I wouldn't say it addresses the problem at length. At best it goes one level deeper than "you can't prove a negative" to say "you _can_ actually offer some evidence or probability for said negative" but even then it hands off the threshold of [what's been proven vs. not proven at that point] to epistemology.

After that, the author concludes that you should never dismiss an inductive argument just because you think any probability it provides is immaterial. After all, we rely on induction all the time in day-to-day life! Well, duh. So let's hear it for induction, everybody. At least it gives us some probability.

I dunno. It's just not as intriguing a line of thinking as I hoped it would be based on the title of the paper. Despite all the excitement about proving a negative, the author goes completely silent on the issue of how much probability proves what!

It's more that it avoided the issue by deflecting to a different example, while assuming unproven and fallacious (to the original point) premises to construct an inductive argument, which the author later admits is not any kind of proof according to the original question.