It is for a visual designer, so obviously the presentation of that work is different than academic/technical research, but it is very clean and simple.
Apparently he is re-doing his portfolio as the main site is just a giant tweet.
300 karma · joined August 17, 2011
It is for a visual designer, so obviously the presentation of that work is different than academic/technical research, but it is very clean and simple.
Apparently he is re-doing his portfolio as the main site is just a giant tweet.
There are a few worthwhile reasons to get an MBA, but one really trumps the rest.
As some others have said, the overwhelming value of an MBA is to build strong relationships with future business leaders. End of story. If you don't want to spend 2 years doing that and pay for it, don't do an MBA.
Those I've talked with that did an eMBA mostly regretted it because they were incredibly busy, and barely had time to meet anyone in the program, let alone build strong relationships with them.
If you don't have much background in management or business (most of which you can get from reading books) the course material will be helpful, but you could just as easily learn it on the job - if you can get the job. That is the other reason to get an MBA; to get into a company who requires it, though these are increasingly become less mandatory.
There are many answers to the question of how to get to executive management, but I think a very common one, which is likely to work for most people is the following: work at a service provider which gives you some strong functional/business skills (e.g., consulting, investment banking, equity research, marketing strategy, etc.). Do well there, but don't stay too long. From there, take a middle-management role (e.g, director, VP) at a corporation that is growing fairly quickly. Make your way up, and probably switch to another firm if you're not advancing quickly where you are.
Be careful of the trap of not having operating responsibility - you won't have this as a consultant or investment banker. If you don't have experience owning a P&L, you can't be trusted to do so even if you smart and capable. You could be in corporate strategy, corporate development, etc. but those are not true executive management roles.
Wow that went longer than I intended so I'm going to stop rambling.
From the quote below, they reference $85 to cover launch, insurance, and 1 year of operating costs. Presumably that insurance would cover some of the costs of an event like this?
Quote from an article on this (http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000759794)
Spacecom Satellite Communications' (TASE:SCC) board of director has authorized management to sign a contract with Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. (IAI) (TASE: ARSP.B1) to build and buy the Amos 6 communications satellite for $200 million. IAI will build the satellite and its ground control systems, and will provide operating services. The company plans to launch the Amo6 in the first quarter of 2015, and its operating life will be at least 16 years.
Spacecom estimates that the cost of launching, insuring and one year's operation of the Amos 6 will be $85 million. The company has to pick a launch company. Spacecom said that it will seek financing for the Amos 6 from IAI and foreign sources.
Some have features that get them some incremental value over time (e.g., a 10% return paid through additional ownership over time), but this would differ wildly depending on funding round, investor, etc.
If the business keeps growing and the whole equity cap table is "in the money," his shares could probably be close to this estimated value.
Caveat: you can go totally nuts with complicated share structures, so this could not at all be the case for Domo.
Let's set up three parties to this scam: 1. The Scammers - these people start the company 2. The Short Sellers - these are the "smart money" who uncover some fictitious/sketchy company and want to profit 3. Brokers - these are the intermediaries through which both The Scammers and The Short Sellers trade
First, The Scammers set up the company and take it public on some sort of lightly regulated exchange (look up pink sheets, over-the-counter trading, etc.). These are not the NY Stock Exchange where an IPO has to be somewhat legitimate.
Second, The Scammers lightly trade the stock up among themselves over time until it looks overvalued enough for The Short Sellers to notice it in their quantitative screens and get interested.
Then, expecting the price to drop, The Short Sellers decide they want to sell short the stock. This would generally mean that they borrow the shares from someone that has them (e.g., borrow 100 shares at $10 a share), sell them to someone else (e.g., all 100 shares at $10 a share), and buy shares again when the price goes down (e.g., buy 100 shares at $2 a share) to repay the person they bought them from (to whom they owe 100 shares, regardless of share price).
So, in order for the Short Sellers to orchestrate this, they turn to Brokers, who match buyers and sellers. Since this company is a scam, only The Scammers have any shares. So the Brokers go find The Scammers (hopefully not realizing they are scammers), and ask them to lend their shares to The Short Sellers. The Scammers gladly do this.
Next, the Short Sellers want to sell their borrowed shares back to someone, so they are set up for when the price drops. Again, The Scammers are glad to buy these shares (putting up some cash to do so).
When enough Short Sellers get involved, or when The Scammers feel like it, they will call up their Brokers and ask for the shares they loaned back. There are some rules around this, but they can generally call them back. Now begins an epic short squeeze - the Short Sellers don't have any shares, but they owe them to someone, not realizing that the person they borrowed from is the same as the person they sold to (The Scammer in both cases).
So, the Short Sellers go out looking for shares to buy to repay their loan (again, denominated in shares, not cash). But since only The Scammers have shares, they can demand any price, and they do. They demand higher and higher prices, until the Short Sellers finally have to pay up exorbitantly for shares to pay back their loan. The Short Sellers buy shares from The Scammers at wildly high prices, and return them (through a Broker) to The Scammers, who are very pleased with themselves, having both sold their shares for 100s of times what they bought them for, and having gotten the shares returned to them.
It's pretty beautiful in an illegal sort of way: So the clever short sellers borrow and sell 100,000 shares of stock at $2 each, hoping to profit when it crashes to zero.
By hypothesis, there are no buyers. But we buy. We buy those 100,000 shares for $2 each, laying out $200,000. Now we own 300.1 million shares, out of 300 million outstanding.
On Thursday we go to our brokers and say "you know what, we changed our minds, we want our stock back from whoever you loaned it to."
So the brokers call in the short sales.
The short sellers can't borrow the stock anywhere else. We own it all. So they have to close out their short sales by buying in the stock.
But they can't buy the stock anywhere else either. We own it all. So they have to buy it from us. How much do we charge?
Yeah, $15. Or $20 or whatever, I don't know. We can charge whatever we want. If the short sellers don't buy the stock, they're breaking the law. So they'll pay whatever we ask.
They pay $20 to buy back the shares they sold us at $2, making us a $1.8 million profit.
source: https://www.reddit.com/r/investing/comments/4wvlkv/a_scam_wi...
[edit: formatting]
From the article (in reference to shutting down a suit against Aruba for selling too cheaply to Hewlett Packard) "It wasn’t a first for Mr. Laster, long the court’s firebrand. In his six years on the bench, he has made weeding out weak cases something of a pet issue. But “this time feels different,” said Ed Micheletti of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, in part because Mr. Laster’s colleagues are joining him."
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-judge-who-shoots-down-merger...
It seems that in this case he felt that the price discovery mechanism of the process and go-shop wasn't sufficient to reach the theoretically "correct" price, which makes sense. The reason any market approaches efficiency is because investors can easily buy and sell undervalued or overvalued securities. In massive transactions of this sort, there are only a handful of buyers who can participate, and it would be unreasonable for such a situation to be as efficient in price discovery as a liquid, publicly traded market.
My sense is that the issue is more with the law, and ability to challenge this sort of thing (which is mostly capitalized on by specialized hedge funds who buy shares and sue) holds a transaction to a different standard than when it actually occurred. Specifically - the board, representing the fiduciary interests of shareholders, should be expected to make a reasonable effort to get the best price. If markets are not efficient and no one has the capital to step up and make a purchase, how would they know that? You can never prove the counterfactual in that type of situation, and it seems dangerous to attempt to do so via ex-ante analytical modeling.[1]
1. I get that this concept is widespread in settlements of all sorts (loss of use, damages, etc.), but in this case, no one was defrauded or coerced. Shareholder agreements were obeyed, and that should be that.
Then the guy basically asks the EXACT same thing, but rather than asking for the final price, he asked for the pace of reduction (CAGR) in price, over a given amount of time (until the Gigafactory is open, and once it is online)... which would allow him to calculate cost/kwh when Model 3 launches.
Musk politely answered a whole series of questions from this and other analysts, only cutting them off if they asked something stupid - like this guy. You're not gonna trick Elon Musk into giving you more data by asking the question a different way.
But when I'm offsetting to an array upon which I'm selecting and summing a subset of these cells with an if-driven sumproduct, and maybe dynamically looking up all of the ranges with more index/matches.... its impossible to look at in the little formula tracing box.
I can't wait to try this out.
When you have clueless reporters telling clueless viewers the news, that hurts everyone and spreads ignorance and bias, no matter the topic.
Boston (4.5M metro area) New York (8-20M depending on how far you stretch the metro area) Philadelphia (6M metro area) Washington D.C. (5.7M metro area)
-Flash sales rarely have any inventory, and usually low enough quantities that they just sell through 100% of their buy and close the sale -Inventory-based store models require significant planning months in advance to source the right amount of each product, color, size, etc. They also then have to deal with the extra (you can't just leave products with one size all over your site b/c people will be frustrated) -Typically flash models need more focus on buying/sourcing (ie finding the cool new products to sell) and store models need more focus on planning (ie figuring out how much/when to buy, then managing inventory).
I'm not sure what their EU team was focused on, but from Jason's comments, it sounds like there was a lot of redundancy in buying/sourcing, which would need less resources as they pivot to a store model.
In terms of their open positions, it seems like a a company growing as fast as they have would want to keep the door open for hiring any position they might need - their open positions look like a broad range of resume collectors...
and the Yahoo car of the year (http://autos.yahoo.com/blogs/motoramic/tesla-model-2013-yaho...)