? It's software. Google will leave and hire elsewhere.

This is exactly why Subaru and Toyota builds cars in the southern U.S. while Ford builds in Mexico, and why industries are flocking to non-union states, and why the people are going with them.

It also has the issue of calculating negative externalities to add to the "cost" of fossil fuels without attempting to understand the positive externalities.

The reasoning is "we will eventually have to pay for climate change and air pollution, so let's add that to the cost calculation for accuracy." This is reasonable (depending on the accuracy of your estimates) but it has to be accompanied by another calculation -- what would we have to pay for in the absence of fossil fuels that we're not paying for now? Likely quite a bit, at the very least in the loss of tax revenue caused by the economic slowdown. An estimate that looks at the cost of consequences is meaningless if you don't include all the relevant consequences of both action and inaction.

In the U.S. we spend the following on tax subsidies each year: 1. Renewable energy: $7.3 billion 2. Energy efficiency: $4.8 billion 3. Fossil fuels: $3.2 billion 4. Nuclear energy: $1.1 billion

The subsidy number you're referring to is calcuated by adding negative externalities related to air pollution and climate change to the numbers. Those estimates don't reflect funds that could have been spent elsewhere and it doesn't reflect funding priority.

This article calculates "fossil fuel subsidies" using an expansive definition that includes negative externalities and arrives at $649 billion. People might assume that "subsidies" means things like tax breaks for industry by the federal government. That is more like $4 billion. The article uses the narrowest possible defintion of "education spending" to mean the funding of the department of education, which is $68 billion but doesn't operate any schools. If you were to count what Americans actually spend on public education at local and state levels, it's actually like $700 billion.

Then again, it's kind of crazy to pick up negative externalities in a calculation of a "subsidy." By that reasoning, anything measurably bad that the government hasn't outlawed yet is a "subsidy" if you look at it the right way. How much do we spend in the U.S. subsidizing opiod addiction? Murder? Car crashes?

The industry group that represents the publishers here is not talking about the sell-side ad tech, they're perfectly happy showing ads to their users. They have lots of choices for sell-side platforms anyway, it's a very robust and competitive market. They're talking about search results and Google News, their belief being that Google should share search advertising revenue with them because their content contributes to the value of search results.

I agree to the extent that many seem to acknowledge the transfer and remittance use case but seem to think that the market is already filled by niche players -- the fact that FB doesn't have to contend with network effects because everyone already has Messenger and/or WhatsApp is a huge deal.

It is simultaneously the case that FB can't build this and then magically be exempt from each jurisdiction's laws related to cross-border transfers. It's not like a real decentralized coin where there's no real enforcement mechanism, each government will know exactly where to knock and FB will play ball with reporting requirements, etc.

I think the right analogy is that they want to be to the rest of the world what AliPay is to China -- ubiquitious, so that it will very quickly be the case that you know everyone supports it in the world so you don't need to carry around your credit cards. Sort of like what Apple and Google Pay would want to be but with a larger incentive for retailers to adopt it as it has instantly higher penetration among users. It also might be more likely that messaging payments to a retailer becomes the norm instead of NFC (like how everyone in China pays for a restaurant check with AliPay by simply sending payment via message to the address, usually on the table in a QR code).

I'm not sure that it needs to be a blockchain but I assume it's about making the economics work by cutting out middlemen. If FB gets everyone to use this in their daily lives, however, it'll be a huge win for FB even if they don't make money on it directly -- because purchase data is very valuable, but also because you can't feasibly get rid of FB once it becomes your normal payment method.

So you're saying you understand the value proposition and that it's been successful elsewhere, but you don't understand why Facebook would want to do it, or why it might make sense for the company who already has messaging apps on billions of phones?

and to be explicit, the "we" is the FTC and the antitrust division of the DOJ.

It's not really, because the two (telecom and big tech) are in a fight for dominance and focusing on one will benefit the other. It's natural to wonder about the influence of telecom when the Attorney General, under whom the DOJ's investigation is being conducted, was the general counsel of GTE/Verizon for 14 years and then served on Time Warner's board until last year, helping them to merge with AT&T. If you assume the antitrust division of the DOJ has limited resources, and that they were until recently focused on telecom, it's not "whataboutism" to wonder what's driving the abrupt shift to tech.

This is insane. No, you don't have to use it. You can reset cookies and device identifiers whenever you want if you don't want "phantom profiles."