19,115 karma · joined March 11, 2009
I don't think the money to be made in VR/AR will come from making the headsets themselves, but from providing some sort of software with lock-in. If Magic Leap has that, then they could become the Apple of AR, but so far it looks like they're just developing fancy hardware that the Chinese will quickly clone.
Given how many top venture funds simply invest partners' and partners' friends' capital at this point, most institutional LPs would be best off avoiding venture. The same goes for quant funds - Renaissance Technologies' Medallion Fund has only contained prop money for years.
And actually, no, DHH wrote about Groupon and Zynga as well: https://signalvnoise.com/posts/3221-and-then-the-music-stopp...
As for making money in venture, most venture funds lose money, so it clearly doesn't work that well for most investors. As an asset class, VC has failed to consistently deliver returns. Of course, the bottom 95% doesn't get plastered on magazine covers or fêted by the Twitterati, so most people don't know about them.
Of course, this is all wonderful for the consumers - we get VC-subsidized rides and meals. It's just not that great of a deal for the LPs.
http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/TWTR
http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ZNGA
Cherry-picking isn't that hard. Plus, when DHH wrote that post, Facebook was a totally different company. They only really started justifying their valuation in 2013, after they got lucky with how mobile advertising worked to their advantage.
> Running Sergey Brin’s family affairs is a full-time job—and it takes dozens of people. The Google co-founder, who’s worth about $30 billion, has ex-bankers and philanthropy experts working at his family office, Bayshore Global Management. Brin also has employed a former Navy SEAL for security, a yacht captain, a fitness coordinator, a photographer, and an archivist, according to profiles on LinkedIn.
Forbes had a similar exposé on one of Zuckerberg's financial advisers, Divesh Makan[1]:
> Makan shuns the title of wealth manager, according to those who have worked with him. He sees himself instead as part do-it-all financial consigliere, part deal broker/venture capitalist and part human Rolodex. Makan’s currency is access and relevance. While Silicon Valley stalwarts like Sequoia and Benchmark can point to a long list of successful IPOs and a deep bench of management experts, he hawks the “Zuck & Friends” brand to piece together deals between young startup entrepreneurs and billionaire sugar daddies, as well as between the billionaires themselves.
0: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/google-ser...
1: http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/12/01/the-spid...
VCs are easy to hate: they're rich, successful, powerful, and mostly straight, white men who had privileged upbringings.
They had many competitors that were earlier to market, but ultimately lost out to YouTube.
Edit: here's the source[0]:
> Youtube acquired traction over it's competitors by their funding strategy, product strategy (growth rate) and a liberal interpretation of the DMCA. As illustrated and extensively researched by Mr Jaffari,, YouTube tried many tactics to gain differentiation over it's competitors. In the end, YouTube's growth hack was the only metric that mattered, conversion of viral buzz into users.
> When YouTube debuted it was already late to the party with numerous competitors growing quickly. The company copied and experimented with the interfaces of it's rivals to establish a baseline. Then they applied liberal amounts of Venture Capital to organize a star development team that would iterate product faster than it's rivals. Finally they adhered very loosely to the DMCA laws leveraging primarily copyrighted content to build viewership against more generally viewable Flash player technology.
…
> The first and largest strategic advantage for YouTube was their investors, Sequoia Capital. Other Start-Ups were already in this space with more traffic, but with a major investment the sector had validity. This created coveted Bay Area buzz, while larger more established start-ups were largely ignored being outside of the echo chamber. For example VideoEgg.com (Who chose to move to the bay), Break.com (Then Big-Boys.com), Revver.com (Also LA Based), StupidVideos.com and Vidiac.com/StreetFire.net (Atlanta Based).
> On top of the buzz Youtube leveraged VC investment to land a major blow to it's rivals. They went Ad-Free. It took YouTube over 12 months to pass Vidiac's traffic but with an interface clean of ads and a cost no object design team, YouTube's competitors could not iterate on designs quick enough. The development staff would see a feature on other sites, copy it, improve it, release it. An example of this behavior is the Flash embed video players that could be placed in MySpace that was already being employed by other services. Youtube let their competitors figure out the hard problems such as UX flow, user requirements, feasibility, copied it and spent more. With better funding of development, servers, bandwidth Youtube offered their users better site performance and quicker adoption of technology. For example an early metric of success was the acquisition of content contributors. Expensive encoding solutions could process an uploaded video into a streamable format but sometimes this process could take hours and the users had to wait for their video to be ready. YouTube could buy more encoders and cut this time down to 15 minutes offering bloggers quicker video to market times. Using Flash over QuickTime and Windows Media, embed code was more universally able to deliver a consistent if inferior video experience. Inferior until the delivery of Flash 8 when the On2 CODEC was introduced giving Flash full screen and high quality videos.
0. https://www.quora.com/How-did-YouTube-gain-its-initial-tract...
It doesn't make sense to compare the core apps on iOS to the alternatives on Android. The core apps on Android are just as good as (I would say better than) the core apps on iOS.
Like you said, in a constrained environment like the military, it might be possible to achieve this in a short period of time through deliberate actions. I'm not sure how much that approach would prepare potential cofounders, since they're going to be operating in a much more ambiguous and freeform environment.
There seem to be similar challenges to creating a scalable solution for finding an SO/spouse (another unsolved problem).
> S16: False. 14.2% of accepted companies weren’t even incorporated when they applied.
This didn't actually address the misconception - it sidestepped it. I would love to see data on what percent of YC companies raised a seed round prior to being accepted (or had a cofounder who had raised a round for a prior company), and how that's changed over time.
Of course, keep in mind that Suster himself doesn't have the right pedigree (he studied econ at UCSD and got an MBA from Chicago). Then again, maybe that's why he has a shitty portfolio (Upfront is certainly no Sequoia).
There are some other nuances as well, like how the existing social structure was preserved in Mexico. Check out Why Nations Fail[1] for the details.
Probably shortly after they realized it brings in eyeballs.