426,828 karma · joined November 1, 2007
Helu! I'm Thomas.
thomas@sockpuppet.org
t@tk.inc
(Don't apologize for contacting me! I'm happy to meet you.)
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Not for nothing, but it would have been possible for Firecracker to disable the partial checksum feature this vulnerability exploits. If you wanted to push on the argument a bit, you could say that Firecracker ran virtio-net in an aggressive and possibly unsafe configuration. I wouldn't agree, but it's a colorable argument.
First, you're the one who brought up this stupid article claiming that I'm singlehandedly responsible for the failure of DNSSEC. Not me. Next time, don't cite it!
Second, you have a funny definition of "thoroughly answered". People have written posts disagreeing with it. Their arguments are not persuasive. Clearly, for the last decade or so, my arguments have been carrying the day. You can't just write a rebuttal and declare the debate over!
DNSSEC proponents are weird about this stuff. Someone else took me to task for not point-by-point including their rebuttal article in my original post, like that's a reasonable demand to make.
If they have arbitrary code execution in the Linux kernel itself (which it feels like maybe they should?) then the jailer is a nonfactor. But the exploit they write up sure seems like it's just getting code execution in userland from Firecracker itself.
You don't have to keep replying, but I'm going to point out that we have gotten no closer to finding a reason that anyone would even entertain the idea of SSHFP, a system that wires the already perfectly good SSH PKI subsystem into the state-controlled DNS PKI. Why would anybody ever do that?