themeek

It's more of a cyber shield for NGOs that align with US strategic objectives.

Julian Assange is perfectly right in this case.

Google is already very involved in geopolitics.

Google Ideas is a way to protect US investments in culture export "civil society" apps.

The United States Department of Defense is doubling down on investment in the tech sector for national security and strategic purposes.

One of these investments is into something called "Civil Society Apps" - applications that support exporting American culture and values to certain areas of the world.

The United States benefits by being the center of entertainment (Hollywood), for example, and by having US Social Networking sites filter the content according to American values and ideals across the world.

This is a form of 'soft power'.

The DoD's investment in the tech sector, while also focusing on defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, is putting money into culture export apps.

While some of this work is already done, the governments and civil societies and organizations of other countries do not always like this export, and the US has been known to 'weaponize' some of the networks to stir revolution, dissent, etc (e.g. ZunZuneo).

Google Shield is a project whereby these cultural export apps can be given additional protection.

What's interesting to me is how divergent your speculative threat model is from what Washington is talking about.

How fully do your think your threat model addresses the scope of national security concerns of the United States?

Thanks sideloader.

Pretty damning anecdote about reporting on the arctic. Press coverage that happily glosses over international uncertainty and debate in favor of a national narrative and interests conclusively outs coverage for what it is.

Media concentration is extremely high inside the United States as well, and of course reporting is similarly colored.

Encryption is extremely hard to get right. Increasing key sizes does not matter if your scheme, protocol, padding, chaining mode, implementation, nonce values, randomness, key management, user interface, key agreement, key generation, IV generation, constants and settings, etc are done poorly - and it is difficult to get essentially every one of these right.

There is state of the art encryption. Encryption is not about key size.

Did they not track the brothers with their cell phones?

No, that's not quite the claim I'm making. I'm making a strictly stronger claim - backed by the brunt of articles - which is that China was purposefully performing a counter-espionage operation that involved Google because Google had (and has) a partnership with US intelligence.

You being in the role and expertise that you are - excluding Operation Aurora for now because you seem to have a certain characterization of it - you know that China and the US hack each other for strategic purposes and that when China hacks the US it is not about dissidents.

We can't predict an alternate history here whether China would have gone after Google for other reasons. What we do know is that China went after the intelligence system linked up to GMail and used it for counter-espionage purposes. One Google personal relations spokesperson did say they suspected China of using the system to collect information of terrorists and dissidents as well.

Attributing motive of course changes the narrative. Making it sound like China wanted to hack Google for the sole purpose of getting to dissidents makes it sound all spooky and evil. The reporting that has China hacking Google to track down terrorists and dissidents usually 'forgets' to mention the counter-espionage link at all or that the database they accessed was for law enforcement or that they gained access to Google's systems exclusively through this system; so I tend to believe the reporting and sources that include more, rather than less, information.

There's purpose behind casting doubt on the intentions of China and the context of the compromise: this is known as spin. Spin is important - for PR and for propaganda - but if you want people to have a real conversation you've got to do what you can to minimize it.

I'm afraid this is heading the direction of 'let's define a backdoor'. What remains true is that China targeted a system built for the FBI to get unencrypted access to GMail systems and customer data that did not require 'front door' access. Many people here would call a service run for the FBI without oversight or a lengthy and transparent approval process with the requirement for a warrant a backdoor. We don't have to call it that if you don't like - I think the terminology is not so important for the point.

I will leave the semantic discussion to whether such a system constituted a 'front door' or a 'back door' to folks who enjoy such deliberations.

Ultimately I hope that readers see how hacking of 'side systems' built for intelligence agencies to make full data requests have been used to gain access to the larger systems they connect - in the spirit of the original thread.

:) Sorry I missed your point. Thanks for sharing and editing.

Continue to read. You will find that this was the target of the operation. It was not the vector that allowed them to get in (not soley). It is usually the case that a successful breach gives very wide access, so I would suspect this as well.

I think you'll find that on the whole I am right. That the system was there for US intelligence and the Chinese were there for counter-espionage and that the backdoor allowed the Chinese used the system to access email information that they would have had to compromise a different way to get - thus their getting access through a back door.

It is ironic in a certain sense. Comments here unfortunately were and are linking the two in a causal way rather than just pointing out the double standard.

The point of these backdoor programs is that there is an asymmetry in how the vulnerabilities can be exploited. The point being that the calculus has been done - right now the benefit to national security (the place of the US in the 'world pecking order' - it's ability to project power and protect its strategic interests) is greater than its detriment to national security.

Now, it absolutely does weaken 'personal security'. Broken encryption, backdoors, weak protocols, federated auth, these things decrease the digital security of companies and persons.

As a person not involved in performing the calculus of national security (again global strategic interests) it is easy to see these programs as merely a threat with no obvious gain. Those concerned with national security and global competition see this as a small price to pay to wield a large amount of global influence.

This is a good way to understand why the FBI will say things that seem so plainly wrong to the HN crowd.

I happen to agree with the HN folk wisdom - that the national security apparatus is there to protect our democracy not the other way around - but to really engage with the issue its important to understand what the 'other side' is arguing more fully.

This is a very complicated space. Very important policy scholars (Sunstein) even recommends reinterpreting free speech to mean something closer to what we've historically criticized China for.

Going forward we need as much informed debate as possible. The national security apparatus isn't going to listen to the public if the public can't understand the issues they grapple with and engage it charitably.

I hope I didn't rant too long.

There's a lot to reply here and I'm not uniquely qualified to do it, but I figured I'd write something given the effort you've put into sharing your thoughts and feelings.

With regard to the FBI hacking another agency - the CIA hacked Congress when they were investigating them for torture. Rounding that down to something a founding father could say: the executive branch spied on the legislative branch while it was investigating the executive branch for breach of law.

With regard to US world order - it's so hard to tell when an empire is doing the world more good than bad - and between various 'opportunity costs' to the good it could do the world under its order.

In this sense, the US does do some very, very dirty deeds. It is not above killing and even torturing and then killing innocent people, committing mass fraud on the world to justify its interests, or involving itself in the rape of children, and trafficking of arms and drugs internationally (illegally) to supply proxy forces. It propagandizes and it censors and it disappears people. It steals resources and engages in protectionist trade while espousing free markets. It rigs elections overseas and it coups genuine leadership. It assassinates key figures to decide geostrategic events. It has a long list of scandals.

To maintain its justified place at the top of the world order it needs to maintain an image of legitimacy. If you ask those who know about its special operations who is on the US's side you will hear precisely what you have mused about: the good that America does in keeping a world order with static boundaries based on trade and other forms of competition is collectively a better world to live in, even if some people - in the eyes of the power elite - need to be subjected to torture for it to continue.

Digesting this statement requires a neigh impossible task: predicting alternate futures where current order never developed and in its place another one does. Quickly this task becomes an imaginative one that falls prey to the leanings and biases of the person imagining it: those who favor the US imagine a more chaotic world and those who favor another nation a more peaceful one.

It's nearly impossible to ask this question, so the real work to be done is through alternate questions. What can we do now? What questionable programs and opinions exist today that can be dismantled? What powers are needed to maintain a peaceful sphere? Should the world have one protector, or is it possible for some Wilsonian (or other) creation to succeed at the task?

I can't give you those answers. I don't have them myself.

As an aside - one I hope is interesting - the United States relies very heavily on its reputation as a just and kind force to maintain its legitimacy. Were qualms with the US to bubble into a loss of legitimacy the world order would quickly dissipate.

This is what the US fears the most. It has to keep the optics at a higher bar than it can keep its practices. It hopes, it wishes and it needs to find solutions that allow for international stability - where it remains the top dog - and where it can keep its reputation.

We get to see how our leadership and representatives navigate this space and we get to be the primary sources for the historians to annotate it for the future.

I understand this. Such a database would definitely be a juicy target. Concentrating backdoor keys and information is unwise.

I'm not sure we want to base policy on something speculative like that. Agreed that conversations should be had - both about widespead backdoors and about centralizing the keys to these backdoors - if the scenario ever comes to pass.

In the meantime we can't say that the backdooring contributed to this Chinese attributed breach.

The NK-SONY episode was undoubtedly NK or NK-sympathizers.

The malware analysis from Fireeye is a good start for this (it was a variant of malware used by NK to target SK media outlets that run negative press against the regime, was compiled with Korean character sets, and much more), but it's also true that the motive of the hack, written by the Guardians of Peace themselves, was to punish the US for the State Department and CIA's involvement in the creation of The Interview and the plans to get the movie into NK.

Curiously linguistic analysis of the Guardian of Peace messages suggest that the author was possibly Russian and variants of the malware package had also been used in an Iranian attack on US oil companies in the Middle East. (These nations are known to collaborate in malware development and tactics, tools and proceedures.)

:) Thanks good Canadian.

Yes, I am speaking primary to a US audience and from my own experience as a US citizen.

As a tangent - how is Canadian reporting overall? Is it reliable?

"operation aurora fbi backdoor"

https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&e...

There's other threads here were people suggest this.

It seems pretty speculative to me that there's some large database with all of the mandated software backdoors and keys to get access to. And if it existed, I don't know that it would be such a large threat.

Certainly security bugs and professionals inside of industry are targeted by hackers already.

Given everything else, I don't know how large an issue this is (compared to say, hacking nuclear defense systems, energy grid, military C2C, etc).

It would be interesting to see whether this is considered a threat scenario by the USG.

Even the Wikipedia article is pretty good. Honestly I would recommend Googling around for it. There's bound to be declassified aspects to the attacks you can trace down if you are dogged, but it's likely you'll find everything you want with standard internet search.

This seems sort of speculative to me - at least too speculative to base (important) policy on.

The way the US government would be likely to handle this situation is that they would recognize the threat and mandate that no such single database be created or that one be separated were it to exist. I don't know that they would change their mind about backdooring products and services when they can mitigate the scenario and address concerns a much easier way.

It's likely that scare tactics and politics will use whatever justification they can to achieve their goals - including politicization of large media events.

This is right, but it doesn't address my comment.

Did this play a role in the breach? Almost certainly it did not.

The US undoubtedly hacks China, though there's some forms of asymmetry whereby the US has more to lose.

There's also a language and media bubble that filters out information and criticisms of the United States. These bi- and multi-lateral criticisms happen all the time but rarely are subject of US media reporting.

Computer Network Attack/Exploitation, also see CNO - Computer Network Operations.

I see.

This has already been done. During Operation Aurora the Chinese hacked into the FBI backdoor built into GMail by Google and used it to gather information about intelligence operations being performed by the United States against Chinese nationals and also used it to perform surveillance of their own against their terrorist and dissident watch lists.

There are probably more examples.

I do not know of a single database that has 'all the keys' to the all software and encryption back doors. If such a thing existed it would be a very valuable target. Somehow, though, I imagine that there isn't such a centralized database.

The US is trying to establish norms for cyber operations in the international community - this is a missing and critical piece.

But the US does have cyberwarfare policies. As part of a deterrence strategy the US strikes back when it can attribute attacks to a specific party. You may also remember the recent Executive Order from the Obama Administration whereby a series of policies were joined so that the US is organized to levy sanctions against governments, actors and corporations overseas that are involved in sponsoring intrusions into US networks.

Stopping Computer Network Exploitation is very, very difficult (the attacks happen at close to the speed of light).

However with appropriate signals intelligence, sources of attacks can be determined.

We don't know that China was really behind these attacks, but the US has a pretty good track record at attestation so far.

Oh this isn't new. There has been cyberwarfare now for close to two decades, although there's certainly been increasing amounts of activity.

The US of course will reply in kind. It is US defense policy in cyber to retaliate for cyber attacks - specifically this is part of a deterrence strategy.

The USG reserves the use of backdoor-free software and strong encryption for itself, so I'm not sure that this is a worry with regard to the recent data breach.

The FBI means that consumers and foreign markets should not have encryption or backdoor-free software. I understand that this is a double standard, but we need to be clear that the double standard doesn't have to do with this most recent breach.

The US government has some of the best CNA/E defense anywhere in the world - certainly better than almost all of industry - even departments that you would otherwise think are puny.

The backdooring and lack of encryption in software is because the US is still a primary exporter of technology and we want to be able to continue to hack, surveil, message and control those who get US technology. US FedRAMP and other compliance minimums insist on the use of properly configured encryption in private industry to protect government information and cyber sharing programs enable both the sharing of data between private and public sectors for surveillance and for the detection and analysis of foreign cyber attacks. The US government has state of the art encryption (for the most part) and some of the most heavily monitored perimeters.

None of this is enough to stop cyberattacks, which have all of the advantages in their favor.

So while I'm inclined to agree with you that the US should stop mandating backdoors and weak encryption I don't think its a fair characterization to suggest this anything to do with why the US was breached.

China and the US are battling each other in several arenas of influence, as are Russia and the US. In this case the US is trying to stop Russia and China's global and regional power projection and these countries do not accept the US world order and their current place in it.

Conflict is inevitable. It will be interesting to read the history books to see what gets written about the role of the information warfare space and what role it plays in whatever outcome we get.