https://maps.wikimedia.org/osm-intl/4/2/6.png
https://maps.wikimedia.org/osm-intl/4/3/6.png
Placing labels on a map is quite a hard problem, especially when certain tiles are refreshed.
1,013 karma · joined September 5, 2012
https://maps.wikimedia.org/osm-intl/4/2/6.png
https://maps.wikimedia.org/osm-intl/4/3/6.png
Placing labels on a map is quite a hard problem, especially when certain tiles are refreshed.
> h4sh was written during a cold, but sunny weekend in August 2005.
hs-plugins looks so cool, but I'm afraid it's bit-rotten and abandoned. :(
Trust is also a difficult problem with transports, as they often need to store your passwords in plain. A single server storing your Facebook, Google, Twitter and Microsoft passwords just does not sound like a great idea to me.
1. More complicated protocols. iMessage and Skype are many times more complicated than AIM/ICQ, MSN or YIM, with lots of layers of custom encryption and authentication. Reverse engineering of these protocols has never been close to done. 2. Battery usage. Each new account you add is (likely) another connection that you have to keep open. With one connection you can apply optimizations like the server bundling packets, but you can not do that when you need to keep connections to many different services.
4. You download the script successfully.
It is trivially easy for a MitM to interrupt the download of the script between two TLS packets, without any CA or server compromises. When you do:
curl https://project.com/script.sh | sh
Then sh happily executes instructions as they come in. It may be that the script starts by moving important directories aside or by creating large temporary files, so if the script is incomplete the user may end up with a broken system. Or maybe if you're really unlucky an attacker might manage to truncate "rm -Rf /..." to "rm -Rf /".With hashpipe, you are at least guaranteed to have the complete script before you run it. I still don't like the practice, but it is better.
It may be hard to exploit, but executing a script before you have completely downloaded it is simply a really bad idea.
http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php/Komodia%27s_Redirector...
(Down near the bottom, "sslpsd - To the password of the root CA (it's mandatory).")
http://www.komodia.com/wiki/index.php?title=SSL_Digestor#Cer...
Yeah, I don't think this is a good idea.
If I find a few small flaws that are problematic, but not enough to claim the prize, I'll definitely keep them to myself until the contest ends. Instead of incentivizing people to share vulnerabilities with them, they incentivize hoarding bugs.
Even if you'd consider their protocol secure enough (which I don't), this third-party app was written by someone who thought rand48 was good enough for long-term crypto keys. I'd stay far, far away from this.
Pros:
* PolarSSL seems to be very clear code, well modularized and a much more sane API than OpenSSL.
* Supports setting cipher orders by TLS version.
* Cipher support is good (all the new ECC and SHA2 stuff is included), but it doesn't support SSLv2 or EXP ciphers (I'm counting this as a "pro", though).
Cons:
* Not quite as much support for working with X509 certificates. It parses the extension fields it knows about, but if you want to know more than those, you'll have to dig into ASN.1 yourself.
* Related to the previous point: I couldn't find support in converting different ASN.1 string formats. Probably will have to depend on another library to do that.
* I found a buffer overflow bug within a few hours of working with it [1], which is really not a good sign for a TLS library. However, it did get acknowledged within 24 hours (I've got an OpenSSL patch which has been sitting on their bugtracker without any reply for 6 months).
* Setting a different curve for ECC requires a compile time flag to be set, which is disabled by default.
* Using the server's cipher order or the client's is also a compile time flag, can not be set at run time.
This is trying to combine 3 points on Zooko's Triangle [1]: You want human-meaningful names (which phone numbers are, because they map to existing things), so you have to make a trade-off between decentralization and security. WhisperSystems opted for security for some reduced decentralization. For something that’s aiming to replace text messaging, I can’t really blame them for that choice.
So people would be forced to make a choice: use it on your phone, or on your computer. Aside from the group of people who don't have a smartphone, most people would chose phone.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but as far as I know the required effort to break multiple DH exchanges doesn't scale linearly in the number of exchanges. A single successful index-calculus attack on the used group will make breaking additional key exchanges much easier.
Except, you know, DMCA notices: https://github.com/github/dmca/blob/master/2014-02-12-WhatsA....
Yes, this is complete bullshit. Especially how they try to use a DMCA notice for trademark infringement.
In real CRAM-MD5 this is not true. It uses HMAC-MD5 of the key directly. To be able to calculate that, you need to do
MD5((key XOR opad) || ...)
Which means that you either store "key XOR opad" (not meaningfully different from storing key), or an intermediate result from MD5, which is tricky.Quakenet's authentication mechanisms, except for LEGACY-MD5, call MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 before using it as the key, so they could store just each of those different hashes (unsalted). The LEGACY-MD5 mechanism does require the plain text password to be known by the server.