928 karma · joined August 16, 2012
This is why I consider a working public steganography protocol so important. Using a very short message you could arrange the sd card to be dropped at some random place and know that somebody would come back in a couple of days to retrieve it. Encoded with ordinary simple text, using messages of typical lengths on popular, public websites. There are just too little bits of encoded information there to be statistically significant.
I'm not so worried about statistical analysis of how natural sounding or typical or expected the text you're producing is, as it would be a very difficult problem considering it requires a good understanding of natural languages to be done well automatically. What would be really problematic is that WL may very well be infiltrated and the private key compromised. Then you would be really screwed.
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mai...
There is also no prior need to contact WL--this is the whole point of the scheme. All this is public so NSA is supposed to be well aware of WL monitoring all these messages. That's why he would be encoding using wordlengths modulo 2 (see my post below) so they are statistically indistinguishable from normal text. NSA would not be able to detect suspicions activity without having the WL private key.
Also, there is no need to raise undue suspicion by using untypical photo sizes as he can publish as many and as different files (e.g. video, music, etc.) as he requires once the harder process of establishing channel of communication with WL has already been accomplished.
1. Write a normal message discussing his favorite videogame on Ars Technica.
2. Encode his public key in it.
3. Use the WL public key (already available to him via the hypothetical stegano-crypto suite in common distros) to derive a shared secret.
4. Use the secret to encode and hide 20 top secret slides in his holiday family photos and upload them to his flickr account.
5. Write another post on Ars discussing some other videogame, hiding in it the URL to his flickr photos.
6. Meanwhile, WL monitors the several thousand posts per day on the most used internet forums, and detects a possible public key and tries to decrypt all the messages within the next 24 with the common secret that could be derived using it. One of them has correct checksum after decryption and gives the URL to the photos.
7. WL also daily randomly visits several thousand photos on flickr, including this time the one with the sent URL. After it gets it, it uses the shared secret and gets the message.
This whole process could be accomplished without leaving the room, without transmitting any suspicious data or contacting suspicious addresses, and would be indistinguishable from his normal online activity. As long as his computer or the WL private key are not compromised it should be perfectly untraceable.
I fail to see how arranging for a microsd card to be sent over to WL would be easier to accomplish, assuming he could be tracked and recorded constantly.
If it comes to wasting 2 MB per CD on the odd chance it could aid a whistleblower of similar importance every couple of decades, I'm all for it.
Imagine you wanted to leak something but don't want to attract attention to yourself. You could encrypt it (with the public key of the organization you want to leak to), hide it with steganography and then upload the result to some public place you know the organization would be monitoring.
If you had ready access to tools to do so you could do all that inconspicuously.
You could even encode info in plain text by the lengths of non-whitespace characters, modulo 2. As an example, try using the so-defined scheme on the letters count of this very sentence; they're encoding, repeatingly, S.O.S.
Posts of similar length as this one are enough to send a public key using ECDH and negotiate a shared secret for use with a block or stream cypher. You could then send short messages using this shared secret inconspicuously. Shannon entropy of English is about 1.5 bits per character so you could store quite a bit if you cared to compress it well before encrypting, preferably using a shared static dictionary.
The purpose of steganography is not to get noticed in the first place. It's orthogonal to regular cryptography.
Still, for all the crypto export nonsense, 1998 appears to have been a more innocent time:
> "But access to authentication keys is one thing that government has long agreed that they don't want to have."
Perhaps it would be more befitting to a person in his position (a CS professor, it appears) to actually critique the book itself. Judging by his rant, it's doubtful he even read it. Otherwise he would have known that the most controversial thing about it is a preference of constructive proof, when possible, as they are generally both more illuminating and rely on fewer assumptions.
Those were secret programs justified by secret laws written by secret courts. The whole system has gone so far already that a negative proof is impossible in the current legal framework. There is simply no credible way anymore an official could present evidence of the absence of mass surveillance.
In Germany, they prefer burning fossil fuels and therefore need less electricity during the winter. Should those burned fossil fuels be arbitrarily excluded when considering the total energy dependence of the country, considering they could be substituted with other energy sources?
[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/europe-power-suppl...
[1] http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/Daten_EE/Dokume...
MS Research did this right with the experimental hardwhite support while F# was still in alpha. People liked it so much that it became the default style for the compiler and the standard library. It would be impossible to try to make the switch now that the language is widely used.
It might be childish for me to choose one language for a project than another over trivial things like semicolons, but for the language itself it's an irreversible decision once the spec gets set in stone.
Some compromises had to be made, e.g. the lack of tailcalls is a regrettable but nonetheless well justified decision. But why didn't they include a standard indentation style in the language specification itself and get rid of the cruft? They have one for Servo anyway, which is the raison d'etre of the whole language, so it's bewildering to me why it isn't included as a part of the specification.
It just pains me to see a promising new language being burdened with an ugly looking syntax when the language itself is quite elegant.
And to all those people that suggested seeing things from prosecution's vantage point -- now might be the time to also consider how Aaron might have felt reading those comments.
For example, the official MS party-line has been to withhold releasing standalone compilers unless they are bundled with some "free" visual studio crap. Compiling the compiler from source every time I want to check something on another machine is simply not an option and it's one of the primary reasons I haven't moved to the new 3.0 version.
That's precisely the kind of problem a truly independent foundation could easily solve, but so far they haven't demonstrated any willingness to move in a way that could be considered competing with Microsoft's own products.
In any case, this kind of antagonism between the two approaches might be useful as it keeps the field more vital, preventing yet another stagnation.
Politics aside, the MSR people did a beautiful job designing the system and it's very saddening how it's currently misused by the mother corporation. It's good that it gets a chance to thrive beyond their suffocating grasp.