1,351 karma · joined May 20, 2013
I think that Haskell's strangeness harms it in two ways. One it puts off people because the superficial strangeness takes some getting used to. More dangerously it makes a small fraction of Haskell programmers dangerously arrogant. They feel that just because they are now familiar with this strange jargon they have become superior to the users of other languages. Depending on temperament this turns them into snobs or evangelists.
I don't think there is any concrete evidence of Haskell's superiority as a practical tool. Programs like pandoc, darcs or xmonad are great but there is no proof (and as far as I know neither have their authors claimed) that they were easier to develop than comparable programs in imperative languages (TeX, git?).
Much better is the attitude of Haskell leaders like Simon Peyton Jones who present Haskell as a ongoing research project with its set of successes and unsolved problems: http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/simonpj/papers... http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/simonpj/papers...
If you deny the meaningfulness of talking about different ways of ranking then of course any notion of altruism becomes self-contradictory: "He gains enjoyment by starving himself to feed the poor, that's why he does it." But in practice we distinguish between masochists and saints.
Helping others may help you survive if selfish people are ostracized by others (as seem to happen in human societies) or if a good turn today entitles you to a good turn tomorrow. But the evolutionary theory of altruism is not something I understand very well. My only point was that contrary to what the OP suggests, the formal techniques of game theory such as Nash equilibrium are agnostic with respect to nature of payoffs. And both casual observation and systematic experiments in economics show that many humans act out of a sense of fairness and expect fairness from others even when interacting with strangers.
[The story would have been different in a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria where a change in beliefs can move you from a bad equilibrium to a good equilibrium.]
The Pareto Optimal is not an outcome which is best for both, since the whole point of this concept is to avoid giving a definition of "best for both". Rather it is an outcome from which no player can be made better off without making some other player worse off. So, for example, for two greedy people sharing a cake, any division of the cake, including one which gives the entire cake to one person, is Pareto optimal.
Anyone seriously interested in understanding what game theory really says and avoiding superficial mistakes in its interpretation should read at least the first chapter of Binmore's 'Playing for Real'.
* Oz Shy, The Economics of Network Industries.
If you are interested in research at the interface of economics and theoretical computer science you have:
* Shoham, Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems.
* Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory.
* Cramton, Shoham, Steinberg, Smith. Combinatorial Auctions.
For the traditional economic theory of asymmetric information among economic agents:
* Bikchandani, Riley and Hirshleifer. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information.
I'm a teacher of economics and the only time I use slides is when I have to present a lot of data or literal text like the statements of theorems. Even in these situations I think distributing printed handouts works much better. But that involves logistics and expense.