Who are you quoting here?
980 karma · joined June 18, 2018
Who are you quoting here?
https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/en/stable/templates/#templ...
> and so have 4 different libraries they rely on
HTMX has no dependencies. https://htmx.org/essays/vendoring/
> and actually the most up to date version of two libraries you rely on are not interoperable right now because they depend on different node versions
HTMX has no build step. https://htmx.org/essays/no-build-step/
What's funny about it?
> Plans for the 14.5-mile (23km) route were approved in March after a 16-year process that has already cost £1.2bn.
For comparison the planned 4.2km Lower Thames Crossing has already cost £1.2bn (€1,400 million) just for the planning phase with nothing built. The French know how to build.
Speculation: it’s because Linux (the kernel) is a large centralised project, so there’s a critical mass of people willing to pay for Linux Weekly News.
From there the proven quality allowed the publication to cover other OSS projects. I suspect that without Linux LWN would not be sustainable.
True. https://www.sqlite.org/mmap.html lists 3 other issues as well.
> and buggy stray writes by other code in the process could corrupt the database.
Not true: "SQLite uses a read-only memory map to prevent stray pointers in the application from overwriting and corrupting the database file."
You must set it to a value higher than the size of your DB. I use:
PRAGMA mmap_size = 1099511627776;
(1TB)Here's a post to the git mailing list from Martin Uecker describing the same from 2005: https://lore.kernel.org/git/20050416173702.GA12605@macavity/ . From the tone of the email it sounds like he didn't consider the idea new at that point:
> The chunk boundaries should be determined deterministically from local properties of the data. Use a rolling checksum over some small window and split the file it it hits a special value (0). This is what the rsyncable patch to zlib does.
He calls it a merkle hash tree.
Edit: here's one that's one day earlier from C. Scott Ananian: https://lore.kernel.org/git/Pine.LNX.4.61.0504151232160.2763...
> We already have the rsync algorithm which can scan through a file and efficiently tell which existing chunks match (portions of) it, using a rolling checksum. (Here's a refresher: http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/tech_report/node2.html ). Why not treat the 'chunk' as the fundamental unit, and compose files from chunks?
> There should be a huge mess of choices available because it increases the cost of web development.
I reckon there are ~40,000 lines in the printout. So: ~10 years.
“Simple declarative schema migration for SQLite”
https://david.rothlis.net/declarative-schema-migration-for-s...
Discussed previously:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31249823
Disclosure: I am the co author of that article
To what end?
mmap_size = 1TiB requires 1TiB of address space per connection. This is fine on 64-bit, unless you have millions of connections. Doesn’t work with 32-bit (4GiB) address space.
You want mmap_size to be greater than the size of your database. If you know your database will be small then you could set it to a smaller number, but you could still become address space constrained with many connections.
PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL; PRAGMA foreign_keys = 1; PRAGMA mmap_size = 1099511627776;
Unless you know a reason that you can’t (like NFS or using a 32-bit cpu).
I think the answer is also Wayland. It's very confusing because there is wayland the protocol and wayland the system, where the protocol is a part of the system - but there is no separate name for it. When people discuss wayland they are very rarely talking about wayland the protocol, and are much more likely talking about wayland the system.
1. There is nothing fundamentally insecure about the design of X that couldn't be fixed with a bit of effort.
2. The effort required would be significantly less than what has gone into Wayland over the last 16 years.
Fixing the security of the system certainly would involve changes to more than just xorg. Anywhere there is a security boundary you'd need to make modifications - but that's OK, most of these security boundaries are younger than wayland anyway.
This discussion of $DISPLAY seems like distracting minutiae. Sure it's a medium size problem that would need solving, but that's all it is.
To address your specific point: it could be the responsibility of the window manager to set $DISPLAY to a less powerful socket when starting processes. Ultimately it doesn't matter though, because if the display server isn't doing some sort of sandboxing then the spawned process can just ptrace xorg and do whatever it wants. X being secure only matters in the presence of a security boundary and in that case it would be the responsibility of whatever is setting up that boundary to create a less privileged socket. Whether that be ssh or flatpak or whatever.
I'm not. My comment doesn't address the latency of gnome shell. I understand the boring technical distinctions between wayland and wayland client libraries and wayland display servers and gnome shell and mutter and sway, blah blah blah. Much like I understand that Linux is a kernel. That it is inspired by UNIX, but it is technically not a UNIX. I also understand that if someone describes themselves as a Linux user they probably don't just mean that they have a Android phone or that the display controller in their dishwasher or wireless access point happens to include Linux the kernel.
The "well acksually wayland is just the name of the protocol" that emerges whenever a problem is brought up is a symptom of the underlying problem with wayland the system. The confusion that gives rise to these deflections is also a symptom of that problem.
By Conway's law systems end up resembling the organisations that produce them. In this way the design of wayland the system seems to be designed by people who don't want to work together. I can see a parallel with microservice architecture.
I suspect it would be less challenging than writing a whole new wayland server.
Off the top of my head, I'd use a separate abstract domain socket for the window manager including some UUID, and then pass that to the window manager when launching it.
You could create these sockets on demand - one for each security context. On linux typically a different security contexts will either have different UIDs - in which case filesystem permissions would be sufficient - or they have different mount namespaces - in which case you make different sockets visible in different namespaces.
For SSH forwarding you could have SSH ask the X server for a new socket for forwarding purposes - so remote clients can't snoop on local clients.
> Good luck on your lonely[1] journey! > > [1]: The people who actually developed Xorg are now working on various Wayland-related things.
This is what I mean by a failure of technical leadership.
> Wayland, which is a protocol
This is wayland's biggest weakness. The effect is diffusion of responsibility.
I've been hearing this for over a decade now. I don't get it. Just because xorg currently makes different clients aware of each other and broadcasts keypresses and mouse movements to all clients and allows screen capturing doesn't mean it has to. You could essentially give every application the impression that they are the only thing running.
It might seem difficult to implement, but compare it to the effort that has gone into wayland across the whole ecosystem. Maybe that was the point - motivating people to work on X was too difficult, and the wayland approach manages to diffuse the work out to more people.
I was really bullish on Wayland 10 years ago. Not so much any more. In retrospect it seems like a failure in technical leadership.